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This dissertation is about expectations in ¯nancial markets. The purpose of this
research is to examine what one can learn from expectations, what they tell us
about individual participants in ¯nancial markets, about the future, about periods
of ¯nancial turmoil, and about the way market participants form their beliefs. In
this research, I use survey data as a proxy for expectations of market participants.
Survey data are obtained through sending questionnaires to key players in ¯nancial
markets, to ask these market participants what they think will happen in the future
with a particular economic variable. In this study, I focus on expectations of future
exchange rates and future interest rates.
Looking back over the four years I worked on this research I have to admit that
it was a tremendously interesting and fun experience. The many useful discussions
I had with my colleagues and experts in the ¯eld, the many business trips I made
abroad, and the many things I have learned during this time have certainly given
shape to this dissertation and to me as a person. I am grateful to many people who
have made this experience particularly enjoyable.
My ¯rst words of gratitude go to my supervisor Christian Wol®. I would like
to thank him for the many things I have learned from him and for the con¯dence
he always expressed in me and my work. He has allowed me much independence
in how I conducted my research, but at the same time he was close by to provide
meaningful advice and constructive criticism. His role as a mentor has extended far
beyond that concerning the content of this dissertation alone. Over the years I have
also become impressed by his personality and attitude towards life, and I look back
at a very pleasant cooperation.
My other supervisor, Willem Verschoor, has also been a great motivating force
behind this dissertation. Despite the physical distance between Nijmegen and Maas-
tricht, I always felt his presence and encouragement. The most apparent example of
this is that he envisaged the ¯nal version of an article and the academic journal in
which this article should be published long before the ¯rst letter was ever written!
The conversations we had about my work, but also about holidays, family and his
boat, have always been very enjoyable to me.
Aline and Remco de¯nitely deserve thank-you's! Our cooperation on some of the
work in this dissertation has been a wonderful experience and the articles we wrote
together look very promising! I sincerely hope that we will continue our cooperation
in the future. I am also grateful to Ilja and Hetty for helping me so much with the
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design and format of this book.
I owe a special word of gratitude to Dennis and Chris, my two `paranimfen' They
have always supported me greatly and have provided me with much valuable advice
during the last stages of ¯nishing this dissertation. But more than that, both of
them, each in their own way, have been two very important persons to me during
the years I worked on this dissertation. I hope that our friendship will all but grow
for the years ahead.
They say that caring parents are always proud of their children. I am fortunate to
concur with this! I learned much from my parents' sense of perspective and the need
for re°ection. Their unconditional support, care, advice, and pride, I will always
cherish and they have greatly shaped me as a person. Many of my achievements,
however small they may be, are also theirs. To them I can only say: I am very proud
of you too!
My last words are for the person who has been standing at my side for all these
years ... Loes. She made me feel proud of my work, and I made her share in the
excitement of my research, mostly by attending opera performances in La Scala,
eating Wiener Schnitzels in Vienna, experiencing the culinary discoveries in the
Zeughauskeller in ZÄ urich, running from one highlight to the other to see as much
as possible from yet another city during the free hours we had on a conference trip,
and many other experiences. To me it feels she wrote two dissertations: her own in
terms of content and at the same time mine in terms of encouragement, re°ection,
and understanding. Her wonderful personality, intelligence, and the bravery in the
choices she makes in her life can only make me feel all but exceptionally proud of
her. I am grateful that we have been on such a long journey together with many
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Introduction
1.1 Expectations in Financial Markets
Expectations play a very important role in all aspects of life. Everyone has his or
her own expectations about speci¯c events or about the outcome of these events in
the future, for instance the status of the weather, the result of a football match, or
even the life expectancy of oneself. These expectations are usually very subjective.
At times we can have the same expectation as other people, while at other times the
expectations are not in line.
The expectations we have guide, to a large extent, the actions we perform at the
present time. If we have a certain expectation about an event in the future, we plan
our actions in such a way that we can bene¯t the most from the event in the future.
Expectations may be the result of sheer guess and intuition, but can also be the
result of experience, learning, and other skillful use of all the information we possess
that may have anything to do with the future event for which we have a particular
expectation.
In ¯nancial markets expectations play an equally important role. The behavior of
what we observe now in these markets is often driven by what we expect will happen
in the future. An expected political uproar or civil war in oil producing countries,
for instance, will increase the price of crude oil and an expected increase in United
States (U.S.) interest rates will raise the rate of return on U.S. dollars above the
rate of return on euros, leading investors to shift investments to U.S. assets, which
results in an increase in the U.S. dollar / Euro exchange rate (i.e., an appreciation
of the U.S. dollar and a depreciation of the Euro).
In fact, many theoretical models in the ¯nancial economics literature assume a
relationship between the current value of a ¯nancial instrument and the expecta-
tions about the future value of that instrument. An example hereof is the dividend
discount model, that states that the price of a certain stock at present is the dis-
counted value of all expected future dividend payments. Another example is the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, of which one version
states that the return on a long term bond contract is equal to the weighted average
12 Introduction
of the expected future return on short term contracts.
Yet, one of the most critical aspects of expectations is that they are unobservable.
One cannot measure what `the' expectation is of, say, the future exchange rate.
For that reason, we cannot verify the correctness of many of the models that have
been devised in the ¯nancial economics literature. Financial policy makers and
academics have therefore used several attempts to approximate these expectations.
The two mainstream approaches that have always been used is 1) to try to model the
expectations using economic theory and other variables and 2) to make assumptions
about the way the expectations are formed.
One of the most frequently used assumption about expectations is that of ratio-
nality, which, in a nutshell, states that expectations are made by an agent who is
representative for all agents, who'se expectations are not biased, and who uses all
information that is available to him in an optimal manner. Among the reasons of
the popularity of the rational expectations assumption is the relative ease of (math-
ematical) modeling and, especially in empirical work, the lack of alternatives. For
these reasons the rational expectations assumption has become one of the major
workhorses in the ¯nancial economics literature. For instance, Lucas (1972, 1976),
Sargent and Wallace (1975), and Barro (1976) demonstrate that the assumption
of rationality of agents' expectations in the Muth (1961) sense has strong implica-
tions for economic behavior and policy, but, at the same time make the assumption
that the rational expectations hypothesis remains upheld. In later empirical work
by Friedman (1979, 1980), Fama (1984a,b) and Wol® (1987a) the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis remained the principal tool with which the expectations generating
process was characterized.
Yet, the assumption of rational expectations is not a solution to many of the
questions and debates that remain in the literature. For instance, in a world where
expectations are generated in a rational way and where market participants are
expected to behave all in the same, rational manner, we cannot explain some of the
so called `anomalies' (or: puzzles) that exist in the literature. An example of such an
anomaly is the ¯nding that the amount of foreign exchange that is currently traded
on a daily basis is far in excess of the amount that is required for the trade of goods
and services. Frankel and Froot (1990b), MacDonald and Marsh (1996), and Chionis
and MacDonald (1997) claim that this is the result of the interaction between highly
di®erent and irrational market participants. Similarly, in the foreign exchange risk
exposure literature, pioneered by the work of Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion
(1990), expectations were also assumed to be formed in a rational manner. But
the result of this assumption is that although there should be, from a theoretical
perspective, a strong argument in favor of the claim that the return on companies'
stocks are a®ected by the °uctuations in exchange rates, there is much less empirical
proof hereof.
From these examples it is clear that the way we think about how expectations
are generated and how typical market participants behave, needs to be re-examined.
One promising alternative to the approaches in the previous section is the use of
survey data. The next section will introduce this approach.A Survey Data Approach 3
1.2 A Survey Data Approach
In a typical survey representative market participants are questioned about their
subjective forecasts about the future value of a particular ¯nancial instrument or
the path a certain instrument will follow in the future. The participants in the survey
can be questioned for point forecasts of the price of a certain stock, exchange rate,
or macroeconomic variable, or simply be asked whether the value of an instrument
will increase or decrease over a certain time period.
Among the advantages of using survey data is that ¯nancial policy makers and
academics do not have to make any assumptions anymore about the way expec-
tations are formed. Furthermore, no modeling of expectations is required, as the
expectations formation process is left over to the individual survey participants. Al-
though of course all survey participants can use di®erent expectations generating
techniques, any aggregate measure of these individual expectations should give a
reasonable proxy for `the' market's expectation.
Typical concerns when using survey data in any setting are whether this data
re°ects the true market's expectations, whether the expectations are biased because
of strategic behavior from the panelists, or whether forecasts from surveys are of any
good in an out-of-sample forecast setting|a criteria that has often been put forward
to evaluate the quality of survey expectations. It should be noted that for survey
data in the present setting it is only important that the survey forecasts re°ect the
market's sentiment at the time they are formed, that is, the survey data should
re°ect expectations, nothing more than that. There may be reasons for panelists
not to reveal their true beliefs, though. One motive may be that agents do not
want to expose their (private) information to other market participants. This e®ect
can be mitigated by the reputation e®ect that surveys can have. When the names
of the forecasters are given in the survey publication, which is more often the case
nowadays, panelists have an incentive to perform well in order to attract customers.
Also, while it is not the primary concern that the expectations outperform other
forecasting techniques, there is general consensus that expectations from surveys
in general perform no worse than any other forecast technique. Ang et al. (2007),
for instance, provide recent evidence that expectations from various surveys on in-
°ation consistently deliver better forecasts than time-series models, models based
on the yield curve, and forecasts based on the Phillips curve, which highlights the
usefulness of survey measures of expectations. Elliott and Ito (1999) ¯nd that in
the foreign exchange market portfolio's based on survey expectations produce small,
but positive, pro¯ts.
The use of survey data is not uncommon in the ¯nance literature and increas-
ingly the use of surveys in various areas of the ¯nance literature is observed. Early
work predominantly focused on macro-economic forecasts. For example, Friedman
(1979, 1980), Froot (1989) and MacDonald and Macmillan (1994) have used interest
survey data in tests for identifying term premiums and examining the rationality of
expectations of future interest rates and concluded that forecasts were biased and
respondents did not e±ciently exploit the information contained in past interest
movements. Similarly, Dokko and Edelstein (1989) reviewed the usefulness of the4 Introduction
Livingston forecasts of stock market rates of return and ¯nd evidence of adaptive
behavior in the forecasts. Keane and Runkle (1990) use survey forecasts of the
GNP de°ator and ¯nd that expectations are rational, and MacDonald and Torrance
(1988b) used survey data on expected changes in money aggregates with U.K. data
and ¯nd that these survey measures of expectations are extremely useful, for, unlike
statistical methods for generating estimates, they are truly exogenous.
In the last years the use of survey data has become more common in many
other ¯eld in the (¯nancial) economics literature, for instance in equity markets
(Strong and Xu, 2003), in°ation (Branch, 2004, 2007), labor market (Di Tella and
MacCulloch, 2005), trade policy (Porto, 2006), manufacturing (Mitchell, 2007), and
consumer characteristics (Bhattacharya, 2007; Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger,
2007). The use of survey-based measures of expectations has by now become a
¯rmly-established tool in many areas of (¯nancial) economics.
In the foreign exchange and interest rate literature in particular, Dominguez
(1986), Frankel and Froot (1987b), Froot (1989), Hafer et al. (1992), Cavaglia et al.
(1993b, 1994), and MacDonald and Macmillan (1994) have addressed several impor-
tant topics using survey-based measures of expectations, namely whether expecta-
tions are formed in a rational manner and whether time-varying risk premiums exist
in the expectations of market participants. Yet, several important issues still remain
unanswered. It is the goal of this research to ¯ll these gaps. We will outline these
gaps in particular.
1.3 Aims and Outline of the Dissertation
The aim of this research is to get new insights in the role of expectations in ¯nancial
markets. In this study we focus in particular on the foreign exchange and interest
rate markets. We address several topics that have previously not been examined
before. These topics are 1) whether expectations in interest rate markets are formed
in a rational manner or whether any other expectations generating technique better
characterizes expectations, 2) whether term premia that are inherently present in
interest rates vary over time and what the source of this time-variation is, 3) whether
expectations in foreign exchange markets are dispersed and what the source of this
dispersion is, 4) whether market participants use di®erent tools over time to forecast
future and foreign exchange, and 5) whether we can prove that foreign exchange
risk exposure is understated when not speci¯cally measuring exposure in terms of
unanticipated exchange rate exposure.
All these topics will be examined empirically and the use of survey-based mea-
sures of expectations will play a central role in each of them. It should be noted
that we do not address several other important topics in the ¯eld, such as the role
of expectations of stock prices, in°ation rates, and other macroeconomic variables.
Although much can still be learned from these ¯elds, it is beyond the scope of this re-
search. It should also be noted that this study does not look at the forecasting role of
expectations, rather, we look at which lessons can be learned from the expectations
and what the expectations say about the behavior of market participants.Aims and Outline of the Dissertation 5
In chapter 2 we start with an exploratory study of the role of survey-based
measures of expectations in the foreign exchange market. The chapter gives an
overview of the theoretical and empirical work that is done in ¯ve areas of foreign
exchange research, where in all the ¯ve areas the use of survey-based measures
of expectations has a central role. First, the chapter analyzes the evidence on the
failure of the forward exchange rate as an unbiased predictor of future spot exchange
rates and in particular looks at whether the failure is primarily attributable to
time-varying risk premiums, to the failure of the rationality assumption, or to a
combination of both. Second, the chapter reviews the various attempts to model
the time-variation in the risk premium in foreign exchange and investigates whether
the use of survey-based measures of expectations adds in this modeling. Third, the
chapter looks at the performance of market participants when forecasting future
exchange rates and tries to ascertain whether individual market participants can
outperform a simple random walk forecast. Fourth, the chapter looks at the role
of heterogeneity in survey-based forecasts and how this heterogeneity can shed new
light on some of the puzzles in the foreign exchange market, like the excess volume of
foreign exchange trade. Fifth, the chapter reviews the literature on fundamentalist-
versus chartist-type of forecast techniques and how the interaction between these
two techniques has changed over the years.
In chapter 3 we apply some of the lessons from the ¯eld of foreign exchange
to the area of interest rates. We try to shed new light on one of the areas in the
¯eld of interest rates expectations and the term structure of interest rates that has
received quite some attention in the literature, namely whether expectations of future
interest rates are made in a rational manner. The chapter begins with one of the
well-documented anomalies in the ¯eld, namely that implied forward interest rates
are biased estimates of future interest rates. This is the so-called forward premium
puzzle. We de¯ne what we mean by `rational' and start the analysis by replicating
`traditional' ways by which the forward premium puzzle has been examined. We then
introduce a unique data set of survey-based interest rate forecast for a large set of
international interest rates, where forecasts are made for several periods of di®erent
length in the future. The survey data allows us to perform two additional tests,
namely one in which we examine whether the expectations by market participants are
biased and another that examines whether market participants use all information
that is available to them in an optimal manner. These two tests together assist in
answering the question whether interest rate expectations are formed in a rational
manner and thus whether the failure of the forward rate as an unbiased predictor of
future interest rates is attributable to irrational behavior. Finally, the chapter tries
to ¯nd alternative approaches to the rational expectations model and investigates
whether survey-based expectations are better characterized by learning behavior or
mean-reversion behavior.
In chapter 4 we extend the analysis from chapter 3 and investigate an alternative
explanation for the forward premium puzzle, namely whether the premium that
market participants require for investing at a certain horizon changes over time.
We call this premium the time-varying term premium. We provide a theoretical
decomposition of the forward premium puzzle into one part that can be attributable6 Introduction
to irrational expectations (as investigated in chapter 3) and one part that can be
attributable to time-varying term premia. We apply the analysis on the same data
set as in the previous chapter to keep the results comparable. Unit root tests for the
stationarity of the spot and expected interest rate series are provided as a ¯rst step
in examining the relationship between term premia and the forward premium puzzle.
We then turn to a test that examines the time-variation and look at the role of serial
correlation and volatility clustering. Next, we turn to a novel ¯eld, namely that of
trying to explain the time-variation in the premia by means of survey-measures of
expectations. First, we examine various time-series models, then we introduce a
linear model, and ¯nally use a GARCH-type model that considers the conditional
variance of the premia.
In chapter 5 we make two switches in research. First, we jump to the ¯eld of
exchange rates and second we introduce the role of heterogeneity in the expectations
of market participants. Chapter 5 looks at the role of the di®erence between the
expectations of one market participant versus those of another. We call this di®er-
ence the `dispersion of beliefs'. The chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of
what dispersion of beliefs is and why it is important in asset pricing. We discuss
three important reasons why dispersion of beliefs arises. Using a unique data set
of survey-based exchange rate expectations, the chapter tries to address three im-
portant questions. First, it attempts to get an answer on how dispersion of beliefs
can be discovered in a statistically meaningful manner. This is done by looking at
the distribution of the individual di®erences in beliefs. We use tools from Extreme
Value Theory. Second, the chapter tries to get an answer as to what the sources
of the dispersion are, by looking at whether market participants have private infor-
mation on which they build their individual beliefs, whether they simply interpret
information in a di®erent way, or a combination of both. Third, we try to answer
the question whether the dispersion of beliefs, which is not constant over time, has
an e®ect on the volatility of the market. We examine the (causality) relationship
between dispersion, volatility and fatness of tails.
Chapter 6 builds upon the previous chapter and looks at whether dispersion of
beliefs occurs because market participants use di®erent types of rules to forecast fu-
ture foreign exchange. We make the distinction between fundamentalist and chartist
rules, where the former relies on various (macroeconomic) variables and the latter
exclusively on the own history of the exchange rate. We develop a theoretical frame-
work where the expected change by a particular market participant is a time-varying
weighted average of a fundamentalist and chartist rule. We construct several fore-
cast rules that are both easy to construct and for which we know that all market
participants have access to. These rules are a purchasing power parity-based rule, a
rule that relies on a version of the monetary model, an extrapolative expectations
rule, and a moving average rule. These rules are then implemented in thee di®erent
models. The ¯rst model is a linear one where the weights of the various forecast
techniques are assumed to be constant during the entire forecast period. The second
model is a heterogeneous agent model that allows for switching between the chartist
and fundamentalist techniques, where switching is based on the relative success of
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weights are assumed to follow a simple, low order time-series process.
Chapter 7 brings together two areas of research in international ¯nance, namely
that of survey-based exchange rate expectations and that of foreign exchange risk
exposure. In the chapter we introduce a sample of 935 U.S. multinational companies
that have operations abroad. We investigate whether the domestic-currency returns
of these companies are exposed to foreign exchange risk by speci¯cally modeling
the `unanticipated' changes in the exchange rates to which individual companies
should be exposed. The use of survey-based measures of exchange rate expectations
allow us to ascertain the claim that standard exposure studies underestimate the
extent of exposure because they use `realized' changes in the exchange rate instead of
`unanticipated' changes. This approach is revolutionary in the literature. The study
also generates company-speci¯c exchange risk factors, by exposing the individual
companies' returns only to those areas in the world in which it has foreign operations.
The chapter provides tests both for the case where `realized' exchange rate changes
are used to proxy the foreign exchange risk factors and the case where `unanticipated'
(based on the survey-based expectations) changes are used.
Finally, chapter 8 takes the evidence from all these studies together and presents




In the last decades we have seen an increase in the number of studies that attempt
to explain various anomalies in the foreign exchange market. The academic interest
in this market does not come as a surprise, because the foreign exchange market
has grown to be the largest market worldwide in terms of volume and trade. For
instance, the amount of foreign exchange that is traded worldwide is far in excess
of what is required for trade in goods and services. It therefore seems that the
foreign exchange market is a market `on its own' and that this market, because of
its large volume, is highly liquid and e±cient (Froot and Thaler, 1990). For this
reason, market participants are said to have equal access to information and form
their expectations about future events in a uniform, rational manner.
However, with the rise of several anomalies in the foreign exchange literature,
such as the forward premium puzzle or the excess trade volume, the notion of rational
expectations is losing more and more ground. Instead, the focus is shifting in the
direction of bounded rationality, and the accompanying heterogeneity of agents'
expectations. New insight in how market participants form their expectations is
therefore warranted.
Over the last decades, an interesting and promising new literature has emerged,
relying on survey measures of exchange rate expectations. Instead of making as-
sumptions about the way expectations are formed, or relying on some underlying
model for these expectations, these studies try to measure expectations by use of a
market panel. Pioneered by the work of, inter alia, Blake et al. (1986), Dominguez
(1986), and Frankel and Froot (1987b), many studies since have employed some form
of survey measures of expectations in explaining some of the anomalies in the foreign
¤Part of this chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Surveys as joint work with
Willem F.C. Verschoor and Christian C.P. Wol®.
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exchange market.
In this chapter we will give an overview of the work that was conducted in ¯ve
areas of foreign exchange research, all of which have received considerable atten-
tion over the past few decades. The emphasis in these ¯ve areas is on the role of
expectations about future exchange rates. First, we will discuss the failure of the
forward rate as an unbiased estimate for future spot exchange rates, and in par-
ticular look at whether the failure is attributable to the role of time-varying risk
premiums, or due to the failure of the assumption of rational expectations. Second,
we look at attempts to model the time-variation in the term premium using either
fundamentals-based models or time-series models. Third, we look at the performance
of market participants when forecasting future exchange rates and try to ascertain
whether individual agents can outperform a simple benchmark like a random walk
forecast. Fourth, we look at a relatively new ¯eld within the foreign exchange litera-
ture: market microstructure and the role of heterogeneous expectations. Finally, we
review some of the literature on the role of fundamentally di®erent types of agents
and the interaction between these types.
The use of survey data has not been uncommon in the international ¯nancial
economics literature. For example, Friedman (1979, 1980), Froot (1989), and Mac-
Donald and Macmillan (1994) have used survey data on interest rates in order to
quantify term premiums and to examine whether these expectations are formed in a
rational manner. They concluded that predictions were biased and respondents did
not e±ciently exploit the information contained in past interest movements. Simi-
larly, Dokko and Edelstein (1989) review the usefulness of the Livingston forecasts
of stock market rates of return and ¯nd evidence of adaptive behavior in the fore-
casts, Keane and Runkle (1990) use survey forecasts of the GNP de°ator and ¯nd
that expectations are rational, and MacDonald and Torrance (1988a) use survey
data on expected changes in money aggregates with U.K. data and ¯nd that these
survey measures of expectations are extremely useful, for, unlike statistical methods
for generating estimates, they are truly exogenous. It is thus surprising that only
towards the end of the 1980s the use of survey data was established in the foreign
exchange literature.
On the other hand, the number of surveys on exchange rate expectations has
grown considerably over the past twenty years. Most promising, these surveys 1)
increasingly encompass exotic exchange rates (i.e., not only the top ¯ve most actively
traded rates), 2) they have also included more cross-rates (instead of only currencies
relative to the U.S. dollar), and 3) have reported expectations on a disaggregated
level, instead of only reporting a consensus measure such as the arithmetic mean. It
is therefore not surprising that at the end of the 1980s the literature that incorporates
the forecasts from such surveys had expanded rapidly and is still growing. In this
chapter, we intend to capture all of the main ¯ndings from these studies from the
past twenty years.
Although this study is not the ¯rst to review this considerable, and growing,
literature, it nevertheless ¯lls some important gaps. For instance, in his review
of the literature on forward market e±ciency, Engel (1996) explicitly excludes the
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time-varying risk premiums based on survey data.1 Takagi (1991), as well as Mad-
dala (1991) and MacDonald (2000a), also summarize some of the ¯ndings in the
area of survey-based exchange rate expectations, but primarily focus on the forward
premium puzzle. Therefore, we focus on aspects that were not covered in-depth in
the previous studies. Speci¯cally, our studies may be seen as as a direct follow-up
of MacDonald (2000a).
The outline for the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 will
introduce the forward premium puzzle and discusses the importance of time-varying
risk premiums and irrational behavior on behalf of market participants, in explaining
this puzzle. Subsequently, in section 2.3 we look at various attempts to model the
time-variation in these risk premiums. Section 2.4 examines the performance of
market participants in forecasting exchange rates. In section 2.5 we examine the
microstructure of the foreign exchange market and look at the role of heterogeneous
agents. Section 2.6 will subsequently look at the role of di®erent players in the
foreign exchange market. Section 4.7 o®ers some concluding comments.
2.2 The Forward Premium Puzzle
One of the most challenging debates in the ¯nancial economics literature is the failure
of the forward exchange rate as an unbiased predictor of future spot exchange rates.
This failure is often referred to as the forward premium puzzle. The use of forward
rates to predict future spot exchange rate is not arbitrary, because the much-debated
e±cient market hypothesis claims that if foreign exchange markets are e±cient,
then it should not be possible to generate exorbitantly high above-normal pro¯ts
(where above-normal pro¯ts are de¯ned relative to an expected equilibrium rate of
return) through arbitrage in the forward market. In particular, the e±cient market
hypothesis encompasses the joint hypothesis that expectations are formed rationally
and that market participants are risk-neutral with respect to domestic or foreign
assets. This section will review some of the work on the forward premium puzzle
with an emphasis on the use of survey expectations.2
A formal and simple test of the unbiasedness assumption of forward rates can
be introduced by regressing the actual change in the exchange rate on the forward
1Note that the survey of Engel (1996) is limited only to those studies which have assumed ratio-
nal expectations and attempted to attribute the forward rate bias primarily to a foreign exchange
risk premium.
2We would like to refer to MacDonald (2000a) for an earlier and in-depth overview of this
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premium, plus a constant, or3
st+k ¡ st = ®1 + ¯1(ft;t+k ¡ st) + ²t+k; (2.1)
where st is the natural logarithm of the current spot exchange rate and ft;t+k is
natural logarithm of the k-period-ahead forward rate. The null hypothesis of forward
discount unbiasedness is presented as H0 : ®1 = 0;¯1 = 1, and ²t+k is a mean-zero
white noise process, orthogonal to the information set on which agents base their
expectations. A constant should be added to account for the convexity term arising
from Jensen's inequality. Under this null hypothesis, equation 2.1 in essence states
that the future spot rate can be written as the weighted average of the current spot
rate and the current forward rate for the delivery in period t + k, such that
st+k = ¯1ft;t+k + (1 ¡ ¯1)st: (2.2)
Finding that ¯1 = 1 would thus imply that the current spot rate has no explanatory
power and the future spot exchange rate is solely predicted by the respective forward
rate.
The unbiasedness hypothesis has been rejected in most studies, and most seem to
agree on the direction of the bias. A review of this literature is available in Hodrick
(1987) and more recently in Engel (1996). In fact, it has become a well-established
regularity in the international ¯nance literature that the forward premium is a biased
predictor of future changes in exchange rates. Some researchers attribute the rejec-
tion of unbiasedness to irrational behavior of exchange rate forecasters, while others,
such as Fama (1984a), Hsieh (1984), and Wol® (1987a), claim that the rejection is
caused by the risk preferences of market participants, that is, by the existence of a
time-varying risk premium. Since true market expectations are inherently unobserv-
able, the ¯rst line of researchers assumed investors to be risk neutral with respect
to investing in domestic or foreign assets, while the second line of researchers as-
sumed expectations to be rational. Clearly, the inherently necessary use of joint
tests of rationality and for the existence of a risk premium made it impossible to
truly determine what caused the existence of the forward premium.
To ¯nd explanations for the failure of the forward discount unbiasedness hy-
pothesis we must examine the above equation in greater detail. If investors, for
some reason, require a reward for the added risk of holding an open position in a
foreign currency, those investors will demand a premium for this risk. When rates
are quoted as units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency, investors will
require the future expected spot rate to be lower than the forward rate (a risk
3Since from most studies it appeared that both the current spot rate and the forward rate series
follow a unit root process, the correct way to estimate forward rate unbiasedness is through tests
in which the variables are transformed into returns, or expected returns in the case of survey-based
expectations. A seminal work on unit root behavior in the empirical modeling of exchange rates
is provided by Meese and Singleton (1982) and Liu and Maddala (1992a,b). Dutt and Ghosh
(1997) approach the issue of unit root behavior di®erently by adjusting the tests for unit roots,
instead of the variables. Fischer (1989) furthermore provides an excellent work on the application
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premium is required for holding an open position in a foreign currency and do-
mestic and foreign assets are not considered perfect substitutes anymore), in that
ft;t+k = Et[st+k] + 't+k, or more formally in terms of returns:
ft;t+k ¡ st = Et[st+k] ¡ st + 't;t+k; (2.3)
and where the risk premium can be de¯ned as
't;t+k ´ ft;t+k ¡ Et[st+k]: (2.4)
Studies that use the forward rate as a proxy for the expected future spot rate will
consequently not consider this risk premium. Hence, the risk premium should be
isolated from the expected spot rate in unbiasedness tests, which creates a problem:
the expected future spot rate, Et[st+k], is inherently unobservable. The rejection of
forward rate unbiasedness can therefore be attributed to both biases in expectations
or to the existence of a risk premium, (or both). Algebraically, this implies a decom-
position of the forward discount bias in an expectational bias and a risk premium
component.
Following the above decomposition, the existence of a time-varying risk premium
as the principal reason for rejection of the hypothesis that forward rates are unbiased
predictors of future spot rates, can be tested through a regression of the expected rate
of depreciation on the forward discount. The expected future spot rate is replaced
by the survey-based forecast:
se
t;t+k ¡ st = ®2 + ¯2(ft;t+k ¡ st) + ²t; (2.5)
where se
t;t+k presents the survey-based proxy for the (unknown) market expectation
Et[st+k]. Overall, the null hypothesis of perfect substitutability (i.e., no constant,
nor a time-varying risk premium) can be stated as H0 : ®2 = 0;¯2 = 1, where ²t
is a mean zero white noise process uncorrelated with the information set on which
agents base their forecasts.
Cavaglia et al. (1993a, 1994), Cavaglia and Wol® (1993), Frankel and Chinn
(1993), Frankel and Froot (1987a, 1990b), Froot and Frankel (1989), Gan and Wong
(1993), MacDonald and Torrance (1989, 1990), Madsen (1996), and Verschoor and
Wol® (2001a,b) ¯nd that in most instances, the hypothesis of perfect substitutability
is rejected. In fact, rejection usually occurs at signi¯cant levels exceeding the 1
percent. Parameter estimates for ¯2 are usually between zero and one.
Such a ¯rm rejection of perfect substitutability comes as a surprise. Since the
daily volume of foreign exchange that is traded worldwide is far greater than the
volume that is traded in other ¯nancial markets, the foreign exchange market should
be very liquid and e±cient|a point made by Froot and Thaler (1990). In addition,
transaction costs are comparably low and various currencies are commonly traded
by the same ¯nancial institutions. For these reasons, assets denoted in the domestic
or foreign currencies should be considered identical with respect to their degree of
risk and it would appear that foreign currency-denoted assets are perfect substitutes
to domestic-currency assets.14 Perspectives on Foreign Exchange Rate Expectations
The alternative explanation for the failure of the forward premium unbiasedness
hypothesis is due to irrational expectations. Expectations are rational in the sense of
Muth (1961, p. 316) when these \expectations, since they are informed predictions
of future events, are ...the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory."
Pesaran (1987) speci¯es that for expectations to be rational, four conditions need
to be met. First, forecasts should be unbiased, implying that the expected rate of
depreciation is identical to the actual rate of depreciation, with the di®erence being
a white noise error (distributed with a zero mean and constant variance). Second,
survey-based forecast errors should be orthogonal to variables from the information
set available to agents. Third, the forecast errors should be serially correlated only
up to a moving average process of order k ¡ 1, due to the presence of overlapping
observations. Finally, expectations should be e±cient, where e±ciency is a special
case of orthogonality in that the information set now only includes past values of
the variables that are expected to form the expectations. We will focus on results
from the ¯rst two conditions here.
Avraham et al. (1987), B¶ enassy and Raymond (1994), Blake et al. (1986), Cavaglia
et al. (1993b), Chinn and Frankel (1994b), Dominguez (1986), MacDonald (1992),
MacDonald and Marsh (1994), Marsh (1999), Kim (1997), Sobiechowski (1996), and
Verschoor and Wol® (2002), test whether survey-based expectations are biased pre-
dictors, by regressing the actual depreciation on the survey-based expected rate of
depreciation. Speci¯cally,
st+k ¡ st = ®3 + ¯3(se
t;t+k ¡ st) + ²t+k; (2.6)
where, under the null hypothesis of unbiasedness, ®3 = 0 and ¯3 = 1, and the
forecast error is a white noise process with zero mean and constant variance and
is orthogonal to the information set on which individuals form their forecasts. One
should usually be careful to account for moving average errors, since the overlapping
nature of the expectations is such that the error terms are usually serially correlated
up to an order of k ¡ 1.
It appears almost as an empirical regularity in the literature that the null hy-
pothesis of survey-unbiasedness is rejected, for nearly all currencies at all horizons, in
that the expected rate of depreciation does not equal the actual rate of depreciation
and even misses the direction of the actual depreciation in many cases. Although for
EMS cross-currencies and for rates from high in°ation countries the survey-expected
rate of depreciation is usually in the same direction as the actual rate of depreci-
ation, the expectations are nevertheless signi¯cantly biased. One might even ask
whether the actual rate of depreciation is not better described by a random walk
forecast. Indeed, for the majority of currencies the correlation between the actual
and expected rates of depreciation is close to zero, a ¯nding that is consistent with
the random walk hypothesis.
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the presence of biases in expectations does
not immediately imply that expectations are formed irrationally. Krasker (1980)
shows that expectations, even when they are biased, are still formed rationally when
a small probability of an event that would cause a large depreciation in an exchange
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which the Mexican peso sold prior to its massive depreciation in 1976. In addition,
errors in expectations may arise when the market gradually and rationally learns
about the true process that generates expectations or learns about new depreciation
regimes|a point made by Lewis (1989). Finally, the assumption of homogeneous
expectations, as made so far, may not hold. Indeed, it will be shown later that this
assumption is empirically questionable (see section 2.5). Hence, ¯nding that the
expected rate of depreciation is a biased estimate of the actual rate of depreciation
is no direct evidence of the failure of the rational expectations hypothesis.
The second condition for an rational expectations to be rational is orthogonality.
When agents use all available information e±ciently, any variable from their infor-
mation set should be orthogonal to the forecast error. Error orthogonality can be
tested, for instance, by regressing the forecast error against its own lagged value:
st+k ¡ se
t;t+k = ®4 + ¯4(st ¡ se
t¡k;t) + ²t+k: (2.7)
B¶ enassy and Raymond (1994), Dominguez (1986), Frankel and Froot (1987b),
Gan and Wong (1993), MacDonald (1990, 1992), MacDonald and Torrance (1988b),
Lim and McKenzie (1998), and Sobiechowski (1996) ¯nd that at shorter forecast
horizons, speci¯cally 1 week and 2 weeks ahead, rejection of such a test hardly
ever occurs. At the somewhat longer 1-month horizon, rejection occurs more fre-
quently, though the evidence is still not overwhelming. Rejection of the hypothesis
of weak-form orthogonality is strongest when the forecast horizon lengthens beyond
3 months.
Since error orthogonality requires the forecast error to be orthogonal to all vari-
ables from the investor's information set, a test can be performed by analyzing the
relation between the forecast error and, say, the forward premium:
st+k ¡ se
t;t+k = ®5 + ¯5(ft;t+k ¡ st) + ²t+k: (2.8)
Cavaglia et al. (1993a,b, 1994), Cavaglia and Wol® (1993), Frankel and Froot
(1990b), Froot and Frankel (1989), Gan and Wong (1993), Madsen (1996), So-
biechowski (1996), Taylor (1989), and Verschoor and Wol® (2001a) ¯nd that re-
jection of this version of error orthogonality becomes more likely when the forecast
horizon lengthens. At the longer end of the forecast horizons (12 months), rejection
becomes almost an empirical regularity. Furthermore, it is also a virtual empirical
regularity that estimates for ¯5 are negative for nearly all currencies in most studies.
Such a ¯nding would indicate that agents could have reduced their forecast errors
by betting against the forward rate and focus more on the contemporaneous spot
rate instead.
The rejection of error orthogonality prompts for an understanding of the behav-
ior of the processes underlying the generation of expectations. A general framework
for analyzing the formation of market expectations is by seeing these expectations as
the weighted average of the contemporaneous spot rate st and some other variable
xt from the investor's information set. One common expectations formation process
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expected future spot rate can be characterized as a weighted average of the con-
temporaneous spot rate and the l-period lagged spot rate. An empirically testable
version of the above extrapolative expectations model can be presented as
se
t;t+k ¡ st = ®6 + ¯6(st ¡ st¡l) + ²t: (2.9)
Using this test, Cavaglia et al. (1993a,b), Chinn and Frankel (1994b), Frankel
and Froot (1987a, 1988, 1990b), Ito (1994), and MacDonald and Torrance (1988b)
¯nd ample evidence of a twist in expectations. In particular, at horizons of up to
1 month nearly all estimates for ¯6 are positive, thereby indicating that short-run
expectations exhibit bandwagon e®ects in that the most recent depreciation is ex-
trapolated into the future. On the other hand, at horizons of 3 months or longer,
nearly all estimates for ¯6 are negative and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, indi-
cating that after the 3-month horizon expectations are stabilizing in that the most
recent appreciation of a currency is expected to be followed by a future depreciation.
Alternatively, the expected future spot rate can be formed adaptively, as the
weighted average of the contemporaneous spot rate and the lagged expected value
of the current spot rate. In a way, this model can be considered as learning process
where forecasters try to learn the `true' level of the variable, instead of its underlying
process. An empirically testable version of the above adaptive expectations model
can be introduced as
se
t;t+k ¡ st = ®7 + ¯7(st ¡ se
t¡k;t) + ²t: (2.10)
At the short spectrum of the forecast horizon (1-week up to 1-month) expecta-
tions appear to be destabilizing in that slope estimates are positive, while at horizons
exceeding the 3 months, expectations are stabilizing in that nearly all estimates are
signi¯cantly negative. In contrast to the previous ¯ndings of statistically signi¯cant
destabilizing bandwagon expectations at horizons of up to 1 month, empirical evi-
dence of signi¯cant destabilizing expectations in the adaptive scheme at the same
spectrum of the forecast horizon is only weak.
It is interesting to consider to what extent exchange rates are expected to appre-
ciate or depreciate relative to their current deviation from long-run fundamentals.
Dornbusch (1976) showed that the expected future spot rate can be expressed as a
weighted average of the contemporaneous spot rate and a long-run equilibrium, ¹ st,
that is commonly based on economic fundamentals. A speci¯cation of the long-run
equilibrium value is given by the purchasing power parity (PPP) assumption, where
the exchange rate moves over time relative to the in°ation rates of two countries. Us-
ing these tests, Frankel and Froot (1987b), Chinn and Frankel (1994b), and Gan and
Wong (1993) ¯nd that expectations do regress towards their long-run equilibrium
values.
When combining the empirical ¯ndings from the extrapolative, adaptive, and
regressive models of expectations formation, the evidence strongly indicates that,
for currencies relative to the U.S. dollar, expectations are stabilizing for forecast
horizons exceeding 1 month. On the other hand, for shorter horizons, expectations
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Altogether, the consensus emanating from the literature on survey data is that
the failure of the forward discount unbiasedness is attributable both to irrational
expectations and to the existence of time-varying risk premiums. Furthermore,
when the forecast horizon lengthens, rejection of the rational expectations hypoth-
esis grows ¯rmer and survey-based expectations show more evidence of stabilizing
behavior in that the most recent price trend is expected to be reversed in the future.
2.3 Modeling Risk Premiums
When the possibility of time-varying risk premiums as an explanation of the for-
ward premium puzzle emerged in the foreign exchange literature, academics have
considered rationales for why this time-variation makes sense from an economic
point of view. Ever since, there has been an ongoing debate on the source of the
time-variation in the foreign exchange risk premium. Although some tentative ex-
planations exist, such as the `safe-haven' argument, most of the studies that looked
into this issue still assume that expectations are formed in a rational way. Only
a few studies have employed survey-based measures of expectations in an attempt
to model this time-variation. In this section, we will examine some of the work
on modeling the time-variation in risk premiums without the stringent assumption
that expectations are formed in a rational manner. The discussion will focus on
fundamentals-based models and time-series models.
A traditional methodology for modeling risk premiums by using macroeconomic
fundamentals is through the portfolio balance model (PBM), (see e.g. Frankel, 1982).
According to this approach, a portfolio of various foreign and domestic assets is
composed through a mean-variance optimization process. When some assets are
imperfect substitutes, an increase in the amount of a particular asset results in
either an increase of the required return, or an increase of the risk of that asset.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993) were the ¯rst to apply a version of the PBM to
model risk premiums by using survey-based measures of expected future spot rates.
Their model is stated as
ft;t+k ¡ Et[st+k] = °0 + °1¾2
t + °2¾2
tVt + ²t; (2.11)
where ¾2
t is the variance of changes in exchange rates between two consecutive dates,
which is a proxy for the volatility of the spot exchange rate, and Vt is the value of
domestic assets in an investor's portfolio as a proportion of total wealth. A higher
level of variability of the spot exchange rate will increase the uncertainty of the
returns on assets that are denominated in the domestic currency, which on its turn
will increase the risk premium. In addition, an increase in the proportion of domestic
currency-denominated assets relative to assets in the foreign currency (an increase
in Vt), will increase the risk premium.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993) implement this methodology for the risk premium
of the Deutschemark versus the U.S. Dollar, using weekly 1-month-ahead and bi-
weekly 1-month-ahead survey-based measures of the expected future spot rate for
the period 1982{1988, taken from the MMS dataset. Vt is approximated by the18 Perspectives on Foreign Exchange Rate Expectations
central bank intervention as a percentage of wealth, which is calculated as the total
supply of U.S. and German government debt. They ¯nd that over the period 1984{
1988, the estimated coe±cient of the variance of the spot rate, °1, is statistically
signi¯cant in all regressions, usually even up to the 1 percent level. For the period
1982{1984, no such signi¯cance is found.
Giorgianni (1997) estimates equation 2.11 for the Italian Lira versus the U.S.
dollar (IL/US) and Deutschemark (IL/DM) by regressing the survey-based risk pre-
mium on the expected future domestic and foreign ratios of government net borrow-
ing to gross domestic product and ¯nds that for the 3- and 12-month-ahead IL/US
premium, the Italian (domestic) net government borrowing requirement always en-
ters signi¯cantly and positive of sign, indicating that a higher Italian government
de¯cit is associated with higher risk premiums on assets denominated in Italian lira.
For the IL/DM premium, the results are similar, though less signi¯cant. Finally,
MacDonald (2000b) uses a variation to the PBM approach by regressing the risk
premium on the conditional standard deviations of the domestic stock price changes
and the foreign (i.e., U.S.) stock price changes, with survey data from the 1985{
1991, 1-month-ahead MMS dataset. He ¯nds that the stock market volatility is
statistically signi¯cantly related to the BP/US, DM/US, JY/US, and BP/DM risk
premiums.
An alternative methodology that also relies on fundamentals for modeling risk
premiums is the general equilibrium asset-pricing (GEAP) model, due to Lucas
(1982), that relates the risk premium to several macroeconomic variables. A closed
form, empirically testable speci¯cation of this model can be expressed as
ft;t+k ¡ Et[st+k] = °0 + °1Et[Xt+k] + °2¾2[Xt+k] + ²t; (2.12)
where Xt is a vector of ¯scal and monetary variables and ¾2[Xt] proxies the volatility
of these variables through their variance and covariance terms.
Giorgianni (1997) implements a testable version of the GEAP model by regressing
the survey-based risk premium on the variance and covariance terms of the domestic
and foreign government expenditures, for the IL/US and IL/DM rates. Interestingly,
all regressors are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and with the correct sign: a higher
(lower) volatility of the future Italian (U.S.) ¯scal policy is associated with higher
risk premiums on assets denominated in Italian lira. This makes sense, for a ¯scal
expansion in a country may increase the risk of assets that are denominated in
that country's currency, thereby depreciating the domestic currency. However, the
model has little explanatory power overall. For the models that focus on the IL/DM
rate, the evidence is even less convincing. The introduction of monetary variables
to the model|the covariance of the foreign and domestic money growth with the
government expenditures|does not substantially alter the earlier ¯ndings for neither
currency.
MacDonald (2000b) proxies the GEAP model by regressing the risk premium
on the conditional standard deviation of ARCH- and GARCH-based forecast errors
and ¯nds that for the JY/US, BP/DM, and BP/US rates there is evidence that the
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is important in determining the risk premium. For the DM/US market, no such
evidence is present.
A second strand of the literature tries to model the risk premiums using time-
series models. Cavaglia et al. (1994) use survey-based measures of the risk premium
for some eighteen EMS and non-EMS exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar
and Deutsche mark from the 1986{1990 Business International Corporation (BIC)
survey and try to model the risk premium using di®erent time-series models of the
ARMA class. They ¯nd that the AR(1) model appears to be the best model for
nearly all currency-horizon combinations. Apparently, low-order time-series models
(especially when measuring the risk premium through survey datasets) appear to
be capable of capturing the variability in the risk premium. Indeed, Peel and Pope
(1989) ¯nd that for ¯ve out of nine currencies relative to the U.S. dollar, using data
from a monthly survey conducted by Euromoney over the period 1984{1988, the
3-month-ahead survey-based estimates of the risk premium are white noise, while
the other premiums follow an MA(2) process. Also Giorgianni (1997) tries to model
the risk premium for the IL/US and IL/DM rates using low-order variations of the
ARMA family, with or without a time trend. He ¯nds that the 3- and 12-month-
ahead IL/US risk premiums are best described by an AR(1) model without a time
trend. For the 3-month IL/DM risk premium the mere sample mean gives the best
¯t and for the 12-month premium a MA(1) model with a constant seems to o®er
the best ¯t. Yet, the explanatory power of these two models for the IL/DM rate is
very low. A possible reason for this poor ¯t is the presence of many institutional
arrangements in the EMS in an attempt to reduce volatility of EMS-currencies.
As a result, a time-series model for the IL/DM risk premium will likely not be a
time-invariant model and stochastic properties are hence not guaranteed.
A third strand of the literature attempts to explain the time-variation through
direct application of ARCH or GARCH type of models|initiated for the foreign
exchange market by Domowitz and Hakkio (1985). Nieuwland et al. (1998, 2000)
and Verschoor (1993) specify an ARCH-in-mean model (or ARCH-M), due to Engle
et al. (1987), that extends the original ARCH model to allow the conditional variance
to a®ect the conditional mean directly, by
se
t;t+k ¡ st = °0 + °1(ft;t+k ¡ st) + °2¾2
t + ²t: (2.13)
When assuming that the error term conditional on the information set at time t is
normally distributed, the ARCH e®ect can be introduced as
¾2





where p equals the number of lagged squared disturbances and !i the weight attached
to each of them. Following Baillie and Bollerslev (1990), the above ARCH e®ect
can be generalized as a GARCH e®ect by including one or several (q) lags of the
conditional variance.
Nieuwland et al. (1998, 2000) and Verschoor (1993) show that over the period
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FF/DM, IL/DM, and SP/DM rates from the BIC dataset, these models|and in
particular the GARCH model|appear to be reasonably successful in modeling the
risk premium in about half of the currency-horizon combinations. Berk and Knot
(2001) use the same dataset, as well as the Consensus dataset, and ¯nd largely
signi¯cant ARCH-M terms (°2 signi¯cantly di®erent from zero) for the four most
actively traded rates plus the FF/US rate at the 3- and 12-month horizons. Taylor
(1989), however, using monthly 12-month-ahead survey-expected measures of the
risk premium for the BP/US rate from a survey conducted by Godwins, a ¯rm
of British management consultants, ¯nds that over the period 1981 to 1985 his
speci¯cation of an ARCH model fails to explain variation in the risk premium.
Hence, the evidence of successfully modeling the risk premium through speci¯cations
of ARCH or GARCH models is mixed.
Overall, it can be stated that the literature on modeling the risk premium us-
ing survey-based measures of expected future spot rates produces somewhat mixed
results. Although most models based on fundamentals have di±culties in ¯nding
the right variables to analyze, simple time-series models have been quite successful
in modeling the risk premiums for most currencies. One of the future challenging
avenues in this area is to use the information that is available from individual market
participants, instead of assuming a representative agent.
Chionis and MacDonald (2002) question whether aggregate survey-based mea-
sures of expectations are of any use at all to derive a model of the risk premium.
When comparing aggregate (mean), individual, and sector-average measures of the
risk premium for the BP/US, DM/US, and JY/US rates from the 1989{1995 Con-
sensus dataset, using an ARCH-in-mean strategy, they ¯nd that the disaggregate
survey-based risk premium for each individual is more volatile than the survey con-
sensus measure. This ¯nding would imply that aggregate measures of the risk pre-
mium \average out much of the heterogeneity and richness of the individual survey
expectations" (Chionis and MacDonald, 2002, p. 67). An interesting ¯nding is that
these ¯ndings are irrespective of whether the aggregate measures come from survey
data or from realized spot rate data.
2.4 Foreign Exchange Forecasting Performance
There has been an ongoing debate in the literature about whether foreign exchange
rates can be forecasted. The general consensus thus far is that forecasting exchange
rates in a consistent way is cumbersome. Meese (1990), Meese and Rogo® (1983),
Wol® (1987b, 2000) show that most methods of exchange rate determination cannot
outperform a simple random walk characterization. A natural extension to this
debate is the question whether market participants themselves can better forecast
future exchange rates, or perform worse.
There exists a spectrum of competing approaches for calculating the accuracy
of (individual) forecasts, among which those in the statistical angle (of which the
root mean squared error (RMSE) methodology is most notable). MacDonald and
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country averages, and the total cross-sectional mean, as well as the RMSE for the
forward rate and random walk-based forecasts for 3-month-ahead BP/US, DM/US,
and JY/US rates for the period of 1989{1991, yet only ¯nd two individual forecasters
that succeed in outperforming a random walk (in terms of lower RMSE values).
Using a larger set of individual forecasters for the same three rates, Marsh (1999)
still ¯nds only one individual forecaster for both the BP/US and DM/US rates
whose RMSE was less than that of a random walk over the same period. Elliott
and Ito (1999) corroborate these ¯ndings for a disaggregate set of 1-, 3-, and 6-
month-ahead estimates of the future JY/US rate from the 1985{1996 Japan Center
for International Finance (JCIF) survey (nearly all of the individual forecasts have
larger standard errors of the deviation of the forecast from the ex post spot rate
than the benchmark of a random walk forecast). Altogether, one may justly argue
than the Meese and Rogo® (1983) claim remains upheld in that the vast majority of
disaggregate survey-based expectations appears to be statistically worse estimators
of future spot rates than a simple random walk estimate.
At the same time, Elliott and Ito (1999) claim that ¯nding such a forecasting per-
formance that is below the benchmark does not immediately imply that disaggregate
survey data are of poor quality. In fact, survey-based forecasts may be more valuable
in terms of generating pro¯ts as compared to a random walk forecast. Therefore,
Elliott and Ito (1999) de¯ne a simple pro¯t statement in which an agent takes a long
(short) ¯xed position forward in the foreign currency if she believes that the forward
rate undervalues (overvalues) the value of the domestic currency. With log pro¯ts
for each individual agent given by ¼i;t+k = (2I[se
i;t;t+k > ft;t+k]¡1)(st+k ¡ft;t+k),4
it appears that pro¯ts stemming from a random walk strategy (where se
i;t;t+k = st)
only outperform survey-based forecasts for 2 out of 42 individual forecasts in terms
of pro¯tability at the 1- and 3-month horizon, and for none individual forecast at
the 6-month horizon.
One notable shortcoming of these simple pro¯t-based trading rules is that no ex-
plicit measure of risk is incorporated in the transactions. Moreover, the inherently
assumed ¯xed positions in size, as well as the fact that each single agent's fore-
casts of individual currencies are analyzed one at a time, regardless of the probable
dependence between forecasts for di®erent currencies, make such methods rather
unpractical. In an attempt to address these shortcomings, Marsh and Power (1996)
propose to construct portfolios of positions on the BP/US, DM/US, and JY/US
rates based on estimates from each of 22 individual forecasters from the 1989{1992
Consensus survey. In particular, one portfolio minimizes the risk of this portfolio
subject to a prede¯ned minimum level of pro¯t constraint, whereas a second port-
folio uses a more orthodox approach in which a utility function of expected pro¯ts
and risk is maximized. In contrast to the ¯ndings of Elliott and Ito, it appears
that only one forecaster manages to generate returns in excess of those stemming
from a simple random walk benchmark (and only in the ¯rst portfolio speci¯cation);
thereby, again, questioning the ability of individual forecasters to forecast exchange
rates.
4Here, I[:] is an indicator function yielding 1 if the statement between the brackets is true and
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Combining these ¯ndings, one may safely claim that the random walk model
remains pre-eminent. Survey-based forecasts do not appear to produce statistically
signi¯cantly smaller forecast errors than a random walk forecast. For the rare in-
stance in which an individual forecaster does generate statistically more accurate
forecasts, the information therein cannot be exploited to generate more accurate
forecasts in the future.
2.5 Market Microstructure and Heterogeneity
In their survey on nominal exchange rates, Frankel and Rose (1995) note that there
is little evidence that macroeconomic variables have a strong and consistent relation-
ship with °oating exchange rates. In particular, the °uctuation in exchange rates
is usually much larger than the °uctuation in the underlying fundamental exchange
rate. Instead, attention has been directed towards a microstructure approach that
analyzes the interaction between information °ows, price volatility, trading volume,
and the heterogeneity of agents' expectations, and investigates the e®ect hereof on
the movement of exchange rates. The investigation of various aspects of microeco-
nomic theory, particularly the heterogeneity in agents' expectations, appears useful
in explaining some of the anomalies in the foreign exchange literature.
Yet, little is known about the microstructure of the foreign exchange market.
This is surprising, since the daily amount of foreign exchange that is traded world-
wide is vastly in excess of the amount that is required for trade in goods and services.
Most studies assume a single representative agent, and thereby assume that market
participants are homogeneous in their beliefs about the future avenue of the ex-
change rates. However, if all market participants have homogeneous beliefs and act
according to these, the large excess volume of trade in the foreign exchange market
cannot be explained. In this section we review some of the work on heterogeneous
beliefs in the foreign exchange market.
Heterogeneity is a concept that is used in a variety of ways in the foreign ex-
change literature. There are two commonly used explanations for the existence of
heterogeneity of beliefs in ¯nancial markets. One strand of the literature argues
that dispersion of beliefs arises because of the asymmetry in information. Di®erent
market participants are assumed to hold di®erent sets of information, whereby part
of the information is common for all participants and part is private. The asym-
metry in information may be caused by the rigidity in the transmission of public
information, so that the heterogeneity in agents' beliefs is caused by an arti¯cial
informational assumption (Kurz and Motolese, 2001).
Another strand of the literature assumes that all market participants hold dif-
ferent beliefs about economic variables even when there is no di®erence in the in-
formation that is available to them. The di®erence in beliefs arises because agents
disagree about the interpretation of this information. To argue why the di®erence in
interpretation occurs, we can follow the rational beliefs theory due to Kurz (1994)
that assumes that heterogeneity of beliefs is caused by the fact that economic agents
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or `empirical knowledge', which is readily observable from the economy, usually in
the form of a large amount of data about the past performance of an asset or econ-
omy in general. Agents form their opinions about the future by using the empirical
distribution that is derived from the occurrence of events in the past.
The number of methods to measure or quantify heterogeneity in expectations
is small because of the relatively scarcity of data on individual (survey) expecta-
tions. Ito (1990) develops a simple and robust test for detecting any di®erences in
opinion among agents when forming expectations; that is, whether expectations are
heterogeneous. Suppose that an individual forecast i made at time t (where i 2 n
total cross-section individual forecasts) consists of a collectively held function of all
publicly available information, f(­t), and an individual e®ect, gi, that may be based
on private information. The expected future spot rate for this individual forecast
can then be described algebraically as
se
i;t;t+k = f(­t) + gi + ²i;t; (2.15)
where ²i;t is an individual white noise disturbance term that may arise due to mea-
surement errors. It should be noted that we make the explicit assumption that
all individual forecasters attach the same weight to a particular variable from the
common information set ­t: there are no idiosyncratic e®ects with respect to the
publicly available information. The cross-sectional average of the individual fore-
casts, at time t, can be portrayed in a similar fashion as
¹ se
t;t+k = f(­t) + ¹ g + ¹ ²t: (2.16)
When ¹ g can be normalized to be zero, equation 2.16 can be subtracted from equation
2.15, yielding
se
i;t;t+k ¡ ¹ se
t;t+k = gi + ²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t: (2.17)
Now, the individual e®ects can be determined by solving the above equation for
gi. This can be done by means of a least squares regression of the di®erence in
expectation of an individual agent from the cross-sectional average on a constant, and
adjusting for any patterns in the error terms (for instance, due to overlapping data)
by means of the inclusion of MA terms. Clearly, no knowledge whatsoever regarding
the underlying information set is hence required when investigating heterogeneous
behavior.
In the above speci¯cation, the assumption of the identical use of the publicly
available information set can be relaxed when allowing for idiosyncratic e®ects, that
is, beside individual biases (which occurs when gi 6= 0) each agent attaches a di®erent
weight to various elements from the publicly available information set. Suppose that
on one variable in this information set, xt, agents indeed attach di®erent weights.
One can then test for both individual biases and idiosyncratic e®ects (¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0)
by estimating, using least squares regression for all i, the following equation:
se
i;t;t+k ¡ ¹ se
t;t+k = (gi ¡ ¹ g) + (¯i ¡ ¹ ¯)xt + ²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t: (2.18)
Ito (1990) estimates regressions of both the type in equation 2.17 and in equa-
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JY/US rate from the JCIF survey over the period 1985{1987 and ¯nds that for some
44 companies industry e®ects enter signi¯cantly, with an appreciation bias for the
export industry (estimates for gi are signi¯cantly positive), and with a depreciation
bias for trading companies. When allowing for idiosyncratic group coe±cients, and
setting the variable xt equal to the two most recent lags in depreciation, none of the
results change considerably. Hence, it appears that heterogeneous behavior of the
various trading groups arises because of di®erent individual e®ects, not because of
idiosyncratic coe±cients of the variables in the publicly available information set.
The ¯nding of such systematic heterogeneity in expectations remains upheld for an
updated JCIF dataset in Elliott and Ito (1999).
MacDonald and Marsh (1996) mimic the above tests for 3- and 12-month-ahead
estimates of the BP/US, DM/US, and JY/US rates from the 1989{1992 Consensus
dataset and ¯nd signi¯cant evidence of heterogeneous expectations in that signi¯cant
individual e®ects exist, regardless of whether the overall average or country average
is used as benchmark. This latter ¯nding is of particular interest, for it would
indicate that asymmetries in information between various countries are marginal.
Furthermore, in contrast to the results of Elliott and Ito, there is signi¯cant evidence
of idiosyncratic coe±cients when using either the forward discount or the most recent
lag in depreciation as explanatory variables in equation 2.18. Interestingly, the
number of individuals for which we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis of no
individual and no idiosyncratic e®ects, seems to decrease as the forecast horizon
lengthens. This would indicate that on the longer run agents vary more in the way
they use information from the common information set, or attach less weight at
all to the common information set and instead focus more on their own, private
information gi. Extending the Consensus dataset to 1995, Chionis and MacDonald
(1997) ¯nd that still around 40 percent of the forecasters, regardless of the forecast
horizon or currency employed, display signi¯cant individual e®ects.
Having con¯rmed heterogeneous behavior in expectations, Chionis and MacDon-
ald (2002) question whether aggregate survey-based measures of expectations are of
any use at all in tests of unbiasedness, error orthogonality, or perfect substitutabil-
ity. When comparing aggregate (mean), individual, and sector-average measures of
the risk premium for the BP/US, DM/US, and JY/US rates from the 1989{1995
Consensus dataset, they ¯nd that the disaggregate survey-based risk premium for
each individual is more volatile than the survey consensus measure. This ¯nding
would imply that aggregate measures of the risk premium \average out much of
the heterogeneity and richness of the individual survey expectations" (Chionis and
MacDonald, 2002, p. 67)).
With the availability of disaggregate measures of expectations, and realizing that
expectations are heterogeneous, one can also directly test the market microstructure
hypothesis that trading volume is related to dispersion in expectations by employing
Granger causality tests. Frankel and Froot (1990b) use bivariate Granger causality
tests to examine the relationship between volume, heterogeneity and the volatility
in the market. Volume was measured as the weekly number of futures contracts
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), exchange rate volatility as the
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dispersion as the standard deviation of individual forecaster's 1-week and 1-month-
ahead expectations from the 1984{1988 Money Market Survey (MMS) survey for the
individual BP/US, DM/US, JY/US, and SF/US rates. It appears that dispersion
Granger-causes both volume (at the 10 percent signi¯cance level, for all except the
SF/US rate at both the 1-week and 1-month horizon) and volatility (for all of the
4 currencies at the 1-week horizon and for all except the JY/US rate at the 1-
month horizon). Furthermore, there is some evidence that volatility Granger-causes
dispersion at both the 1-week and 1-month horizon.
Chionis and MacDonald (1997) mimic these bivariate tests for 3- and 12-month-
ahead forecasts of the BP/US, DM/US, and JY/US rates from the 1989{1995 Con-
sensus dataset, where measures of dispersion are calculated either as the standard
deviation of the di®erence between the largest and smallest expectation of a par-
ticular currency or the di®erence between an individual expectation and the cross-
sectional mean. Both measures of dispersion appear to Granger-cause volatility at
the 5 percent level (except for the 12-month-ahead DM/US rate), as well as Granger-
cause volume at the 5 percent level|thereby corroborating the results of Frankel
and Froot. In addition, there is lucid evidence of reverse Granger-causality from
volatility to dispersion.
Using the same survey dataset, MacDonald and Marsh (1996) investigate the
relationship between trading volume and heterogeneity in expectations through a
mean-variance model of trading volume, by regressing turnover (de¯ned as the daily
average dollar value of trade on the CME) on the standard deviation of the actual
and expected future spot rate, the latter of which is a measure of dispersion. For
the DM/US and JY/US rates from the 1989{1992 Consensus dataset, the dispersion
of expectations enters positively and signi¯cantly. For the BP/US rate, no such
evidence exists. Finally, Beine et al. (2007) investigate whether central bank inter-
vention has an impact on the dispersion of beliefs in exchange rate forecasts. They
show that forecast heterogeneity increases as a result of interventions, regardless of
whether these interventions are expected or unexpected. This ¯nding is interesting,
for it stresses the role of rumors in foreign exchange markets.
A ¯nal question that naturally arises is whether one market participant's action
or beliefs in°uences the others' in subsequent periods. If this would be the case,
then deviations of the exchange rate from their long-run fundamental value could be
explained by herding behavior of market participants. Beine et al. (2003) assess the
extent of herding behavior in foreign exchange markets by using individual survey
expectations for two currencies versus the dollar. By using Granger-causality tests
they ¯nd that although forecasters are connected to each other through leader and
imitation patterns, there is no evidence of sequential herding. Interestingly, leaders
do not appear to be selected based on their past forecast performance.
Altogether, the albeit limited microstructure literature of the foreign exchange
market and the associated heterogeneity of beliefs on behalf of market participants
presents a challenging opportunity for future research in explaining some of the
anomalies in this market. The debate thus far shows that expectations are hetero-
geneous to such an extent that we cannot simply consider models anymore based on
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for instance from a survey panel, average out much of the heterogeneity of individ-
ual expectations and therefore tests that use these aggregate measures may not be
capable of explaining the anomalies in the foreign exchange market.
2.6 Noise Trading, Chartism, and the Role of Fun-
damentals
An alternative explanation for why market participants hold di®erent beliefs about
the future may be related to the existence of fundamentally di®erent types of market
participants. In the ¯nancial economics literature there have been several attempts
to present models with di®erent types of investors who in essence all have the same
information. For instance, De Long et al. (1990) present a model where noise traders,
with no access to inside information, act irrationally on noise as if it were information
that would give them an advantage over rational arbitrageurs. These noise traders
can earn higher expected returns, due to their own destabilizing in°uence and not
because they bear more of the fundamental risk.
The establishment of heterogeneous beliefs among currency forecasters may fur-
thermore alleviate some of the debate regarding the formation of expectations.
Speci¯cally, such heterogeneous behavior can contribute to the explanation of the
before-mentioned twist in expectations at approximately the 1- to 3-month horizon,
as well as shed new light on how agents form their expectations. To this end, Frankel
and Froot (1986, 1988) establish a model that assumes the foreign exchange market
to consists of three di®erent players, i.e., fundamentalists, chartists, and portfolio
managers; all of which have their own, heterogeneous, beliefs towards the future
value of an exchange rate and behave rationally in that each uses all information
available.
The expectations of portfolio managers (i.e., m, those who actually participate
in market transactions) is de¯ned as the weighted average of the expectations of fun-
damentalists (f), who base expectations on some structural model of exchange rate
determination, and chartists (c), who use non-fundamentals-based based techniques
like autoregressive models, or:
se
m;t;t+k ¡ st = !t(se
f;t;t+k ¡ st) + (1 ¡ !)(se
c;t;t+k ¡ st): (2.19)
If, for the moment, one assumes that the chartists-expected rate of depreciation is
zero (se
c;t;t+k ¡st = 0),5 we can analyze the weight attached to the fundamentalists'
expectations, !, at time t as
(se
m;t;t+k ¡ st) = !t(se
f;t;t+k ¡ st) , !t = ¢se
m;t;t+k=¢se
f;t;t+k); (2.20)
5Liu (1996) uses a somewhat di®erent approach by considering the weight !t to be ¯xed over
the sample period and assuming that fundamentalists adopt a random walk model (of no change)
for the depreciation of the BP/US, DM/US, JY/US, and SF/US exchange rates, and shows that
the percentage weight assigned to fundamentalists' views over the period from 1984 to 1989 never
exceeds 40 percent.Noise Trading, Chartism, and the Role of Fundamentals 27
where the expected rate of depreciation of fundamentalists is approximated by the
survey-based expectations and the expected depreciation of portfolio managers by
the forward discount. Using pooled survey-based expectations for the four most
actively traded rates from the AMEX and Economist surveys, Frankel and Froot
(1986, 1988) ¯nd that the weight !t has been decreasing since the early 1980s|
a phenomenon indicating that gradually less weight is attached to fundamentalist
forecasting techniques. Instead, chartists' methods of forming expectations have
become the primary tools for generating forecasts in the above four markets.
In a companion paper, Frankel and Froot (1990a) analyze a 1978{1985 Eu-
romoney survey that investigates the extent to which a selection of forecasting
companies use various speci¯cations of chartist or fundamentalists forecasting tech-
niques, and conclude that the number of companies using the latter techniques as
the primary tools for estimating future spot rates has declined over the years, at the
bene¯t of technical, or chartist, analysis. In two auxiliary studies, Allen and Taylor
(1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) attempt to ascertain the in°uence of chartist
methods used in the London foreign exchange market and uncover that at the short
run spectrum of the forecast horizon up to 90 percent of all survey respondents
use some chartist input when forming expectations regarding future exchange rates.
When the forecast horizon lengthens (3 months up to 12 months), weight given to
fundamental variables increases.
These ¯ndings also have the potential of explaining some of the above-mentioned
anomalies in the foreign exchange market. Most important is that the earlier discov-
ered shift in expectations can now be attributed to an alteration in the use of fore-
casting methodologies, shifting towards chartist techniques as the forecast horizon
shortens. In the same line, a somewhat di®erent and carefully advocated alternative
explanation, provided by Frankel and Froot (1986), states that chartists are simply
people who think only in terms of the short run horizon, whereas fundamentalists
think long term. Thus, both groups (which inherently hold heterogeneous beliefs
regarding the future value of a spot rate) are taking direct positions in the market.
This latter view is challenging and provides a ground for future research.
Second, the model of chartists and fundamentalists has the potential of explaining
the microstructure anomaly of excessive trading volume. When considering the
¯nding that currency forecasters have increasingly relied on chartist methods of
forecasting, and when maintaining that noise traders encompass those traders who
employ such chartist analysis, the noise trader model of De Long et al. (1990) then
explains that an increase in the number of trades based on noise (which inherently
rely on diverse, and often con°icting, sources of information) will make the foreign
exchange rate more volatile. In addition, a shift towards more noise trading will
imply an increase in the number of trades based on heterogeneous information,
which on its turn may Granger-cause an increase in trading volume (although this
reasoning has so far not been veri¯ed empirically).28 Perspectives on Foreign Exchange Rate Expectations
2.7 Conclusions
This study has attempted to shed new light on some of the anomalies in the for-
eign exchange market by analyzing over twenty years of empirical work that employs
survey-based measures of expected future spot rates. Five topics that gained consid-
erable attention in the past years, or that will play a more important role in future
research, are covered. First, we have attempted to determine the relative impor-
tance of both irrationality in the behavior of market participants and the existence
of time-varying risk premiums in explaining the forward premium puzzle, and see
how market participants form their expectations about future spot exchange rates.
Second, we analyzed the rationales behind the existence of time-varying term premi-
ums and how these premiums can be modeled best. Third, we looked at the relative
performance of market participants in forecasting future spot exchange rates, rela-
tive to a simple random walk forecast, using a range of performance criteria. Fourth,
we touched upon a relatively new topic in the foreign exchange literature: market
microstructure and the role of heterogeneity in beliefs, and examine how microstruc-
ture theory is capable of explaining some of the anomalies in the foreign exchange
market. Finally, we looked at the relative role of di®erent players in the foreign
exchange market.
Survey-based measures of expectations have allowed a direct measure of biases
in expectations and risk premiums, and consequently allow a decomposition of the
forward premium into a part that is attributable to irrationality on behalf of market
participants and a part that is attributable to the existence of time-varying risk
premiums. The consensus emanating from the literature is that the failure of the
forward premium unbiasedness is attributable both to irrational expectations and
to the existence of time-varying risk premiums.
In particular, the survey-based expected future spot rates are biased estimates
of the true level of the future spot rate and that expectations are irrational in that
agents do not use all available information e±ciently. The survey-based forecast
error is not orthogonal to the most important elements from agents' information
sets, at least at forecast horizons exceeding 1 month. Agents could have reduced
their forecast errors by betting against the various elements from the information
set and instead should have focused more on the contemporaneous spot rate. When
analyzing the process of expectations formation in greater depth, it appears that at
horizons up to approximately one month, agents extrapolate the most recent trend
in the behavior of exchange rates and do not su±ciently adapt to the most recent
survey-based forecast error. Also, expectations appear to diverge from their hypoth-
esized long-run equilibrium values. At horizons exceeding one month, expectations
appear to stabilize, in that expectations regress towards their equilibrium values.
The existence of time-varying risk premiums at horizons larger than 1 month
has led to several attempts to model these premiums. There is some support for the
claim that survey-based risk premiums can be modeled by simple, low-order time se-
ries models (in particular of the ARMA class), and that exchange rate risk premiums
are not constant over time, in that they systematically vary with agents' perception
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tion of macroeconomic or ¯scal variables occasionally contain signi¯cant explanatory
variables, although most fundamentals-based models have little explanatory power
overall.
Yet, most of the earlier studies are hampered by the fact that they use aggregate
measures of expectations when modeling the risk premiums. Since risk premiums
are associated with the attitude towards risk and uncertainty of market participants,
using aggregate measures of risk premiums averages out much of the heterogeneity
and richness of the individual survey expectations. Indeed, risk premiums based on
disaggregated market expectations have shown to be more volatile than the survey
consensus measure. One of the challenges in modeling risk premiums is to use the
information that is available from individual market participants, instead of relying
on a single representative-agent model.
The debate about whether market participants can forecast exchange rates in
a consistent way has also led to several interesting ¯ndings. The earlier literature
has shown that macroeconomic or time-series models cannot outperform a simple
random walk forecast. Evidence from survey data now shows that actual market
participants (irrespective of which techniques they use), do not seem to outperform
a simple random walk forecast either, at least when measured in terms of lower
forecast errors. Although studies that use a pro¯t-based criterion to assess the
forecast performance of individual market participants show that most forecasters
are successful in forecasting the directional change, these simple pro¯t-based rules
often have the shortcoming that no explicit measures of risk is incorporated in the
transactions. The random walk model therefore remains pre-eminent.
This does not mean that the study on the behavior of individual market par-
ticipants is futile. There is relatively little known about the microstructure of the
foreign exchange market. This is surprising, since the daily volume of foreign ex-
change that is traded worldwide is far in excess of the amount that is required for
trade in goods and services. The examination of disaggregate measures of expec-
tations has shed new light on the e±ciency of the foreign exchange market and on
the preceding tests of rational expectations and perfect substitutability. Not only
has the presence of heterogeneous expectations been revealed; aggregate measures
of various variables have furthermore been shown to average out much of the hetero-
geneity and richness of the individual survey expectations. The analysis of individual
market expectations has also provided new insights on some of the anomalies in this
market, for instance, that the volume of foreign exchange traded weekly is related
to the dispersion in beliefs and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market.
Finally, the claim that the foreign exchange market consists of players that hold
essentially di®erent views about the behavior of the exchange rate is shown to have
considerable empirical ground. Categorizing market participants as either pursuing
a chartist forecast strategy or a fundamentalist strategy has revealed new insights
into how market participants form their forecasts. It seems that over the years the
role of macroeconomic fundamentals in forecasting has declined, and are only used
for longer-term forecasts, while the use of chartist techniques has increased. Still,
most market participants use a combination of these two techniques. The increased
use of chartist techniques and the presence of noise traders in the foreign exchange30 Perspectives on Foreign Exchange Rate Expectations
market can, at least to some extent, explain the large trading volume in the foreign
exchange market.
These ¯ndings have signi¯cant implications for future research on several topics
in international ¯nance. First, one can conclude that investors' exchange rate ex-
pectations do not conform to the rational expectations hypothesis. Although the
rational expectations hypothesis has considerable appeal as a theoretical model, it
does not appear to provide an adequate explanation of exchange rate expectation in
most survey-based studies. It is therefore important to consider alternative models
of expectations formation. Clearly, there is considerable scope for further research
in this area. The ¯nding of systematic exchange rate forecast errors can plausibly
stern from a variety of sources, including|but certainly not limited to|investors'
irrationality.
Furthermore, the possibility of in°uential, yet uncommon events should be con-
sidered. Most notably, peso problems may lead to repetitive exchange rate forecast
errors in small samples and consequently invalidate standard statistical inference.
While this argument applies equally to all empirical analyses, it may be that the
type of government policies and other exogenous processes that determine exchange
rates make this problem a particularly strikingly one in most studies. Such a pos-
sibility probably deserves more study than it has received so far. Especially within
the European Monetary System, where such peso problems may result from expec-
tations of periodic realignments of central parities, further research hereof will be
desirable.
As a second alternative explanation to the failure of the rational expectations
hypothesis, one might investigate whether investors learn as they go. Explicit ex-
amples of the failure of the rational expectations assumption because of learning
gradually emerges in the literature. If investors are in the process of learning about
°oating exchange rates or other regime changes, then exchange rate changes will be
a®ected by such learning.
In future work, considerable attention should also be paid to the heterogeneity
in exchange rate expectations among investors. Although homogeneity has been
assumed by a great many investigators of foreign exchange market e±ciency (het-
erogeneity amongst market participants was aggregated out), the diverse patchwork
on heterogeneous behavior suggests conclusively that homogeneity is not a reason-
able assumption. It may well be that many studies that employed some form of
aggregate expectations found degrees of time-varying risk premiums and biases in
expectations that were understated. Heterogeneous expectations and their role in
determining foreign exchange market dynamics may hence be important areas for
future research.
Finally, the role of survey-based measures of expected future spot rates in the
process of modeling risk premiums is only at its preliminary phase. The `true' ob-
servation of risk premiums only now allows a `true' modeling hereof. Beyond doubt,
the future course of empirical studies on the modeling of risk premiums employing
some form of survey-based expectations of future spot rates is likely to produce in-
teresting and successful methodologies, which might be capable of withstanding the
ultimate test of consistently outperforming a simple random walk forecast.Chapter 3
On the Rationality of
Interest Rate Expectations¤
3.1 Introduction
The debate regarding the rationality of agents' expectations and the informational
e±ciency of ¯nancial markets continues to be an issue of central concern in the
¯nancial economics literature|see Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996), for instance.
These propositions have been tested in the foreign exchange literature by analyzing
survey data for some of the major currencies|see Dominguez (1986), Cavaglia et al.
(1993a,b, 1994), Frankel and Froot (1987a,b), Froot and Frankel (1989), Taylor
(1989), and Verschoor and Wol® (2001a,b). Broadly speaking, the results of these
studies suggest signi¯cant failures of the rationality assumption in exchange rate
expectations, for many di®erent currencies and di®erent sample periods.
The use of survey-based measures of interest rate expectations has shed new light
on this debate. The principal bene¯t of using survey data is that one obtains a direct
measure of agents' beliefs, thus allowing for separate testing of an underlying model
of exchange rate determination and testing a hypothesis about the way expectations
are formed. On the other hand, critics of survey data often question the extent to
which such data is representative of `the market's' expectation or whether the data
truly re°ects the individual survey respondents' beliefs. Furthermore, the rather
narrow survey data sets that are collected often limit the scope of investigative
analysis.
In the 1970s macroeconomics literature, Lucas (1972, 1976), Sargent and Wallace
(1975), and Barro (1976) demonstrate that the assumption of rationality of agents'
expectations in the Muth (1961) sense has strong implications for economic behavior
and policy. However, despite the central role of expectations in the asset market
theory in general and the interest rate literature in particular, the use of survey
¤Part of this chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of International Financial Markets, Institu-
tions, and Money as joint work with Willem F.C. Verschoor.
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data to proxy interest rate expectations has largely been avoided. The reason for this
was the absence of independent information about market participants' expectations.
The majority of studies on interest rate expectations have used the theory of the term
structure of interest rates, due to Hicks (1939) and Lutz (1940), to infer expectations
by comparing the yields on two or more assets, in conjunction with a theory of
the determination of relative yields (i.e., relative asset prices). The validity of the
inference about interest rate expectations is, of course, conditional on the underlying
asset pricing hypothesis.
As such, little e®ort has been made in the literature to exploit the survey-based
approach in verifying the properties that are directly implied by rationality. In
light of the absence of survey-based on interest expectations, convincing empirical
evidence on whether interest rate expectations are indeed rational is understandably
scarce. To the best of our knowledge, Friedman (1980), Froot (1989) and MacDonald
and Macmillan (1994) are the only survey-based studies that have investigated the
hypothesis of whether interest rate expectations are rational and whether agents use
all available information e±ciently.1
In this chapter we extend the limited work on interest rate expectations to a
broad set of foreign interest rates over the period of January 1995 until December
2004. We employ survey data for these interest rates in order to examine the validity
of properties directly implied by rationality. We use a data set that allows us to focus
on di®erences between EMS and non-EMS interest rate expectations.
Furthermore, earlier research has focused exclusively on U.S. and U.K. interest
rates in the 1970's through the very early 1990's|the di®erent sample period and
di®erent overall pattern of interest rate movements thus permit an additional test of
the robustness of previously reported results and allows us to compare the behavior of
interest series from di®erent countries. In addition to exploring di®erences between
EMS and non-EMS interest rates, we address three questions that were considered
earlier in studies on exchange expectations by Cavaglia et al. (1993a,b) and Frankel
and Froot (1987b): 1) whether economic agents' interest rate forecasts are unbiased,
2) whether economic agents use all available information e±ciently, and 3) which
time series process best characterizes the investors' expectations formation process.
Our results are easily summarized. We ¯nd that interest rate expectations are
not rational and that agents do not use all available information in an e±cient
manner. Although forecast errors of EMS interest rates are smaller and less volatile
than errors of non-EMS rates, expectations of future EMS rates are still biased.
Extrapolative and adaptive expectations formation mechanisms describe interest
rate expectations to a certain extent, although a combination of these two is usually
preferred. Our evidence indicates that long-term expected interest rates tend to
underreact to current (unanticipated) changes in the interest rate, as implied by
stabilizing expectations models. Finally, we ¯nd that learning about past forecast
mistakes has a greater in°uence on the formation of expectations than the past
performance of the interest rate itself.
1Hafer et al. (1992) also employ survey data on interest rate expectations, yet their emphasis is on
the out-of-sample performance of survey-based forecasts in relation to other forecasting techniques,
and not on the rationality of expectations.Survey Data and Standard Propositions Regarding Expectations 33
The chapter is presented in four sections. In section 3.2, the construction of
the interest rate survey is outlined and summary statistics describing the data are
provided. In section 3.3, we examine whether expectations are formed in a rational
manner. In particular, we examine the unbiasedness of expectations as well as the
e±ciency with which economic agents use publicly available information. Models
characterizing the formation of interest rate expectations are considered in section
3.4. Finally, in section 3.5 the results of this investigation are summarized and
discussed.
3.2 Survey Data and Standard Propositions Re-
garding Expectations
Every second Monday of each calendar month Consensus Economics of London
publishes results from a survey that was conducted among up to 150 professional
market participants and forecasting agencies (per rate) worldwide for their 3- and
12-months-ahead forecasts for a large number of international interest rates. The
expectations are all for interest rate contracts that have a maturity of 3 months.2 To
keep the analysis tractable and to delete various forecast biases we take the cross-
sectional arithmetic average of the individual market participants and use this in
the analyses. Furthermore, consensus measures of expectations are likely to perform
better than the individual expectations that together make the consensus. Although
some individuals' forecast performance may be better than others' in terms of criteria
like root mean squared errors, it is di±cult to identify a priori who these individuals
are, in particular since forecast performance is not constant.
Replications of the analyses using other aggregate measures of expectations, like
the median, did not alter the general message from the results that will presented
below. From a subset of individual interest rate expectations we learned that the
distribution of their forecasts at each point in time is not skewed, and therefore the
mean is very close to other consensus measures of expectations.
For our sample, we obtain the expectations on 20 interest rate series from devel-
oped economies for the period of January 1995 through December 2004 (see table
3.1 for an inventory). The panel is unbalanced since for some series the expecta-
tions were discontinued in January 1999, while for others the ¯rst expectations were
published somewhere along the above sample period (also see table 3.1 for details).
The sample is chosen in such a way that about half consists of expectations on EMS
rates and the other half of expectations on non-EMS rates.
Although survey participants have a few days time to return their expectations,
we learned that the vast majority send their responses by e-mail on the Friday
before the publication day (second Monday of the month). We consider this Friday
as the day on which the expectations are formed. On this Friday, we obtain spot
interest rate series with di®erent maturities to match with the survey data. All spot
2Thus, the participants are asked to forecast the 3-month interest rate 3-months ahead and the
3-month interest rate 12-months ahead.34 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
rate series are obtained through Datastream. To verify that the information sets of
market participants are not too diverse, all of the analyses throughout this study
were re-estimated by using spot data from various days surrounding this Friday, yet
the overall results remained unchanged.









as the continuously compounded yield to maturity at time t on an n-period zero
coupon (or discount) bond with a normalized face value of 1 currency unit and a
market price of P
(n)
t . Thus, the bond is purchased at time t and matures at time
t + n. We de¯ne Et[rt+k] as the expected (n ¡ k)-month interest rate at time t + k
formed at t and maturing at time t+n, where in our sample k equals 3 or 12 and n¡k
is generally 3 months. We furthermore derive the forward rate that is implicit in the
term structure, for period t+k through t+n, and denote it as f
(n;k)
t;t+k.3 Since for the
12-month ahead forward rate we require zero-coupon rate deposits with a maturity
of 12- and 15-months, and the latter are not commonly available, we estimate this
forward rate from zero curve yields obtained from Datastream.
The survey-based forecasts are all for interest rate series that have a maturity of
3 months. Therefore, the interest rate series that match these survey rates also have
a maturity of only 3 months. We can therefore simplify the notation where we leave
the superscript n out of r
(n)
t and use rt in the remainder of this chapter to denote
the 3 month spot rate and ft;t+k as the k-period ahead 3 month forward rate (since
then n ¡ k equals 3 months). With these de¯nitions, we de¯ne the survey-based
forecast error at horizon k as
»t+k ´ rt+k ¡ re
t;t+k: (3.2)
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the survey-based forecast error for all
interest rate series across the two forecast horizons.4
For the period analyzed, both the absolute values and the standard deviations of
the mean forecast error rise considerably as the length of the forecast horizon goes
from three months to twelve months. This empirical ¯nding is similar to the results
of Dominguez (1986), who found that the variance of one-week- and two-week-ahead
exchange rate forecast errors were smaller than the variance of one-month- and three-
months-ahead forecast errors. Furthermore, for the 12-month forecast horizon all
mean forecast errors are negative, which indicates that market participants always
overestimated the true level of future interest rates. These results provide a prelim-
inary indication that biases in expectations are likely to be of bigger concern when
the forecast horizon lengthens. It must be mentioned that the consistent overesti-
mation of interest rates can also be a manifestation of a peso problem: if a small
3For a particular interest rate series, we follow the commonly used convention to determine the
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equals the market price of an n-period zero coupon (or discount) bond with a normalized face value
of 1 currency unit.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.36 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
probability of a signi¯cant increase in the general level of interest rates is expected,
but this increase did not materialize in-sample, then expectations overestimate the
true level of future interest rates.
While the distribution of the forecast errors is not consistently skewed in one
direction, it is interesting to note that forecast errors are predominantly platykurtic
at the shorter forecast horizon, while leptokurtic at the longer horizon. The latter
could be an indication of fat tail behavior in the long-run expectations, although we
must be cautious here, since kurtosis is not a measure of tail behavior.
Furthermore, we document signi¯cant di®erences in the distribution of forecast
errors for EMS versus non-EMS interest rates. The normality test due to Bera and
Jarque (1982) is rarely rejected for the EMS interest rates (long-run errors even
appear to be all distributed normally), while it is usually rejected for the non-EMS
rates. It is also interesting to note that for the 12-month horizon the standard
deviation of the mean forecast errors is smaller for EMS currency deposits than
for non-EMS deposits (except for the Japanese and U.K. interest rates). All this
corroborates the ¯ndings of, for instance, Cavaglia et al. (1993a) and Nieuwland
et al. (2000) that, since the structure of the EMS is such that it should promote
stability, it exerts a stabilizing role on interest rate expectations. As will be shown
in the next section, this need not imply that interest rate forecasts are unbiased
estimates of future interest rates.
3.3 The Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates asserts that for-
ward rates should be equal to the expectation of the corresponding future realized
interest rates, and hence forward rates can be used to forecast future rates. Since
expected rates are inherently unobservable, one generally assumes that expectations
are formed in a rational way and expected rates are therefore assumed to be equal to
realized ex post future rates. The empirical literature on the expectations hypothesis
of the term structure of interest rates suggests that there is overwhelming evidence
in favor of the view that the forward rates implied by the term structure are biased
predictors of future spot interest rates. The general procedure on how this is tested
is by means of a test of the following speci¯cation:5
rt+k ¡ rt = ®1 + ¯1(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k: (3.3)
5We tested for the existence of a unit root in the levels of the interest rate series, the expectations
series, and the implicit forward rates. To deal with the critique that standard unit root tests cannot
distinguish between a unit root and a near-unit root process, we employ the test due to Kwiatkowski
et al. (1992) (KPSS) where the null hypothesis is that of stationarity against the alternative of a
unit root. Both in the case where the lag structure needed for the KPSS test was set to depend on
the number of observations as suggested by Newey and West (1994), as well as in the case where
we set the lag length ourselves based on prior information (see further on for more information),
we could reject the null hypothesis of stationarity. For the di®erence series, among which rt+k ¡rt
and ft;t+k ¡ rt, we cannot reject the null of stationarity. We therefore choose to perform all tests
using return, instead of level, series.The Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations 37
Table 3.2: Pooled Test of Forward Rate Unbiasedness
3 month forecast horizon (k = 3) 12 month forecast horizon (k = 12)
®1 ¯1 # obs ®1 ¯1 # obs
a) Regression estimates
Full sample ¡0:1307 0:7141 1989 ¡0:5245 0:5950 1156
(0:0138) (0:0295) (0:0318) (0:0406)
EMS rates ¡0:1457 0:7892 813 ¡0:6941 0:9165 510
(0:0251) (0:0757) (0:0920) (0:0660)
Non-EMS rates ¡0:1120 0:6768 1176 ¡0:4649 0:4548 646
(0:0210) (0:0400) (0:0484) (0:0586)
T(® = 0) T(¯ = 1) Â2(® = 0; T(® = 0) T(¯ = 1) Â2(® = 0;
¯ = 1) ¯ = 1)
b) Wald coe±cient tests
Full sample 88:70¤¤¤ 93:27¤¤¤ 238:40¤¤¤ 271:44¤¤¤ 99:01¤¤¤ 927:72¤¤¤
EMS rates 33:69¤¤¤ 7:83¤¤¤ 42:83¤¤¤ 56:84¤¤¤ 1:59 56:90¤¤¤
Non-EMS rates 28:36¤¤¤ 65:03¤¤¤ 105:77¤¤¤ 92:18¤¤¤ 86:25¤¤¤ 457:31¤¤¤
Notes. The regression results are for the pooled test rt+k ¡ rt = ®1 + ¯1(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k.
The sample period is from January 1995 until December 2004. The standard errors are give
in parentheses. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ indicates rejection at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cance level,
respectively. `# obs' gives the total number of observations that is used for the pooled regression
test.
The null hypothesis that forward rates are unbiased estimates of future interest rates
implies that ®1 = 0 and ¯1 = 1, and ²t+k has mean zero and is uncorrelated with
ft ¡ rt. In fact, this is the strong version of the expectations hypothesis, where no
constant liquidity premium is allowed. A weaker version can be presented by ¯1 = 1,
while ®1 is a nonzero, though constant liquidity premium.
Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) demonstrate that, when the fore-
cast horizon is longer than the observational frequency, the forward rate forecast
error ²t+k will be serially correlated up to a moving average process of order k ¡ 1.
While least squares point estimates of ®1 and ¯1 remain consistent in spite of the
serially correlated residuals, the least squares standard errors for the regression co-
e±cients are biased. Therefore, we choose estimating equation 3.3 using generalized
method of moments (GMM) and adjust the standard errors nonparametrically using
the procedure of Newey and West (1987, 1994), employing the Bartlett kernel and
assuming a moving average process of order k, instead of k ¡ 1.6 7
We commence the analysis by replicating tests of the type in equation 3.3 for
blocks of countries and for each forecast horizon. We split the sample up in EMS
and non-EMS deposits. Table 3.2 summarizes the results. Given are the parameter
6The survey forecasts are for `approximately 3 and 12 months ahead' projections. Since panelists
are known to often make their projections towards the end of a calendar month, we expect that the
k-month-ahead forecast is in fact a k-month-plus-a-few-days-ahead forecast. We have replicated all
results assuming a moving average process of order k ¡ 1, yet these results di®er only marginally
from the ones reported and do not alter any of our conclusions.
7Since we have prior information about the lag structure, we do not employ any automatic lag
selection mechanism, as in Newey and West (1994), in determining the appropriate lag length of
the moving average process.38 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
estimates and their (corrected) standard errors, as well as results of T and Â2 tests for
the signi¯cance of the individual parameters, or combinations thereof. Overall, the
evidence presented suggests a fairly consistent rejection of the null hypothesis that
implied forward interest rates are unbiased predictors of future changes in interest
rates. In particular, both the weak (¯1 = 1) and strong versions (®1 = 0 and ¯1 = 1)
of the expectations hypothesis are ¯rmly rejected. Only for the long-run EMS rates
can the weak version of the expectations hypothesis not be rejected.
While the null hypothesis of forward rate unbiasedness is strongly rejected for
all blocks, the rejection is strongest for non-EMS interest rates. Since the structure
of the EMS is such that it should enhance stability, at least on the longer run,
and since EMS countries try to align the level of (future) in°ation of its member
states by adjusting the general level of interest rates, the direction of future interest
rate actions may, to some extent, be anticipated. This may explain why for EMS
countries the rejection is not strong.
Most of the literature on the expectations hypothesis has focused either on only
the major international rates, or on pooled tests for blocks of countries. A simulta-
neous analysis of a broad set of individual deposits is still lacking. To get a better
overview of the failure of the expectations hypothesis for the individual countries,
table 3.3 reports least squares parameter estimates for the individual rates. The null
hypothesis of unbiasedness in this traditional test (the strong version of the expec-
tations hypothesis) is rejected for the vast majority of the individual interest rates.
Furthermore, the slope estimate for ¯1 is less than unity for the majority of the
cases. Although only signi¯cant in a few number of instances due to relatively large
standard errors, this latter ¯nding corroborates the ¯ndings of, for instance, Froot
(1989) and MacDonald and Macmillan (1994). In addition, the constant forward
rate error term, ®1, is almost always negative, suggesting that the implicit forward
rate, and hence the term structure of interest rates, overestimates the true level of
future interest rates.
Rejection of the expectations hypothesis may be attributable to the irrational-
ity of market participants, as suggested by Friedman (1980) and MacDonald and
Macmillan (1994), to the existence of a time-varying term premium, as suggested
by Friedman (1979), Froot (1989), and Modigliani and Shiller (1973), to some com-
bination of both of these phenomena, to the existence of peso problems (Lewis,
1989; Bekaert et al., 2001), learning behavior, or other statistical arguments. The
availability of survey data enables us to identify the relative importance of the ex-
planations. In this chapter we focus our attention on the rationality issue and in
the next chapter we examine the economic importance of the time-varying term
premium explanation.
We follow the de¯nition of a rational expectation by Pesaran (1987). First,
forecasts should be unbiased, implying that the expected rate of change is identical
to the actual change. Second, forecast errors should be orthogonal to variables
from the information set available to agents, in other words, economic agents use
information that is available to them in an e±cient way to forecast future rates.
Third, the forecast errors should be serially correlated only up to a moving average
process of order k ¡ 1, due to the presence of overlapping observations. Fourth,The Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations 39
Table 3.3: Individual Test of Forward Rate Unbiasedness
3 month forecast horizon (k = 3) 12 month forecast horizon (k = 12)
®1 ¯1 Â2 R2
a ®1 ¯1 Â2 R2
a
a) EMS rates
Austria ¡0:1110 ¡0:0811¤¤¤ 37:05¤¤¤ 0:00 NA NA NA NA
(0:0908) (0:4161) NA NA
Belgium ¡0:1794 ¡0:0154¤¤¤ 47:77¤¤¤ 0:00 0:6170 ¡0:8708¤¤¤ 1121:80¤¤¤ 0:27
(0:1105) (0:2925) (0:5209) (0:2961)
France ¡0:1374¤¤¤ 1:2009¤ 11:26¤¤¤ 0:55 ¡0:5494¤¤¤ 1:1053 16:95¤¤¤ 0:28
(0:0450) (0:1209) (0:1360) (0:3340)
Germany ¡0:1129¤¤¤ 0:9362 12:14¤¤¤ 0:36 ¡0:5265¤¤¤ 1:0374 14:55¤¤¤ 0:25
(0:0324) (0:1895) (0:1460) (0:3309)
Ireland ¡0:0959 0:6337 1:96 0:28 NA NA NA NA
(0:1110) (0:3529) NA NA
Italy ¡0:1605¤¤¤ 0:6987¤¤ 12:81¤¤¤ 0:35 ¡0:6816¤¤¤ 1:1514 46:16¤¤¤ 0:66
(0:0531) (0:1338) (0:1308) (0:1545)
Netherlands ¡0:1421¤¤¤ 0:8491 14:61¤¤¤ 0:26 ¡0:5651¤¤¤ 1:0110 16:99¤¤¤ 0:24
(0:0375) (0:2176) (0:1502) (0:3330)
Spain ¡0:1456 0:9666 13:60¤¤¤ 0:48 ¡0:6305¤¤¤ 1:2591 0:65 0:39
(0:0403) (0:1742) (0:1411) (0:3207)
Europe ¡0:0725¤ 1:1612 3:78 0:59 ¡0:7329¤¤¤ 0:7015 41:68¤¤¤ 0:26
(0:0398) (0:1678) (0:1237) (0:2885)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia ¡0:0421 0:7760 2:86 0:19 ¡0:0517 0:8379 0:51 0:19
(0:0499) (0:1833) (0:2111) (0:4203)
Canada ¡0:3860¤¤¤ 0:9392 34:59¤¤¤ 0:29 ¡1:6873¤¤¤ 1:6113¤ 58:71¤¤¤ 0:58
(0:0769) (0:1572) (0:3571) (0:3290)
Denmark ¡0:2827¤¤¤ 1:1771 9:34¤¤¤ 0:30 ¡0:9662¤¤¤ 0:5796 63:43¤¤¤ 0:21
(0:1038) (0:2458) (0:1820) (0:2833)
Hong Kong ¡0:3590 0:6402 6:14¤¤ 0:03 NA NA NA NA
(0:2976) (0:4513) NA NA
Japan ¡0:0472 0:4877¤¤¤ 11:46¤¤¤ 0:09 ¡0:1014¤¤ 0:0184¤¤¤ 8494:76¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0323) (0:1578) (0:0493) (0:0127)
New Zealand ¡0:0477 0:7807 1:54 0:13 NA NA NA NA
(0:1214) (0:2516) NA NA
Norway 0:0874 0:9938 0:64 0:26 ¡0:6011¤ 0:7397 5:42¤ 0:15
(0:1205) (0:2323) (0:3172) (0:2372)
Sweden ¡0:2322¤¤¤ 1:1322 20:00¤¤¤ 0:32 ¡0:8942¤¤¤ 0:7630 86:56¤¤¤ 0:27
(0:0660) (0:2819) (0:2230) (0:1662)
Switzerland ¡0:2194¤¤¤ 0:8822 20:38¤¤¤ 0:19 ¡0:5999 0:5579 15:96¤¤¤ 0:35
(0:0578) (0:1911) (0:6110) (0:6758)
U.K. ¡0:0911¤ 0:7807 7:35¤¤ 0:27 ¡0:4605¤ 0:8988 4:31 0:29
(0:0548) (0:2095) (0:2631) (0:3872)
U.S. ¡0:2062¤¤¤ 1:1173 19:32¤¤¤ 0:38 ¡0:7566 0:8425 7:14¤¤ 0:18
(0:0641) (0:2693) (0:5933) (0:7290)
Notes. The parameter estimates are for the test rt+k ¡ rt = ®1 + ¯1(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k. The
sample period is January 1995 through December 2004. The standard errors of the coe±cients are
given in parenthesis. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant level,
respectively, of the hypothesis that ®1 = 0 or that ¯1 = 1. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint
hypotheses that ®1 = 0 and ¯1 = 1. `NA' indicates the non-availability of a statistic due to data
non-avaliability. R2
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expectations should be e±cient, where e±ciency is a special case of orthogonality
in that the information set now only includes past values of the variables that are
expected to form the expectations.
The null hypothesis of unbiased expectations implies that ®2 = 0 and ¯2 = 1 in
a regression of the following form:
rt+k ¡ rt = ®2 + ¯2(re
t;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k; (3.4)
where ²t+k again is a random forecast error term.
Table 3.4 reports estimates for the parameters in equation 3.4. Although for
the 3-month horizon the evidence is mixed, we ¯nd that for the longer horizon the
evidence presented suggest a fairly consistent rejection of the null hypothesis that the
expected interest rate is an unbiased predictor of the realized interest rate. In most
cases, rejection of the null is attributable to the combined ¯nding that estimates for
®2 are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero and estimates for ¯2 are signi¯cantly di®erent
from one. In addition, we ¯nd that, especially for the short-run forecast horizon,
market participants predicted the correct direction of the interest rate movement,
given signi¯cantly positive parameter estimates of ¯2 for most of the interest rates. It
is also interesting to note that the signi¯cance of the (absolute) level bias in our tests,
which can be veri¯ed via a standard T-test on the estimated ®2-coe±cient, increases
as the length of the forecast horizon increases, and is commonly negative, thus
corroborating the earlier ¯ndings that market participants generally overestimate
the true level of future interest rates.
Finally, we note that for the long-run horizon the null of unbiasedness is rejected
for all but one EMS currency deposit. This is a surprising result, for one would
expect that the stabilizing role of the EMS would enhance the forecast ability of
future EMS interest rates, and lead to a less frequent rejection of the unbiasedness
hypothesis for EMS currency deposits than for non-EMS deposits.
These results should be interpreted with some caution. If conditional forecasts
are formed rationally, allowing for a small probability of a large interest rate move-
ment, then forecasts will appear biased when judged from ex-post forecast errors|
this is the familiar `peso problem' (see Krasker, 1980). However, it is unlikely that
this was the case in our sample period, nor that it would a®ect all interest rate
deposits. An alternative explanation would be that the time series process, which
describes the expected interest rate movement, is not ergodic as is implied in the
application of the GMM procedure.
The second type of test of the rational expectations hypothesis is concerned
with the e±cient use of information available at the time expectations are formed.
If economic agents use all available information e±ciently, then the expectational
errors must be orthogonal to any variable in the information set known to agents at
the time they form their expectations. The null hypothesis of rational expectations
(orthogonality) implies that the vector ¯ = 0 in regressions of the following form:
»t+k = ¯Xt + ²t+k; (3.5)
where the left hand side variable is the survey forecast error, Xt is a vector of el-
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Table 3.4: Unbiasedness Test of Survey-Based Expectations
3 month forecast horizon (k = 3) 12 month forecast horizon (k = 12)
®2 ¯2 Â2 R2
a ®2 ¯2 Â2 R2
a
a) EMS rates
Austria ¡0:1031¤ 0:2133¤¤ 6:59¤¤ 0:01 0:1671 ¡1:4372 123:95¤¤¤ 0.44
(0:0587) (0:3556) (0:2303) (0:2923)
Belgium ¡0:1805¤ 0:2916¤¤ 11:30¤¤¤ 0:01 ¡0:2919 ¡0:4497 38:84¤¤¤ 0:02
(0:0962) (0:3164) (0:3399) (0:2737)
France 0:0361 1:1298 0:86 0:45 ¡0:4801¤¤ 1:5940¤ 13:85¤¤¤ 0:43
(0:0518) (0:1681) (0:2219) (0:3351)
Germany ¡0:0792¤ 1:2151 0:41 0:23 ¡0:3281 0:2725 6:36¤¤ 0:00
(0:0427) (0:3359) (0:3262) (0:7863)
Ireland ¡0:0440 0:6100 1:50 0:25 ¡0:5686 0:8629 2:47 0:43
(0:1105) (0:3230) (0:3617) (0:2930)
Italy ¡0:0526 0:8698 2:54 0:42 ¡0:6027¤¤ 1:2536 19:55¤¤¤ 0:62
(0:0522) (0:0991) (0:2338) (0:2445)
Netherlands ¡0:0881¤ 0:7313 3:46 0:09 ¡0:1018 ¡0:3519¤¤ 12:73¤¤ 0:01
(0:0488) (0:3455) (0:3769) (0:6594)
Spain ¡0:1245¤¤ 1:1483 7:40¤¤ 0:35 ¡0:8810¤¤¤ 0:8855 13:78¤¤¤ 0:11
(0:0515) (0:2003) (0:2589) (0:5398)
Europe 0:0179 1:3667 0:68 0:30 ¡0:4473 1:1880 2:46 0:07
(0:0642) (0:4444) (0:2990) (1:2753)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia ¡0:0671 0:5063 5:36¤ 0:03 ¡0:1262 ¡0:2447 7:17¤¤ 0:00
(0:0611) (0:2807) (0:4038) (0:8192)
Canada ¡0:3182¤¤¤ 1:4768 2:75¤ 0:31 ¡0:9909¤ 1:1159 8:02¤¤ 0:15
(0:0778) (0:2874) (0:5328) (0:5476)
Denmark ¡0:1221¤ 1:2339 3:95 0:51 ¡0:9763¤¤¤ 0:5945 8:78¤¤ 0:06
(0:0714) (0:1736) (0:3368) (0:3521)
Hong Kong ¡0:0060 1:1339 0:54 0:30 ¡0:4575 1:1378 4:45 0:31
(0:2035) (0:1967) (0:5724) (0:1314)
Japan ¡0:0553¤ 0:7367 7:92¤¤ 0:08 ¡0:1298¤ 0:0804¤¤ 14:30¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0326) (0:1715) (0:0707) (0:4081)
New Zealand 0:0107 0:9110 0:05 0:13 ¡0:4116 1:7399¤¤¤ 10:56¤¤¤ 0:62
(0:1110) (0:3966) (0:2688) (0:2281)
Norway ¡0:0846 0:6719¤ 3:31 0:07 ¡0:7325 0:1723¤¤¤ 14:46¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:1297) (0:1808) (0:5544) (0:2176)
Sweden ¡0:2141¤¤¤ 1:2305 14:69¤¤¤ 0:43 ¡1:2473¤¤¤ 1:3100 16:69¤¤¤ 0:21
(0:0578) (0:2086) (0:4460) (0:5004)
Switzerland ¡0:1482¤¤ 0:6322¤ 14:69 0:07 ¡0:5999 0:5578 15:96¤¤¤ 0:03
(0:0716) (0:2197) (0:6110) (0:6758)
U.K. ¡0:1107 0:8925 5:63¤ 0:16 ¡0:4605¤ 0:8988 4:31 0:20
(0:0695) (0:3273) (0:2631) (0:3872)
U.S. ¡0:2995¤¤¤ 1:1322 0:19 0:20 ¡0:7566 0:8425 7:41¤¤ 0:08
(0:1003) (0:2990) (0:5933) (0:7260)
Notes. The parameter estimates are for the test rt+k ¡ rt = ®2 + ¯2(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k. The
sample period is January 1995 through December 2004. The standard errors of the coe±cients
are given in parenthesis. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant
level, respectively, of the hypothesis that ®2 = 0 or ¯2 = 1. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint
hypotheses that ®2 = 0 and ¯2 = 1. R2
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Although the elements that can be included is virtually endless,8 we assume that
investors' forecasts are primarily driven by past information on the interest rates and
their own forecast performance (chartist behavior) and by basic fundamentals de-
scribing interest rates (fundamentalist behavior). As for elements from the investor's
information set we choose the most recent forecast error, »t,9 the most recent change
in the spot interest rate, rt¡rt¡1, the k-period implicit forward premium, ft;t+k¡rt,
and the yield spread, r
(L)
t ¡ rt.10 These variables are all known to the investor at
the time expectations are formed. In order to test whether economic agents use
all available information e±ciently, equation 3.5 was ¯tted for each interest rate on
both forecast horizons.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report estimates of the orthogonality tests using the informa-
tion from the above variables. From the Â2 statistics we learn that for nearly all
deposits the null hypothesis that all of the variables are orthogonal to the forecast
error, is strongly rejected. In fact, the variables included can explain over 20 percent
of the variation in the forecast errors in terms of adjusted R2 statistics for several
deposits. Although it is not always clear which variable is most informative, the
most recent change in the level of the interest rates seems to be positively related
to the forecast error, and signi¯cant in a considerable number of cases.
The inclusion of the forward premium ft;t+k ¡ rt in the orthogonality test has
an other important feature. Observe that the probability limit of ¯1 in the classical
expectations hypothesis test in equation 3.3 reduces to
plim¯1 = 1 ¡
cov(ft;t+k ¡ rt+k;ft;t+k ¡ rt)
var(ft;t+k ¡ rt)
: (3.6)
This probability limit can be decomposed into an expectational error and time-
varying term premium component as ¯1 = ¯3 + ¯4, where
¯3 ´









If the forward discount is included as the sole regressor in equation 3.5, then the
¯3 coe±cient in the resulting orthogonality test:
»t+k = ®3 + ¯3(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k (3.9)
8Provided that the elements are known to the investor at the time she forms her forecast.
9The analysis can be extended easily to include multiple (preferably non-overlapping) lags of




t ¡ rt as the yield on a long-term contract. We choose the 10-year benchmark
bond yield for most deposits, since this is available for nearly all deposits and has a su±ciently
long history. If not available, we use the 10-year government bond yield. All yields are obtained
from Datastream. The short-term rate is simply the yield on the 3-month contract used earlier.The Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations 43
Table 3.5: Multivariate Orthogonality Test (3-month forecast horizon)
Forward Recent Recent Yield Â2 R2
a
discount error change spread
a) EMS rates
Austria ¡0:2336 0:1231 0:0715 0:1210¤¤¤ 17:22¤¤¤ 0:03
(0:4261) (0:2062) (0:4124) (0:0430)
Belgium ¡0:9348¤ 0:2882¤¤¤ 0:4804¤¤ 0:0909¤¤ 76:76¤¤¤ 0:40
(0:4953) (0:1050) (0:2267) (0:0407)
France 0:3955¤¤¤ 0:0840 ¡0:0241 0:1082¤¤ 17:43¤¤¤ 0:20
(0:1441) (0:1084) (0:1818) (0:0495)
Germany 0:5894¤¤¤ ¡0:1274 0:3826¤¤ 0:0485 22:59¤¤¤ 0:25
(0:1825) (0:1673) (0:1649) (0:0327)
Ireland ¡0:0908 0:0009 0:8371¤¤¤ ¡0:0602 15:07¤¤¤ 0:09
(0:5654) (0:1826) (0:3027) (0:1859)
Italy ¡0:0544 ¡0:0113 ¡0:0545 ¡0:0457 3:53 0:00
(0:0689) (0:0685) (0:0712) (0:0451)
Netherlands 0:3691 0:0974 0:3478¤¤ 0:0419 19:05¤¤¤ 0:18
(0:2359) (0:1415) (0:1721) (0:0391)
Spain 0:2693 0:0161 0:3355¤¤ 0:1201¤ 22:26¤¤¤ 0:21
(0:2281) (0:1555) (0:1668) (0:0626)
Europe 0:7767¤¤¤ ¡0:2702 0:2752 0:0367 21:64¤¤¤ 0:30
(0:2029) (0:2199) (0:1875) (0:0516)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia 0:2838 ¡0:0522 0:2552 0:0417 4:61 0:02
(0:3854) (0:1943) (0:2782) (0:1312)
Canada 0:2890 ¡0:0619 0:4990¤ ¡0:0133 14:97¤¤¤ 0:08
(0:2242) (0:1650) (0:2551) (0:0648)
Denmark 0:2511 0:0719 0:1129 0:0176 2:94 0:00
(0:2473) (0:2452) (0:1899) (0:0813)
Hong Kong 0:3376 ¡0:4240¤¤ 0:3143 ¡0:2033 5:61 0:05
(0:5865) (0:2032) (0:2756) (0:1999)
Japan 0:3396¤¤ 0:1273 0:5731¤¤¤ ¡0:0918¤¤ 35:85¤¤¤ 0:29
(0:1587) (0:1480) (0:2020) (0:0430)
New Zealand ¡0:2823 0:2432¤¤ 0:4980 0:2517¤ 18:58¤¤¤ 0:21
(0:3132) (0:1177) (0:3050) (0:1510)
Norway 0:2501 0:3212¤¤ ¡0:0958 ¡0:0300 17:21¤¤¤ 0:18
(0:2089) (0:1481) (0:1616) (0:0551)
Sweden 0:2334 ¡0:0103 0:2467 0:1369¤¤ 10:06¤¤ 0:13
(0:2373) (0:1194) (0:1831) (0:0673)
Switzerland 0:5791¤¤¤ 0:0321 0:3481¤¤ 0:0425 19:77¤¤¤ 0:13
(0:2187) (0:1791) (0:1701) (0:0754)
U.K. 0:0584 0:1451 0:3390 0:0836¤ 15:11¤¤¤ 0:15
(0:1609) (0:1353) (0:2123) (0:0433)
U.S. 0:7421¤¤ ¡0:0531 0:4227¤¤¤ 0:0102 22:00¤¤¤ 0:26
(0:3034) (0:1164) (0:1282) (0:0420)
Notes. This table shows the results from multivariate regressions of the forecast error on four vari-
ables from the investor's information set related to past performance and fundamentals describing
interest rates, namely the contemporaneous forward discount, ft ¡ rt, the most recent realized
forecast error, »t, the most recent change in the spot rate, rt ¡rt¡1, and the yield spread r
(L)
t ¡rt.
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Table 3.6: Multivariate Orthogonality Test (12-month forecast horizon)
Forward Recent Recent Yield Â2 R2
a
discount error change spread
a) EMS rates
Austria NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
Belgium ¡1:8215¤¤¤ ¡0:0510 0:5920 0:0631 15:43¤¤¤ 0:46
(0:4909) (0:1389) (0:4797) (0:2903)
France 0:2008 ¡0:1935 0:6538¤¤ 0:4117 21:92¤¤¤ 0:19
(0:6366) (0:2341) (0:3024) (0:4009)
Germany 0:3644 ¡0:1695 0:6414 0:1996 16:11¤¤¤ 0:13
(0:5920) (0:2173) (0:4903) (0:2947)
Ireland NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
Italy 0:1256 ¡0:2503 0:0406 0:1343 11:27¤¤ 0:16
(0:4423) (0:1714) (0:1796) (0:3529)
Netherlands 0:2458 ¡0:1987 0:9084¤¤ 0:2776 15:67¤¤¤ 0:14
(0:5444) (0:2122) (0:4440) (0:3069)
Spain 0:6802 ¡0:2746 0:6838 ¡0:0278 8:28¤ 0:26
(0:5990) (0:1957) (0:4867) (0:4047)
Europe ¡0:2760 0:1001 0:3007 0:5401 21:92¤¤¤ 0:14
(0:4920) (0:1598) (0:6465) (0:2668)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia 0:9697 ¡0:2299 0:6197 ¡0:5616 5:47 0:03
(0:7467) (0:2012) (0:5783) (0:4991)
Canada 1:1072¤¤¤ 0:0480 0:1747 0:0434 12:44¤¤ 0:24
(0:4202) (0:2594) (0:5308) (0:3455)
Denmark ¡1:2073¤¤¤ 0:4682¤¤¤ ¡0:3898¤ 0:4514¤ 45:46¤¤¤ 0:47
(0:3205) (0:0870) (0:1982) (0:2321)
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
Japan 0:0178¤ ¡0:0521 0:2393 ¡0:0607 5:76 0:08
(0:0104) (0:0974) (0:3164) (0:0922)
New Zealand NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
Norway 0:8346 0:8063¤¤ ¡0:9059 0:5063 23:19¤¤¤ 0:21
(1:0384) (0:3207) (1:1655) (0:6835)
Sweden ¡0:0860 ¡0:2190 0:6101 0:2609 6:19 0:10
(0:3980) (0:1937) (0:5591) (0:3507)
Switzerland 0:9831 0:0877 0:5645¤¤ 0:0908 25:07¤¤¤ 0:18
(0:8235) (0:2002) (0:2656) (0:4323)
U.K. ¡0:3179 ¡0:1276 0:4283 0:3524 6:65 0:14
(0:3672) (0:2046) (0:6176) (0:2960)
U.S. 0:2005 0:1187 0:9105 0:2565 7:68 0:11
(0:5648) (0:2099) (0:5788) (0:2675)
Notes. See table 3.5 for details.
is precisely equal to ¯3 in equation 3.7. The decomposition in equation 3.7 then
examines how much of the failure on the expectations hypothesis is attributed to
the existence of irrational behavior of market participants, as in equation 3.9, whileModels of Expectations Formation 45
the decomposed component in equation 3.8 solely looks at the existence of time-
variation in the term premia. The null hypothesis of orthogonality is presented by
®3 = 0 and ¯3 = 0.
Table 3.7 reports parameter estimates of the univariate orthogonality regression
of the survey-based forecast error on the contemporaneous forward discount. The
null hypothesis of error orthogonality is rejected for half of the rates on the short-term
horizon, and rejection becomes more apparent when the forecast horizon lengthens
to 12 months. The rejection is particularly strong for long-run EMS forecasts. It is
interesting to note that the rejection can often be attributed solely to the ¯nding
that ¯3 is su±ciently remote from unity. These ¯ndings indicate that failure of the
expectations hypothesis can at least be partly attributed to the failure of the rational
expectations hypothesis.
Taken together, the results of both the unbiasedness test and the orthogonal-
ity tests provide a fairly sound rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis for
many international interest rate series. This is not an isolated ¯nding, but is in line
with the general conclusion that so far has emerged from the analysis of survey re-
sults on exchange rate expectations for some of the major currencies relative to the
U.S. dollar|see, for instance, Cavaglia et al. (1993a,b, 1994), Verschoor and Wol®
(2001a,b), and Frankel and Froot (1987a,b). Thus, although the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis has considerable appeal as a theoretical model, it does not always
appear to provide an adequate explanation of many interest rate expectations in the
sampled period. It is therefore important to consider other models of expectations
formation. In the next section we examine two alternative models: extrapolative
and adaptive expectations.
3.4 Models of Expectations Formation
Empirical evidence suggests that interest rates are highly persistent, yet di±cult to
predict (see, for instance, Thornton, 2005). This would suggest that the random walk
may also be a proper characterization of investor's expectations formation, namely
that Et[rt+k] ¡ rt = 0. The availability of survey data permits us to test directly
how economic agents form their expectations of future interest rate movements, and
whether the random walk hypothesis holds for expected interest rates. The ¯nding in
the previous section that agents may not use all information that is available to them
in an optimal way to improve their forecasts suggests that the rational expectations
model may not be valid. In this section, two commonly used alternative models of
expectations formation are considered, i.e. the extrapolative and adaptive model. In
an extrapolative expectations framework, agents extrapolate the most recent trend
into the future. The expected interest rate is formed as a weighted average of the
contemporaneous and the lagged interest rate, so that the test describes a form of a
distributed lag expectation:
Et[rt+k] = (1 ¡ !)rt + !rt¡1: (3.10)
The number of lags of the interest rate is not per se restricted to one, yet we46 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
Table 3.7: Test of Error Orthogonality to Forward Premiums
3 month forecast horizon (k = 3) 12 month forecast horizon (k = 12)
®3 ¯3 Â2 R2
a ®3 ¯3 Â2 R2
a
a) EMS rates
Austria 0:0518 ¡0:8051¤ 4:37 0:13 NA NA NA NA
(0:0798) (0:4284) NA NA
Belgium ¡0:1138 ¡0:6548¤ 7:44¤¤ 0:05 1:5305 ¡1:7628¤¤¤ 327:79¤¤¤ 0:43
(0:1115) (0:3367) (0:8635) (0:4929)
France 0:0121 0:4501¤¤ 5:35¤ 0:14 ¡0:5688¤¤¤ 0:6971¤¤ 16:04¤¤¤ 0:11
(0:0487) (0:2143) (0:1482) (0:3496)
Germany ¡0:1012¤¤¤ 0:5315¤¤¤ 17:23¤ 0:15 ¡0:6915¤¤¤ 0:6855¤ 19:98¤¤¤ 0:11
(0:0352) (0:1942) (0:1556) (0:3538)
Ireland 0:0525 ¡0:0654 0:21 0:00 NA NA NA NA
(0:1248) (0:3693) NA NA
Italy ¡0:0299 0:0075 0:33 0:00 ¡0:5847¤¤¤ 0:2809 24:52¤¤¤ 0:08
(0:0567) (0:1119) (0:1510) (0:1779)
Netherlands ¡0:1255¤¤¤ 0:4291¤ 12:71¤¤¤ 0:07 ¡0:0678¤¤¤ 0:6539¤ 17:22¤¤ 0:09
(0:0417) (0:2440) (0:1638) (0:3593)
Spain ¡0:1168¤¤ 0:4462 18:78 0:15 ¡0:7243¤¤¤ 0:7637¤¤ 32:16¤¤¤ 0:18
(0:0466) (0:1758) (0:1450) (0:3259)
Europe ¡0:0232 0:7027¤¤¤ 14:95¤¤¤ 0:30 ¡0:8474¤¤¤ 0:3460 42:81¤¤¤ 0:06
(0:0478) (0:1819) (0:1295) (0:3272)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia ¡0:0831 0:3673¤ 4:81¤ 0:04 ¡0:2731 0:4348 2:29 0:06
(0:0568) (0:2077) (0:1930) (0:4140)
Canada ¡0:3904¤¤¤ 0:4859¤¤¤ 26:97¤¤¤ 0:11 ¡1:9360¤¤¤ 1:1558¤¤¤ 45:88¤¤¤ 0:38
(0:0757) (0:1557) (0:3192) (0:3393)
Denmark ¡0:1552¤ 0:2463 3:22 0:02 ¡0:8228¤¤¤ ¡0:7063¤¤ 65:17¤¤¤ 0:38
(0:0864) (0:2478) (0:1526) (0:2760)
Hong Kong ¡0:0463 0:0719 0:03 0:00 NA NA NA NA
(0:2813) (0:4485) NA NA
Japan ¡0:0552¤ 0:0142 2:81 0:00 ¡0:1341¤¤¤ 0:0139¤ 8:44¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0329) (0:1839) (0:0467) (0:0076)
New Zealand 0:0127 0:1110 0:28 0:00 NA NA NA NA
(0:1238) (0:2687) NA NA
Norway 0:0102 0:3522 1:71 0:03 ¡0:5909 ¡0:1610 3:09 0:00
(0:1297) (0:1808) (0:5544) (0:2176)
Sweden ¡0:2325¤¤¤ 0:4624 0:1647 0:09 ¡0:9549¤¤¤ 0:1800 28:23 0:01
(0:0576) (0:2406) (0:2803) (0:2455)
Switzerland ¡0:2731¤¤¤ 0:5604¤ 19:46¤¤¤ 0:08 1:4672¤¤ 1:0737¤¤ 67:98¤¤¤ 0:18
(0:0634) (0:2243) (0:2273) (0:4574)
U.K. ¡0:1354¤¤ 0:2691 6:22¤¤ 0:03 ¡0:5479¤¤¤ 0:1911 7:87¤¤ 0:01
(0:0565) (0:2056) (0:1955) (0:2731)
U.S. ¡0:3484¤¤¤ 0:6643¤¤ 29:88¤¤¤ 0:16 ¡1:5748¤¤ 0:5731 12:61¤¤¤ 0:05
(0:0677) (0:2689) (0:6886) (0:5417)
Notes. The parameter estimates are for the test »t+k = ®3 + ¯3(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k. The sample
period is January 1995 through December 2004. The standard errors of the coe±cients are given in
parenthesis. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant level, respectively,
of the hypothesis that ®3 = 0 or ¯3 = 0. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint hypotheses that
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choose to include only the most recent lag to preserve model parsimony. We exper-
imented with multiple lags, but none of the alternatives could improve a single-lag
model in terms of model selection criteria. An empirically testable version of this
model is presented as
re
t;t+k ¡ rt = °0 + °1(rt ¡ rt¡1) + ²t; (3.11)
where °0 = 0 and °1 = ¡! and the expected future interest rate Et[rt+k] is replaced
by its survey-based forecast re
t;t+k.11 If estimates for °1 are greater than zero, then
interest rate expectations are said to exhibit `bandwagon' e®ects: past changes in
the interest rates are expected to be reversed in the future. If estimates for °1 are
equal to zero, then expectations are said to be static in that the best predictor of the
future level of the interest rate is today's spot rate. Hence, if we de¯ne `speculation'
as buying and selling foreign currency rates in response to non-zero expected interest
rate changes, one can interpret a ¯nding of °1 > 0 (`bandwagon' expectations) as
implying that speculation is destabilizing in that the speculation does not lead to
mean-reverting behavior and a ¯nding of °1 < 0 (distributed lag expectations) as
implying that speculation is stabilizing. Least squares estimates of the parameters
in equation 3.11 are reported in table 3.8.
We ¯nd that the null hypothesis of static expectations is strongly rejected across
both horizons (although it must be noted that for EMS deposits rejection is pri-
marily attributable to rejection of the joint hypothesis that °0 = 0 and °1 = 0).
Interestingly, we ¯nd that the sign of the °1-coe±cients that are statistically signif-
icant, are negative in the majority of cases|an indication that the expectations on
interest rates are mean-reverting. Thus, past interest rate movements are expected
to be reversed in the future.
Interpreting the regression coe±cient for the 3-month Hong Kong interbank rate
at the 3-month forecast horizon, a current interest rate change of 10 percent is
expected to be reversed over the next 3 months by about 4.6 percent. Acting on
the basis of such expectations, investors are more likely to buy (sell) when the price
of foreign currency deposits is already low (high), thereby dampening the original
interest rate movement.
Furthermore, from the information on the adjusted R2 statistic it appears that
the extrapolative model can only account for a small fraction of the variation in
the expected interest rate change, in particular for EMS deposits, and that the
extrapolative model does not improve to capture the dynamics when the forecast
horizon lengthens.
Adaptive expectations models were subsequently considered; namely, the ex-
pected future interest rate is formed as a weighted average of the current spot interest
rate and the lagged expected rate, maturing at time t, or
Et[rt+k] = (1 ¡ !)rt + !Et¡k[rt]: (3.12)
11In this section, where the expected depreciation is on the left-hand side of the regressions,
forecast horizons longer than the observational frequency do not themselves imply that the error
term is serially correlated, since expectations are formed using only contemporaneous and past
information. Therefore, equations 3.11 and 3.13 are estimated using the standard least squares
procedure.48 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
Table 3.8: Extrapolative Expectations Model
3 month forecast horizon (k = 3) 12 month forecast horizon (k = 12)
°0 °1 Â2 R2
a °0 °1 Â2 R2
a
a) EMS rates
Austria ¡0:0855¤¤¤ ¡0:0406 10:48¤¤¤ 0:00 0:3945¤¤¤ ¡0:1744 83:16¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0269) (0:1892) (0:0456) (0:3205)
Belgium ¡0:0293 ¡0:4940¤¤¤ 60:91¤¤¤ 0:57 0:4249¤¤¤ ¡0:4669¤¤¤ 190:21¤¤¤ 0:37
(0:0246) (0:0633) (0:0349) (0:0899)
France ¡0:1486¤¤¤ ¡0:2758¤¤¤ 43:39¤¤¤ 0:12 0:0161 ¡0:2730¤¤ 6:57¤¤ 0:05
(0:0269) (0:0681) (0:0432) (0:1092)
Germany 0:0068 0:0413 0:51¤ 0:00 0:3317¤¤¤ 0:0802 250:59¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0122) (0:0767) (0:0210) (0:1316)
Ireland ¡0:2893 ¡0:0431 15:99¤¤¤ 0:00 ¡0:3421¤¤ ¡0:0887 4:21 0:00
(0:0816) (0:2358) (0:1673) (0:4830)
Italy ¡0:1649 0:0993 15:99¤¤¤ 0:00 ¡0:2060¤¤ 0:2574 9:25¤¤¤ 0:01
(0:0443) (0:1191) (0:0803) (0:2159)
Netherlands 0:0118 ¡0:0910 2:57 0:01 0:3657¤¤¤ ¡0:2350 158:63¤¤¤ 0:01
(0:0132) (0:0766) (0:0300) (0:1729)
Spain ¡0:0462¤¤ ¡0:0089 5:44¤ 0:00 0:1812¤¤¤ 0:3405¤¤ 19:27¤¤¤ 0:03
(0:0202) (0:0828) (0:0422) (0:1732)
Europe ¡0:0267 0:2076¤¤ 7:30¤¤ 0:06 0:2534¤¤¤ 0:2442 80:28¤¤¤ 0:03
(0:0173) (0:0994) (0:0283) (0:1632)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia 0:0427¤¤¤ 0:2498¤¤¤ 17:32¤¤¤ 0:08 0:3083¤¤¤ ¡0:0321 110:63¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0139) (0:0799) (0:0295) (0:1698)
Canada 0:1292¤¤¤ 0:1590¤¤ 50:92¤¤¤ 0:04 0:4971¤¤¤ 0:0318 112:30¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0185) (0:0674) (0:0471) (0:1718)
Denmark ¡0:0307 ¡0:0565 0:59 0:00 0:4579¤¤¤ ¡0:2236 50:15¤¤¤ 0:02
(0:0437) (0:1402) (0:0673) (0:2157)
Hong Kong ¡0:1227¤ ¡0:4611¤¤¤ 96:32¤¤¤ 0:46 0:0776 ¡0:4914¤¤¤ 35:24¤¤¤ 0:24
(0:0624) (0:0476) (0:1098) (0:0838)
Japan ¡0:0039 ¡0:2121 7:32 0:05 0:1197¤¤¤ ¡0:3324¤¤ 59:20¤¤¤ 0:03
(0:0083) (0:0783) (0:0172) (0:1619)
New Zealand ¡0:0501 ¡0:1350¤ 5:36¤ 0:02 0:0621 ¡0:1553 1:41 0:00
(0:0305) (0:0783) (0:0751) (0:1926)
Norway ¡0:0599 ¡0:0024 2:66 0:00 ¡0:1611 ¡0:2458 3:07 0:01
(0:0367) (0:0920) (0:1045) (0:2615)
Sweden 0:0486¤¤ 0:2370¤¤ 8:59¤¤ 0:05 0:4549¤¤¤ 0:5394¤¤¤ 121:97¤¤ 0:08
(0:0243) (0:0952) (0:0414) (0:1620)
Switzerland 0:0933¤¤¤ ¡0:3732¤¤¤ 83:72¤¤¤ 0:24 0:6295¤¤ ¡0:4281¤¤¤ 455:99¤¤¤ 0:09
(0:0155) (0:0606) (0:0306) (0:1200)
U.K. 0:0767¤¤¤ 0:2464¤¤¤ 27:51¤¤¤ 0:06 0:3053¤¤¤ 0:7125¤¤¤ 48:08¤¤¤ 0:06
(0:0164) (0:0893) (0:0466) (0:2533)
U.S. 0:1881¤¤¤ ¡0:0843 144:77¤¤¤ 0:01 0:5526¤¤¤ 0:0503 166:60¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0160) (0:0708) (0:0430) (0:1899)
Notes. The parameter estimates are for the test re
t;t+k ¡ rt = °0 + °1(rt ¡ rt¡1) + ²t. The sample
period is January 1995 through December 2004. The standard errors of the coe±cients are given in
parenthesis. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant level, respectively,
of the hypothesis that °0 = 0 or °1 = 0. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint hypotheses that
°0 = 0 and °1 = 0. R2
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Alternatively, one can view the expected interest rate movement as a function of
past forecast errors, and then the following equation may be ¯tted:
re
t;t+k ¡ rt = ±0 + ±1(rt ¡ re
t¡k;t) + ²t: (3.13)
Equation 3.13 corresponds to equation 3.12 if we set ±0 = 0 and ±1 = ¡! and when
the expected future interest rate Et[rt+k] is replaced by its survey-based forecast
re
t;t+k. In essence, this is a version of the class of learning models, where markets
participants learn from their past behavior and mistakes. Parameter estimates for
this test are reported in table 3.9.
The results on the model of adaptive expectations corroborate our earlier ¯nd-
ing in that the null hypothesis of static expectations is strongly rejected. For the
majority of the interest rates at the 3-month horizon the estimates for ±1 are sig-
ni¯cantly negative, indicating that expectations again appear to be mean-reverting.
Interpreting the regression coe±cient for the 3-month Hong Kong interbank rate at
the 12-month horizon, an unexpected interest rate change of 10 percent implies an
expected future change in the interest rate over the next 12 months of about ¡4:7
percent. From tables 3.8 and 3.9, it is clear that interest rate expectations display
a considerable positive weight on the lagged spot interest rate or on the lagged ex-
pected spot rate, rather than placing all the weight on the contemporaneous spot
rate, and in this sense are stabilizing.
In terms of explanatory power, the adaptive model can better explain the vari-
ability in the expected interest rate changes than the extrapolative model: adjusted
R2 are in general higher for the adaptive model, and for a number of deposits the
increase in model ¯t is considerable.12 The latter ¯nding is interesting, for though
both models indicate that expectations are mean-reverting (in particular when the
forecast horizon lengthens) expectations are more in°uenced by the most recent be-
havior of the market participants than they are by the past behavior of the market
itself. This would indicate that expectations evolve from learning more than they
do by way of adapting to the past market status.
In can be questioned whether the underlying processes that generate expectations
can better be described by using a more dynamic model than either the extrapolative
or adaptive framework. We therefore present in tables 3.10 and 3.11 results from a
multivariate regression of the expected changes on both the most recent change in
the level of the interest rates and the most recent forecast error. In terms of adjusted
R2 statistics the mixed model explains the variation in the expected interest rate
change better, or at minimum no worse, than either the adaptive or extrapolative
model. The parameters of the original adaptive model retain their sign, while the
parameters of the original extrapolative model change sign frequently.
We continue by examining formally whether an adaptive, an extrapolative, or a
`mixed' model can best describe the expectations formation process, by using the
Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion13 and ¯nd that either the mixed model or the
12Only for the United Kingdom and Belgium does the extrapolative model have more explanatory
power, albeit marginally.
13We do not provide statistics here, but rather choose to describe the ¯ndings. All results on the
selection criteria test are available upon request.50 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
Table 3.9: Adaptive Expectations Model
3 month forecast horizon (k = 3) 12 month forecast horizon (k = 12)
±0 ±1 Â2 R2
a ±0 ±1 Â2 R2
a
a) EMS rates
Austria ¡0:0994¤¤¤ ¡0:0279 15:74¤¤¤ 0:00 0:3717¤¤¤ 0:0841¤¤ 74:77¤¤¤ 0:11
(0:0250) (0:0810) (0:0476) (0:0403)
Belgium ¡0:0255 ¡0:1676¤¤ 5:42¤ 0:11 0:4146¤¤¤ 0:0169 94:23¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0360) (0:0720) (0:0542) (0:0386)
France ¡0:1208¤¤¤ ¡0:1773¤¤¤ 42:86¤¤¤ 0:08 0:1670¤¤¤ 0:0676¤¤¤ 38:20¤¤¤ 0:06
(0:0223) (0:0530) (0:0270) (0:0251)
Germany 0:0134 0:1154¤¤¤ 8:31¤¤ 0:06 0:3075¤¤¤ ¡0:0176 218:29¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0123) (0:0403) (0:0255) (0:0234)
Ireland ¡0:2577¤¤¤ ¡0:4359¤¤¤ 28:85¤¤¤ 0:22 ¡0:8021¤¤¤ ¡0:4052¤¤¤ 24:74¤¤¤ 0:19
(0:0737) (0:1246) (0:1698) (0:1412)
Italy ¡0:1804¤¤¤ ¡0:3422¤¤¤ 34:29¤¤¤ 0:12 ¡0:1143 0:0673 4:15 0:00
(0:0413) (0:0852) (0:1037) (0:0929)
Netherlands 0:0165 0:0673¤ 3:66 0:02 0:2911¤¤¤ ¡0:0465¤ 134:69¤¤¤ 0:02
(0:0134) (0:0386) (0:0326) (0:0266)
Spain ¡0:0306 0:1575¤¤¤ 16:49¤ 0:06 0:2572¤¤¤ 0:1592¤¤¤ 36:64¤¤¤ 0:20
(0:0196) (0:0539) (0:0447) (0:0308)
Europe ¡0:0344¤¤ 0:2185¤¤¤ 21:29¤¤¤ 0:21 0:2227¤¤¤ ¡0:0147 48:63¤¤¤ 0:00
(0:0164) (0:0520) (0:0354) (0:0317)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia 0:0527¤¤¤ 0:1521¤¤¤ 26:24¤¤¤ 0:14 0:2141¤¤¤ ¡0:1221¤¤¤ 116:20¤¤¤ 0:17
(0:0140) (0:0356) (0:0328) (0:0271)
Canada 0:1541¤¤¤ 0:1050¤¤¤ 55:78¤¤¤ 0:06 0:4019¤¤¤ ¡0:1499¤¤¤ 117:31¤¤¤ 0:16
(0:0207) (0:0387) (0:0541) (0:0327)
Denmark ¡0:0719¤ ¡0:0696 3:61 0:01 0:3001¤¤¤ ¡0:1128¤ 46:78¤¤¤ 0:10
(0:0380) (0:0996) (0:0977) (0:0573)
Hong Kong ¡0:1078¤¤ ¡0:5078¤¤¤ 293:26¤¤¤ 0:73 ¡0:1643¤ ¡0:4866¤¤¤ 146:93¤¤¤ 0:60
(0:0452) (0:0298) (0:0917) (0:0403)
Japan ¡0:0091 ¡0:1779¤¤¤ 26:70¤¤¤ 0:18 0:0604¤¤¤ ¡0:1954¤¤¤ 70:60¤¤¤ 0:18
(0:0079) (0:0344) (0:0197) (0:0400)
New Zealand ¡0:0355 ¡0:1375¤¤¤ 14:62¤¤¤ 0:11 0:0600 ¡0:2946¤¤¤ 42:89¤¤¤ 0:25
(0:0292) (0:0379) (0:0663) (0:0516)
Norway ¡0:0699¤ ¡0:1260¤¤¤ 10:63¤¤¤ 0:09 ¡0:0099 ¡0:1998¤¤¤ 40:08¤¤¤ 0:36
(0:0363) (0:0455) (0:0634) (0:0325)
Sweden 0:0676¤¤ 0:1654¤¤¤ 9:28¤¤¤ 0:05 0:5208¤¤¤ 0:0763¤¤ 114:04¤¤¤ 0:04
(0:0268) (0:0620) (0:0573) (0:0354)
Switzerland 0:0680¤¤¤ ¡0:1792¤¤¤ 64:14¤¤¤ 0:18 0:4961¤¤¤ ¡0:1222¤¤¤ 443:39¤¤¤ 0:15
(0:0173) (0:0356) (0:0386) (0:0274)
U.K. 0:0821¤¤¤ 0:1193¤¤¤ 24:43¤¤¤ 0:05 0:2119¤¤¤ ¡0:1132¤¤ 34:62¤¤¤ 0:04
(0:0171) (0:0447) (0:0564) (0:0517)
U.S. 0:2002¤¤¤ 0:0525 141:01¤¤¤ 0:01 0:4600¤¤¤ ¡0:1236¤¤¤ 190:24¤¤¤ 0:10
(0:0193) (0:0395) (0:0543) (0:0354)
Notes. The parameter estimates are for the test re
t;t+k ¡rt = ±0 +±1(rt ¡re
t¡k;t)+²t. The sample
period is January 1995 through December 2004. The standard errors of the coe±cients are given in
parenthesis. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant level, respectively,
of the hypothesis that ±0 = 0 or ±1 = 0. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint hypotheses that
±0 = 0 and ±1 = 0. R2
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Table 3.10: Mixed Expectations Model (3-month forecast horizon)
Recent change Recent error R2
a Model
a) EMS rates
Austria 0:0675 ¡0:0430 0:00 adaptive
(0:2110) (0:0946)
Belgium ¡0:5257¤¤¤ ¡0:0176 0:50 extrapolative
(0:0874) (0:0589)
France 0:2683¤¤¤ ¡0:2279¤¤¤ 0:14 mixed
(0:0836) (0:0534)
Germany ¡0:1655¤ 0:1736¤¤ 0:07 adaptive
(0:0974) (0:0527)
Ireland 0:3596 ¡0:4948¤¤¤ 0:21 adaptive
(0:2675) (0:1310)
Italy 0:3395¤¤¤ ¡0:4543¤¤¤ 0:16 mixed
(0:1218) (0:0921)
Netherlands ¡0:2542¤¤¤ 0:1445¤¤¤ 0:07 mixed
(0:0901) (0:0464)
Spain ¡0:1288 0:2035¤¤¤ 0:06 adaptive
(0:1157) (0:0679)
Europe ¡0:0639 0:2420¤¤¤ 0:19 adaptive
(0:1348) (0:0720)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia 0:0277 0:1431¤¤¤ 0:13 adaptive
(0:1112) (0:0509)
Canada 0:2079¤¤ 0:0306 0:07 mixed
(0:1021) (0:0529)
Denmark ¡0:0055 ¡0:0666 0:00 adaptive
(0:1517) (0:1299)
Hong Kong ¡0:1875¤¤¤ ¡0:4119¤¤¤ 0:78 mixed
(0:0378) (0:0332)
Japan 0:0503 ¡0:1934¤¤¤ 0:18 adaptive
(0:0971) (0:0457)
New Zealand 0:0565 ¡0:1557¤¤¤ 0:10 adaptive
(0:0987) (0:0495)
Norway 0:2710¤¤ ¡0:2135¤¤¤ 0:13 mixed
(0:1178) (0:0584)
Sweden 0:1079 0:1205 0:05 adaptive
(0:1350) (0:0837)
Switzerland ¡0:2724¤¤¤ ¡0:0950¤¤ 0:26 mixed
(0:0719) (0:0404)
U.K. 0:1389 0:0719 0:05 adaptive
(0:1192) (0:0604)
U.S. ¡0:2553¤¤¤ 0:1469¤¤¤ 0:07 mixed
(0:0880) (0:0502)
Notes. This table shows the results from multivariate regressions of the expected change in the
interest rate on the most recent realized change, rt ¡ rt¡1, and the most recent forecast error,
rt ¡re
t¡k;t. The standard errors of the coe±cients are given in parentheses. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes
signi¯cance at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant level, respectively. R2
a is the adjusted R2 measure.
`Model' gives the model that best describes the expectations formation process, in terms of the
Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion.52 On the Rationality of Interest Rate Expectations
Table 3.11: Mixed Expectations Model (12-month forecast horizon)
Recent change Recent error R2
a Model
a) EMS rates
Austria ¡0:1949 0:0940¤¤ 0:07 adaptive
(0:2955) (0:0433)
Belgium ¡0:6170¤¤ 0:0448 0:10 extrapolative
(0:2539) (0:0379)
France ¡0:0021 0:0678¤¤ 0:05 adaptive
(0:1321) (0:0275)
Germany 0:2304 ¡0:0339 0:01 adaptive
(0:1454) (0:0254)
Ireland 0:0815 ¡0:4042¤¤¤ 0:14 adaptive
(0:5717) (0:1434)
Italy 0:5862¤¤ 0:0017 0:03 extrapolative
(0:2850) (0:0969)
Netherlands 0:0813 ¡0:0517¤ 0:01 adaptive
(0:1753) (0:0289)
Spain 0:2677 0:1372¤¤¤ 0:20 adaptive
(0:2016) (0:0349)
Europe 0:4824¤¤ ¡0:0465 0:04 extrapolative
(0:2321) (0:0344)
b) Non-EMS rates
Australia 0:4080¤¤ ¡0:1497¤¤¤ 0:19 mixed
(0:1858) (0:0294)
Canada 0:7006¤¤¤ ¡0:2014¤¤¤ 0:24 mixed
(0:1943) (0:0341)
Denmark ¡0:1904 ¡0:0970 0:06 adaptive
(0:2617) (0:0616)
Hong Kong ¡0:2477¤¤¤ ¡0:4307¤¤¤ 0:64 mixed
(0:0642) (0:0404)
Japan ¡0:1883 ¡0:1923¤¤¤ 0:18 adaptive
(0:1957) (0:0401)
New Zealand 0:2134 ¡0:3134¤¤¤ 0:25 adaptive
(0:1626) (0:0534)
Norway 0:8922¤¤¤ ¡0:2507¤¤¤ 0:46 mixed
(0:2438) (0:0329)
Sweden 0:4609¤¤ 0:0353 0:08 mixed
(0:1829) (0:0382)
Switzerland ¡0:2338¤ ¡0:1061¤¤¤ 0:17 adaptive
(0:1201) (0:0283)
U.K. 1:0845¤¤¤ ¡0:1895¤¤¤ 0:15 mixed
(0:2717) (0:0520)
U.S. 0:3749¤ ¡0:1531¤¤¤ 0:12 adaptive
(0:1993) (0:0383)
Notes. See table 3.10.
adaptive expectations model is preferred over the extrapolative expectations model.
Only for Belgium does an extrapolative model have more explanatory power.
We conclude from the above that expected changes in interest rates display mean-
reversion, that learning about past mistakes has a greater in°uence on the forma-Conclusions 53
tion of expectations than the past performance of the interest rate series, and that
non-rational models have appeal as alternatives to the rational expectations model.
Finally, it must be stressed that the expectations formation process is very complex,
in that no single model can capture all of the dynamics in the formation process.
The models described above could only capture part of these dynamics. It is also
reasonable to assume that the way market participants form their expectations is
in°uenced di®erently over di®erent time periods, by the country at question, and
by the speci¯c setting of the asset. For instance, the adaptive and mixed model
capture more of the dynamics of the expected interest rate changes when interest
rate volatility is high or when there is an apparent trend in the series, like with the
Hong Kong interbank rate, that experienced an almost 15 percent decrease since
1997. Altogether, this discussion has been an initial step to get more insight in how
expectations of future interest rates are formed.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we examined whether expectations of future EMS and non-EMS
interest rates are formed rationally during the period of January 1995 through De-
cember 2004. While short-term interest rates sometimes appear to be rational, we
corroborate the earlier ¯nding in the literature that (longer-term) interest rate fore-
casts are not rational and that agents do not use all available information in an
e±cient manner; this ¯nding applies to the post-1990 period, thus questioning the
assertion of Frankel and Froot (1987a, p.151) that \the nature of the rejection of
rational expectations strongly depends on the sample period."
As to the expectations formation mechanism, market participants tend to under-
react to current (unanticipated) changes in the interest rate at the 3- and 12-month
horizons, as implied by stabilizing expectations models. Our results demonstrate
that the pattern across long-term forecast horizons for foreign currency deposits cor-
roborates the long-held view that speculation based on long-term expectations may
be stabilizing. This is in line with the general conclusion that so far has emerged from
survey data on exchange rate expectations. For instance, Cavaglia et al. (1993a,b)
and Frankel and Froot (1987a,b, 1990b) obtained parameter estimates suggesting
stabilizing expectation models for long-term horizons. At shorter horizons of one
week to one month, however, investors tended to extrapolate recent trends. This
lack of unity across di®erent forecast horizons raises the possibility that di®erent
types of market participants form their expectations in di®erent ways, with specula-
tors more heavily represented at the short horizon and investors at the long horizons.
In the current chapter, we have focused our attention on characterizing the for-
mation of expectations at various forecast horizons for a set of interest rates. Our
analysis is extended in the next chapter, which examines the expectations hypothesis
of the term structure of interest rates. We will use the implicit forward rates to im-
pute interest rate term premia to assess whether the rejection of the forward rate as
an unbiased predictor of the spot rate is predominantly attributable to irrationality




The term structure of interest rates describes the relationship between short- and
long-term interest rates, and has become an important concept both for academics
and policy makers. One of the theories explaining the shape of the term structure is
the expectations hypothesis, which states that the entire term structure at a given
point in time re°ects the market's expectations of future rates. In one version of
the expectations hypothesis (see, for instance, the seminal paper by Fama, 1984b)
the forward rate that is implied by the term structure is an unbiased predictor of
the future realized spot interest rate, up to a constant liquidity premium. In other
versions the expected holding return is equal for all bond maturities except for a
maturity-speci¯c constant term premium, or long-term interest rates are equal to
the (weighted) average of expected future short rates, up to a constant di®erence.
Shiller (1990) and Campbell (1995) review some of the literature on term struc-
ture studies and ¯nd that the expectations hypothesis for the U.S. term structure is
rejected. The general result is that although the forward rate contains some infor-
mation about future spot rates, it is by no means an unbiased predictor. In fact, it
has become a well-established empirical regularity in the ¯nancial economics litera-
ture that the implicit forward rate is a biased predictor of the future spot interest
rate. It must be stressed that results are sample-dependent. Christiansen (2003)
¯nds that, when investigating two sample periods, the expectations hypothesis is
rejected in one, though not in the other. Rejection of the expectations hypothesis
has traditionally been attributed to the existence of a time-varying term premia, as
manifested by Fama (1984b) or more recently by Harris (2001) and Dai and Single-
ton (2002), the existence of irrational behavior on the part of market participants,
¤Part of this chapter is from a working paper with Willem F.C. Verschoor and Christian C.P.
Wol®.
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or some combination thereof.
However, international evidence in favor of the expectations hypothesis is by
far not as strong as for the U.S. Dahlquist and Jonsson (1995), Gerlach and Smets
(1997), Jondeau and Ricart (1999), and Dom¶ ³nguez and Novales (2000) ¯nd that
while for the U.S. the expectations hypothesis is ¯rmly rejected, this is by no means
the case in a broader international, non-U.S. context. Their results are irrespec-
tive of the various forms in which the expectations hypothesis has been presented
in the literature and are focused both on forward rate unbiasedness regressions or
cointegration techniques, and on spread regressions. In the current chapter we ad-
dress this issue by relying on a large international dataset that includes simultaneous
American, European, and Asian interest rate deposits, thus allowing an interesting
comparison of the strength of the expectations hypothesis in a broader setting.
Moreover, even when the expectations hypothesis cannot be rejected in a wider
international context, it may still be the case that time-varying term premia exist in
the term structure. Dahlquist and Jonsson (1995) show that while the expectations
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the Swedish term structure over the sample under
investigation|in that forward rates are not biased estimates of future spot rates|
the parameter estimates are nevertheless unstable over time and this instability is
getting larger with the forecast horizon. The instability in turn may then well be
the result of time-variation in the term premia. So even though the expectations
hypothesis may not be rejected for the usual data sources, time-variation in term
premia may still exist.
However, the inherently unobserved nature of the term premium never allows a
clear assessment of how the results from previous expectations hypothesis studies
are biased by the assumption of rational expectations and whether rejection of the
expectations hypothesis is in fact attributed to the existence of a time-varying term
premium. In the current chapter we try to address this issue by relying on survey
measures of interest rate expectations. Using survey measures of expectations allows
us to verify whether commonly-used assumptions about the underlying process that
characterizes the expectations hypothesis are correct. Not only does the use of survey
measures of expectations allow us to assess whether time-varying term premia exist
in the term structure of interest rates, it also allows to model the term premia, in
terms of time series models or economic fundamentals.
The use of survey data is not uncommon in the literature. Frankel and Froot
(1987b) and Cavaglia et al. (1993b, 1994) use survey data on foreign exchange to
examine whether exchange rate expectations are formed rationally. Dokko and Edel-
stein (1989) review the usefulness of the Livingston forecasts of stock market rates
of returns and Branch (2004) re-examines rational in°ation expectations. Although
Friedman (1979) and Froot (1989) brie°y examine the expectations hypothesis of the
U.S. term structure using survey data, these studies are hampered by small sample
problems and do not allow an assessment of the expectations hypothesis in a wider
international context.
While the failure of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest
rates in the U.S. is often attributed to the existence of a time-varying term premium,
it remains ambiguous as to what the sources of this time-variability are. Most of theIntroduction 57
recent literature on term premium determinants has focused on models of its second
moments. Engle et al. (1987), for instance, suggest that the conditional variance
of the excess holding yield on a long-term bond is a determinant of the current
term premium, in addition to the information already contained in the often-used
long-short yield spread. Yet Tzavalis and Wickens (1995) and Henry (1999) argue
that a structural break in the unconditional variance can give rise to a spurious
persistence in volatility. This suggests that conditional heteroskedasticity models
may not adequately capture the time-variation in the term premium. Henry (1999),
for instance, accounts for regime shifts in the U.S. monetary policy in tests of time-
varying term premia and ¯nds that conditional heteroskedasticity models appear
less than adequate. On the other hand, Lee (1995) and Bekdache (2001) ¯nd that
term premia should be modeled as a function of macroeconomic variables instead
of as a function of mere asset covariances. In particular production, money supply,
and maturity composition of federal debt appear important determinants.
Little if anything is documented about the behavior and the determinants of
foreign term premia, while the behavior of international term premia can be sub-
stantially di®erent. Hejazi et al. (2000) report that, in contrast to the U.S., the
Canadian term premium is not related to the conditional variances of Canadian
macroeconomic variables, like industrial production and money supply. Yet, an in-
depth comparative study on the presence of term premia in international interest
rate deposits is still lacking in the literature. We address these issues by explicitly
modeling the survey-based term premia using various techniques.
Finally, the rejection of the expectations hypothesis is particularly pronounced
for longer maturity bonds, while for the shorter maturity bonds the evidence is
mixed. We therefore focus in this chapter on the short end of the term structure, in
an e®ort to obtain more clarity for this segment.
Our results are easily summarized. Although we ¯nd strong evidence for the
rejection of the `pure' version of the expectations hypothesis, we only ¯nd the null
hypothesis that forward rates are biased estimates of future interest rates to be
rejected for a limited number of international interest rate deposits. Nevertheless,
we ¯nd some evidence that the behavior of market participants, when making pre-
dictions about the future level of interest rates, is not entirely in line with what
rational behavior would suggest. We furthermore ¯nd that there is strong evidence
of time-variation in the term premia. Also, while the dynamics of term premia
can be accounted for by low-order members of the ARMA class models, there is
clear evidence to conclude that the conditional heteroskedasticity in term premium
movement plays an important role.
The remainder of the chapter is presented as follows. In section 4.2 we introduce
the basic methodology. Section 4.3 presents the data and examines several important
standard propositions regarding interest rate expectations. In section 4.4 we examine
the validity of the expectations hypothesis and we look at the extent to which time-
varying term premia are present in the term structure of interest rates and whether
the behavior of market participants can be labeled rational. In section 4.5 the time-
series behavior of term premia is examined and section 4.6 models the time-variation
in the term premia. Finally, section 4.7 concludes.58 Time-Variation in Term Premia
4.2 The Expectations Hypothesis of the Term Struc-
ture
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates is presented
in the literature in various basic forms. In one form, interest rates on long-term
contracts are represented as an average of expected future short-term rates, plus
a constant premium. A constant is allowed by the expectations hypothesis, for
instance to account for the liquidity preference theory that states that investors
are risk-averse and hence require an (monotonically) increasing return for bonds
with longer maturities, since the latter are less liquid. An alternative form of the
expectations hypothesis asserts that investors try to equalize the expected holding
returns of investments strategies with various horizons, again up to a constant (see,
e.g. Campbell, 1995). A ¯nal version of the expectations hypothesis asserts that
forward rates should be equal to the expectation of the corresponding future interest
rates, and hence forward rates can be used to forecast future rates. An advantage
of this version is that it depends only on contemporaneous information. All three
versions allow for a constant term premium. Shiller et al. (1983) give a clear overview
of the implications of these three versions. In this article we focus on the third version
of the expectations hypothesis.
The continuously compounded yield to maturity at time t on an n-period zero
coupon (or discount) bond with a normalized face value of 1 currency unit and a











for each period when held to maturity. The forward rate implied by the term struc-
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t+k is the interest rate at which either holding an n-period bond until maturity or
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where k < n. In this chapter, the interest rate series used have a maturity of only
3 months. We can therefore simplify the notation where we leave the superscript n
out of r
(n)
t and use rt in the remainder of this chapter to denote the 3 month spot
rate and ft;t+k as the k-period ahead 3 month forward rate (since then n¡k equals
3 months).
The expectations hypothesis states that the implicit forward rate should equate
the expected future interest rate, up to a term premium, which is de¯ned as
't ´ ft;t+k ¡ Et[rt+k]: (4.3)
From this speci¯cation it can be seen that although the forward rate may contain
information about future spot interest rates, it also contains a premium component.
Variation through time of the term premium can therefore reduce the power ofSurvey Data and Standard Propositions Regarding Expectations 59
forward rates as predictors of future spot rates. Time-variation in term premia may
arise because of changes in market participants' preferred investment horizon, so
that term premia evolve over time with investors' presumed risk aversion. More
general equilibrium asset pricing models, like Cox et al. (1985), imply that the term
premium is a function of both investors' attitudes towards risk, so that the term
premium can be interpreted as a risk premium, and the covariance of long and short
rates with consumption or wealth.
A technical problem that has plagued model builders on the expectations hy-
pothesis is that market expectations are inherently unobservable. A commonly used
assumption is that expectations are formed in a rational way, such that the mar-
ket forms unbiased expectations of future interest rates and that the forecast error,
de¯ned as
¥t+k ´ rt+k ¡ Et[rt+k]; (4.4)
is orthogonal to all information available at time t, and in fact is distributed around
a zero mean and constant variance. Conditional on this assumption of rational
expectations, the term premium is approximated by the ex-post forward bias
Át ´ ft;t+k ¡ rt+k = 't + »t+k: (4.5)
Fama (1984b) builds on this assumption by developing a technique based on for-
ward rates that are implicit in the term structure of interest rates, while allowing
for time-varying term premia. He assumes that premia are time-variant when their
covariance with other elements from the investor's information set, such as the for-
ward premium, is nonnegative. Therefore, the expectations hypothesis of the term
structure of interest rates can be tested by means of the following equation:
rt+k ¡ rt = ®1 + ¯1(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k: (4.6)
The null hypothesis that the implicit forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the
future spot interest rate is presented by the joint hypothesis that ®1 = 0 and ¯1 = 1.
In fact, this speci¯cation tests the pure version of the expectations hypothesis, where
no constant premium is allowed. In a weaker version the constant is allowed to be
nonzero. In the next section we introduce a survey data set that allows us to deviate
from the commonly used rationality assumption. We denote re
t;t+k as the survey-
based proxy for the (unknown) market expectation Et[rt+k].
4.3 Survey Data and Standard Propositions Re-
garding Expectations
The interest rate data and survey data that is used in this chapter is described in
detail in section 3.2. In this chapter we focus only on the 3-month ahead forecasts.
We categorize the interest rate deposits in four areas based on their geographic origin.
The sample primarily consists of expectations for eurodeposit rates, interbank rates,
and treasury bill rates. The use of eurodeposit rates has the added advantage of60 Time-Variation in Term Premia
not being a®ected by any possible government regulations such as capital controls
and are sold in a number of national markets simultaneously, thus making the rates
more comparable than national rates.
Typical concerns when using survey data, in any setting, are whether these data
re°ect the true market expectations, whether the expectations are biased because of
strategic behavior from the panelists, or whether forecasts from surveys are of any
use in an out-of-sample forecast setting|a criterion that has often been put forward
to evaluate the quality of survey forecasts. It should be noted that for survey data
in the present setting it is of primary concern that the survey expectations re°ect
the market's sentiment at the time they are formed, that is, the survey data should
re°ect agents' expectations, nothing more than that. While it is not the primary
concern that the expectations outperform other forecasting techniques, there is gen-
eral consensus that expectations from surveys in most ¯elds perform no worse than
any other forecast technique and in this respect we can also learn much from related
¯elds.
Ang et al. (2007), for instance, provide recent evidence that aggregate expec-
tations from various surveys on in°ation consistently deliver better forecasts than
time-series models, models based on the yield curve, and forecasts based on the
Phillips curve, which highlights the usefulness of survey measures of expectations.
Elliott and Ito (1999) ¯nd that in the foreign exchange market portfolio's based on
survey expectations produce small, but positive, pro¯ts. It is therefore surprising
that Hafer et al. (1992), the only study that investigates the forecast performance of
survey-based interest rate expectations, ¯nd that survey forecasts for the 3-month
U.S. treasury bill rate have larger root mean squared errors (RMSE) and mean
absolute errors (MAE) than simple random walk (no change) forecasts.
To ascertain the quality of the survey-based forecasts, table 4.1 presents MAE's
and RMSE's of the survey-based and forward rate forecasts in comparison to the
benchmark forecast performance of a random walk model. In addition, the table
presents Theil's U-statistic, which is de¯ned as the ratio of the RMSE of the survey
forecast divided by the RMSE of the random walk forecast. Several observations
can be made from this table. First, for about half of the rates the errors for the
survey forecasts are lower that those of the forward forecasts, indicating that the
forecast performance from survey data is about equal to that of forward rate forecast.
Second, and of more signi¯cance is that both in terms of MAE and RMSE the survey-
based forecasts outperform the benchmark random walk model. In fact, except for
U.S., Australian, Swiss and Belgium interest deposits, the U-statistics are below
unity, which stresses the outperformance of the survey forecasts. It is interesting
to compare these ¯ndings to those of Hafer et al. (1992). Generalizing their ¯nding
on the forecast performance of the U.S. treasury bill would erroneously have led to
the conclusion that survey-based forecasts cannot outperform a simple random walk
forecasts, where in fact we document that the failure to `beat' the random walk for
U.S. forecasts is only an exception to a much larger sample where survey forecasts
do outperform their benchmark.
Another issue is that consensus measures of expectations are likely to perform
better than the individual expectations that together make the consensus. AlthoughSurvey Data and Standard Propositions Regarding Expectations 61
Table 4.1: Forecast Performance
MAE RMSE
forward survey random forward survey random Theil's
rate forecast walk rate forecast walk U-statistic
a) Continental Europe
Austria 0:182 0:163 0:148 0:280 0:236 0:259 0:912
Belgium 0:208 0:190 0:178 0:297 0:277 0:259 1:071
Europe 0:175 0:228 0:248 0:242 0:308 0:363 0:847
France 0:219 0:225 0:251 0:322 0:306 0:381 0:802
Germany 0:173 0:204 0:209 0:244 0:278 0:319 0:870
Ireland 0:339 0:357 0:350 0:498 0:530 0:630 0:841
Italy 0:338 0:257 0:389 0:494 0:343 0:578 0:594
Netherlands 0:196 0:216 0:225 0:267 0:291 0:324 0:900
Spain 0:199 0:254 0:310 0:281 0:345 0:436 0:791
Switzerland 0:307 0:315 0:298 0:411 0:430 0:424 1:015
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia 0:267 0:295 0:276 0:349 0:393 0:386 1:016
Hong Kong 1:055 0:809 0:931 1:870 1:526 1:827 0:835
Japan 0:095 0:089 0:087 0:145 0:142 0:152 0:933
New Zealand 0:493 0:531 0:550 0:743 0:738 0:794 0:929
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada 0:403 0:333 0:350 0:559 0:479 0:503 0:953
U.K. 0:254 0:267 0:280 0:334 0:369 0:400 0:924
U.S. 0:243 0:305 0:276 0:372 0:458 0:444 1:031
d) Scandinavia
Denmark 0:277 0:201 0:263 0:391 0:303 0:401 0:755
Norway 0:426 0:513 0:517 0:669 0:756 0:786 0:961
Sweden 0:333 0:317 0:326 0:461 0:414 0:512 0:810
Notes. MAE and RMSE are the mean absolute error and the root mean squared error, respectively.
`U-statistic' is Theil's U-statistic, which is expressed as the ratio of the RMSE of a survey-based
forecast divided by the RMSE of a no-change (random walk) forecast.
some individuals' forecast performance may be better than others' in terms of criteria
like root mean squared errors, it is di±cult to identify a priori who these individuals
are, in particular since forecast performance is not constant. Since surveys aggregate
the expectations from many market participants, the information in consensus mea-
sures is usually superior, which may be due to an e®ect similar to Bayesian Model
Averaging or due to implicitly ¯ltering out the common components of the forecasts.
We continue the analysis by providing summary statistics for the annualized per-
centage realized spot interest rate, its ¯rst di®erence, and the survey-based expected
future rate, in table 4.2. Several ¯ndings are worth noting. Over the period inves-
tigated, January 1995 through December 2004, the general level of all interest rates
decreased, given the uniformly negative mean change in the interest rates. For some
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of the Term Premia
Mean Stdev Skew Kurt BJ % > 0 ¿1(') ¿1('2)
a) Continental Europe
Austria 0:194 0:150 0:56 ¡0:19 2:58 89 0:178 0:320¤¤
Belgium 0:101 0:240 0:27 ¡0:42 0:94 68 0:177 0:099
Europe 0:072 0:162 0:57 1:67 11:84¤¤¤ 67 0:708¤¤¤ 0:612¤¤¤
France 0:154 0:215 ¡0:15 2:43 12:03¤¤¤ 95 0:141 0:031
Germany 0:022 0:143 0:43 0:44 1:75 56 0:416¤¤¤ 0:106
Ireland 0:092 0:419 0:04 ¡0:54 0:59 54 0:577¤¤¤ 0:424¤¤¤
Italy 0:203 0:416 ¡0:75 3:33 26:69¤¤¤ 75 0:136 ¡0:034
Netherlands 0:056 0:136 0:58 ¡0:39 3:05 60 0:184 ¡0:001
Spain ¡0:009 0:235 2:40 8:35 186:07¤¤¤ 33 0:044 0:032
Switzerland 0:051 0:233 0:90 1:47 27:14¤¤¤ 53 0:492¤¤¤ 0:411¤¤¤
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia ¡0:045 0:177 0:36 ¡0:31 2:60 37 0:599¤¤¤ 0:379¤¤¤
Hong Kong 0:474 0:869 2:87 11:97 530:91¤¤¤ 82 0:668¤¤¤ 0:417¤¤¤
Japan ¡0:016 0:097 0:08 1:22 7:60¤¤ 39 0:528¤¤¤ 0:237¤¤¤
New Zealand 0:066 0:234 ¡0:15 0:20 0:64 62 0:575¤¤¤ 0:453¤¤¤
c) Anglo-Saxon
Canada 0:146 0:234 0:17 1:64 14:18¤¤¤ 74 0:523¤¤¤ 0:284¤¤¤
U.K. ¡0:014 0:180 0:22 4:11 85:51¤¤¤ 43 0:412¤¤¤ 0:037
U.S. ¡0:080 0:209 0:20 1:74 16:05¤¤¤ 30 0:397¤¤¤ 0:232¤¤¤
d) Scandinavia
Denmark 0:135 0:194 0:15 ¡0:29 0:34 75 0:272¤¤ 0:081
Norway ¡0:153 0:240 0:12 0:14 0:27 23 0:764¤¤¤ 0:594¤¤¤
Sweden 0:020 0:222 1:43 4:72 153:00¤¤¤ 48 0:423¤¤¤ 0:500¤¤¤
Notes. Sample is from January 1995 through December 2004. `Stdev' is the standard deviation.
Kurtosis is in fact excess kurtosis. `BJ' is the Bera-Jarque statistic for normality of the distribution.
% > 0 is a sign test statistic that gives the percentage of months the term premium is positive
over the sample period. ¿1(') is the ¯rst order autocorrelation of the premium, and ¿1('2) for it's
squared; signi¯cance levels come from Ljung-Box Q-statistics. A ¤, ¤¤, and ¤¤¤ means rejection of
the null hypothesis at a 10, 5, and 1 percent signi¯cance level, respectively.
period of 10 years. We must therefore bear in mind that all results in this chapter
should be interpreted against the background of a period of decreasing interest rates.
Furthermore, there does not seem to be a consistent di®erence in the variability
in expectations for the various blocks of deposits in terms of their standard deviation.
For instance, the standard deviation for the so-called EMS deposits (most continental
European rates) is by no means lower than the variability of expected rates from
other blocks of countries. This is an interesting ¯nding, for it could re°ect that the
market did not believe in the stabilizing role of the EMS, and expected larger swings
in the EMS' interest rates than actually occurred.
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics from the survey-based term premia, ',
following the de¯nition in equation 4.3. The majority of the term premia have64 Time-Variation in Term Premia
a positive average, indicating that forward rates, on average, are larger than the
expected future levels of the interest rates. Interpreting the results, for instance for
the Hong Kong interbank rate, suggests that the yield curve is priced in such a way
that the total return of a longer-term contract is higher than the return participants
expect when short rates are rolled over. In other words, market participants add
a premium for longer-term instruments. Results from a sign test corroborate that
for most interest rates the term premium is more often positive than negative, such
that the ¯nding of positive average premia is not the result of outliers. Note that
premia are typically skewed to the left and show leptokurtic behavior, which results
in a regular rejection of the normal distribution.
First-order autocorrelation coe±cients are reported for the premia and their
squares, accompanied by signi¯cance levels from Ljung-Box Q-statistics for ¯rst-
order serial correlation. The level premia show strong evidence of serial correlation.
Modern equilibrium theory can explain this behavior. If term premia are functions
of both investors' attitudes towards risk and the covariance of long and short rates
with consumption or wealth, as in the Cox et al. (1985) framework, and these param-
eters evolve only slowly over time as is often assumed, then term premia should be
partially predictable from past observations. In this framework the serial correlation
in the levels of the term premia makes sense from an economic theory point of view.
Serial correlation in the squares of the premia furthermore suggests the presence of
at least ¯rst order autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.
We subsequently analyze the (non)stationarity of expected, realized, and forward
interest rates. When the forward rate, realized spot rate, and expected future spot
rate all contain a unit root, a linear relation between any of these variables can
be spurious and hence may lead to an erroneous non-rejection of the expectations
hypothesis. If, say, the forward rate contains a unit root, but the expected inter-
est rate is stationary, the resulting term premium is not stationary, since a linear
combination of a stationary and nonstationary variable is nonstationary.
The (non)stationarity of nominal interest rates remains an issue of central con-
cern in the literature. In a seminal paper Rose (1988) investigates the stationarity of
various international nominal short- and long-term interest rate measured at yearly,
quarterly, and monthly data frequencies and ¯nds that the null hypothesis of a single
unit root in the levels of the series cannot be rejected. Rapach and Weber (2004)
re-examine the stationarity condition of long-term government bonds as the nominal
interest rates for about the same sample of international deposits as Rose, using new
unit root tests with improved size and power. They ¯nd that, except for Austrian,
German, and Swiss interest rates, the results conform to those in Rose (1988) in
that nominal rates contain a unit root.
It remains ambiguous as to whether expected interest rates inherit the same
(non)stationarity characteristics as their nominal realized counterparts. To the best
of our knowledge, no previous study has attempted to investigate the stationarity
of expected interest rates (or expectations series in general), by means of survey
data or other techniques. When the order of integration of expected interest rate
series di®ers than that of realized interest rate series, any linear combination of the
two is nonstationary, and results of a test of time-varying term premia may then beSurvey Data and Standard Propositions Regarding Expectations 65
spurious.
We examine the stationarity of realized, expected, and implicit forward rate series
using two nonparametric unit root tests. First, we use a traditional Phillips-Perron
(PP) unit root test that is robust to a variety of serial correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity, where the null hypothesis is that of a unit root. A criticism of such traditional
unit root tests is that they cannot distinguish between a unit root and a near-unit
root process, since the classical way of hypothesis testing ensures that the null hy-
pothesis cannot be rejected unless there is strong evidence against it. Therefore, the
test due to Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (henceforth KPSS) is also considered, where
the null hypothesis is that of a stationary series.
In both tests a linear trend does not seem relevant for the data at question
and a constant term is included for generality; thus we check for level stationarity.
Spectral estimation is performed using the Bartlett kernel and the optimal lag length
is selected automatically using the Newey-West bandwidth.1
Table 4.4 presents test statistics from the unit root/stationarity tests for the
forward rate, realized future spot rate, expected future spot rate, and some linear
combinations hereof. The general ¯nding that emerges from the Phillips-Perron unit
root test is that nominal realized interest rates, rt, appear to be I(1) in that the
null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels cannot be rejected, whilst for their ¯rst
di®erences the null of a unit root is strongly rejected.2 Three exceptions are the
German, Dutch, and Japanese interest rate deposits, for which a unit root in the
level cannot be rejected. Interestingly is that for survey-based expected interest rates
the null hypothesis of a unit root also cannot be rejected for most rates. This would
imply that expected interest rates seem to share the stationarity properties with their
realized counterparts. However, we must be careful with such an interpretation, for
results on Austrian interest rates show that although realized rates can be I(1),
expected rates can nevertheless be I(0). Finally, most forward rates appear to
contain a unit root as well.
However, for the expected and implicit forward rates in excess of the contempo-
raneous nominal spot rate, the null hypothesis of a unit root is generally rejected,
suggesting that any test of the expectations hypothesis is not in°uenced by a spu-
rious relationship between ft;t+k and rt+k or ft;t+k and re
t;t+k. KPSS test results
support these results, although for continental European deposits the results remain
somewhat non-uniform. At minimum, for all non-continental European and nearly
all continental European rates, the null hypothesis of stationarity can be rejected
for the levels of the realized, expected, and forward interest rates.
Although it is possible that for some interest rate deposits the levels of the
realized, expected, and forward interest rates contain a unit root, whereas for other
deposits a unit root is absent, it is also possible that our sample size simply does not
give us enough testing power to reject the unit root in the levels for a few countries.
Based on results from both tests, the general picture that emerges is that while
1Other bandwidth estimators, like the Andrews bandwidth, were considered but did not alter
the general conclusions in any way.
2Statistics on the di®erenced series are not reported to conserve space, but are available on
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nominal realized, implicit forward, and expected interest series seem to contain a
unit root, linear combinations thereof are stationary. In addition, Bekaert et al.
(1997) show that traditional single-equation regression models are characterized by
a positive bias in the slope coe±cients, even with relatively large samples. Tests
of the expectations hypothesis, rational expectations, or time-variation in the term
premia should therefore be expressed in terms of these linear combinations. In
the next section we examine the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of
interest rates empirically and investigate to what extent expectations are rational
and whether term premia are time-varying.
4.4 Rational Expectations and Time-Varying Term
Premia
The unbiasedness speci¯cation in equation 4.6 has been used regularly as a tool
to verify the validity of the expectations hypothesis, and in a comparable version
to explain the forward premium behavior in the exchange rate literature (see, e.g.
Engel, 1996; Hodrick, 1987, for an overview). Failure of the hypothesis that ®1 = 0
and ¯1 = 1 is interpreted as failure of the expectations hypothesis, and conditional
on the assumption of rational expectations the failure is generally attributed to the
existence of a time-varying term premium.
However, from the decomposition in equation 4.5 it follows that the forward
premium consists of both an expectational error and a term premium component
and therefore the above regression-based test is in fact a joint test of time-varying
term premia and of the existence of errors in expectations. Whenever the assumption
of rational expectations is invalid, rejection of the null hypothesis that ®1 = 0 and
¯1 = 1 does not automatically imply the existence of time-varying term premia, but
instead can be attributed to the existence of constant or time-varying expectations
errors, constant or time-varying term premia, or a combination of these. Moreover,
even when one fails to reject the null hypothesis that ®1 = 0 and ¯1 = 1, this does
not imply that no time-varying term premia exist, whenever the variability of term
premia and expectations errors move in opposite directions, thereby dampening any
movement in the ex-post forward error.
Table 4.5 reports GMM estimates for the unbiasedness test in equation 4.6,
with standard errors corrected to allow for a k-order moving average.3 Most slope
coe±cients are positive and signi¯cant, indicating that the forward rates contain
information about the future spot rates. Conditional on the assumption of rational
expectations, the null hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased estimate of
3When the forecast horizon is longer than the observational frequency, the forecast error will
be serially correlated up to a moving average process of order k ¡ 1. Since the survey forecasts are
for `approximately 3 months ahead' projections, and since panelists are known to often make their
projections towards the end of a calendar month, it is expected that the k-month-ahead forecast is
in fact a k-month-plus-a-few-days-ahead forecast. We have replicated all results assuming a moving
average process of order k ¡ 1, yet these results di®er only marginally from the ones reported and
do not alter any of our conclusions.68 Time-Variation in Term Premia
Table 4.5: Forward Rate Unbiasedness
®1 ¯1 T : ¯3 = 1 Â2
a) Continental Europe
Austria ¡0:1110 ¡0:0810 2:59¤¤¤ 37:05¤¤¤
(0:0908) (0:4161)
Belgium ¡0:1794 ¡0:0154 3:47¤¤¤ 47:77¤¤¤
(0:1105) (0:2925)
Europe ¡0:0707¤ 1:1624¤¤¤ 0:96 3:45
(0:0415) (0:1677)
France ¡0:1383¤¤¤ 1:2015¤¤¤ 1:11¤ 11:03¤¤¤
(0:0901) (0:1552)
Germany ¡0:1138¤¤¤ 0:9376 ¡2:44 11:73¤¤¤
(0:0332) (0:1902)
Italy ¡0:1666¤¤¤ 0:6987¤¤¤ ¡2:44¤¤ 13:19¤¤¤
(0:0539) (0:1343)
Netherlands ¡0:1440¤¤¤ 0:8512 ¡2:44 14:26¤¤¤
(0:0384) (0:2180)
Spain ¡0:1472¤¤¤ 0:9657¤¤¤ ¡2:44 13:23¤¤¤
(0:0415) (0:1749)
Switzerland ¡0:2199¤¤¤ 0:8837¤¤¤ ¡2:44 19:38¤¤¤
(0:0585) (0:1923)
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia ¡0:0464 0:7793¤¤¤ ¡1:20 2:94
(0:0511) (0:1831)
Hong Kong ¡0:3793 0:6336 ¡0:80 6:42¤¤
(0:3023) (0:4523)
Japan ¡0:0489 0:4890¤¤¤ ¡3:24¤¤¤ 11:53¤¤¤
(0:0330) (0:1574)
New Zealand ¡0:0512 0:7825¤¤¤ ¡0:86 1:56
(0:1248) (0:2516)
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada ¡0:3892¤¤¤ 0:9439¤¤¤ 0:35 33:33¤¤¤
(0:0784) (0:1572)
Ireland ¡0:0959 0:6337¤ ¡2:44 1:96
(0:1110) (0:3529)
U.K. ¡0:0929 0:7819¤¤¤ ¡1:04 7:25¤¤
(0:0511) (0:1831)
U.S. ¡0:2092¤¤¤ 1:0845¤¤¤ 0:30 20:84¤¤¤
(0:0644) (0:2764)
d) Scandinavia
Denmark ¡0:2827¤¤¤ 1:1771¤¤¤ 0:72 9:34¤¤¤
(0:1038) (0:2458)
Norway 0:0975 1:0075¤¤¤ 0:00 0:70
(0:1271) (0:2380)
Canada ¡0:2308¤¤¤ 1:1469¤¤¤ 0:53 18:52¤¤¤
(0:0667) (0:2732)
Notes. The parameter estimates are for the test rt+k ¡ rt = ®1 + ¯1(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k. The
standard errors of the coe±cients are given in parenthesis. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at the
10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cant level, respectively, of the hypothesis that ®1 = 0 or that ¯1 = 1. The
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the future spot interest rate is presented by the joint hypothesis that ®1 = 0 and
¯1 = 1.
The null hypothesis is rejected for about 75 percent of the countries, with varying
degrees of signi¯cance. This implies that there is considerable evidence against at
least the pure version of the expectations hypothesis. Rejection of this null is not
predominantly caused by either a constant or a time-varying premia, but must be
attributed to both. Estimates for ¯1 are furthermore mostly less than unity and
occasionally even negative, although when relaxing the zero constant premium, we
¯nd that the null hypothesis of ¯1 = 1 can only be rejected for ¯ve interest rate
deposits.
Focusing on the role of the estimate for ¯1 alone, one could erroneously be
tempted to interpret the ¯ndings in table 4.5 as evidence against time-variability
of term premia. However, since the test in equation 4.6 is a joint test of rational ex-
pectations and the existence of constant or time-varying term premia, results in table
4.5 remain inconclusive as to the existence of time-varying term premia. In fact, even
when time-varying term premia exist in the term structure of interest rates, ¯1 may
still be equal to unity provided that expectations are irrational. Equation 4.6 hence
cannot capture the presence of time-varying term premia, nor provide evidence of
irrationality of expectations in the term structure of interest rates.
Survey data can be used to decompose the forward premium into a time-varying
term premium component and an irrational expectations component. It can be
shown that the probability limit in equation 4.6 reduces to




which exactly measures time-variability in term premia in the Fama sense. The
probability limit in equation 4.7 can be decomposed into an expectational error and










To test the rationality of survey-based interest rate expectations we employ an
orthogonality test (see, for instance Pesaran, 1987). The orthogonality test aims to
assess whether economic agents use information that is available to them e±ciently
to forecast future interest rates. The null hypothesis of rational expectations implies
that ®3 = 0 and ¯3 = 0 in regressions of the following form
»t+k = ®3 + ¯0
3Xt + ²t+k; (4.10)
where Xt is a vector of elements from the investor's information set, a subset from
her complete, yet unobserved information set ­t. When expectations are formed in70 Time-Variation in Term Premia
a rational way, the survey-based forecast error should be orthogonal to all elements
form the investor's information set at the time she forms her forecasts. Although
the information set may be in¯nite and unobserved, we choose to use the forward
premium, ft;t+k ¡ rt, as the sole element for Xt. We choose this speci¯cation since
under the null hypothesis of rational expectations and under the assumption that
any measurement error in the survey is orthogonal to the forward discount, the ¯3
coe±cient is precisely equal to ¯3 in equation 4.8. Equation 4.10 was estimated
using GMM for each interest rate.
Table 4.6 reports parameter estimates of this orthogonality test. The null hy-
pothesis of rational expectations is rejected for about half of the interest rates. It is
interesting to note that the vast majority of estimates for ¯3 are positive of sign, in-
dicating that an increase in the interest rate implied by the term structure (through
the implicit forward rate) leads to an underestimation of future interest rates.
These results should be interpreted with care. If conditional forecasts are formed
rationally, while allowing for a small probability of a large interest rate movement,
then forecasts will appear biased when judged from ex-post forecast errors. This is
the familiar `peso problem' due to Krasker (1980). Bekaert et al. (1997) ¯nd that
the failure of the expectations hypothesis in the U.S. can be explained at least partly
by the existence of such a peso problem e®ect. An alternative explanation would be
that the time series process which describes the expected interest rate movement, is
not ergodic as is implied in the application of the GMM procedure.
In order to discover time-variation in the term premia and to see to what extent
the existence of a time-varying term premium is an economically important reason
for rejection of the expectations hypothesis, the following regression test is used:
re
t;t+k ¡ rt = ®4 + ¯4(ft;t+k ¡ rt) + ²t+k; (4.11)
where the mathematical expectations are replaced by their survey-based counter-
parts. The null hypothesis of no time-varying term premia is represented by the
hypothesis that ¯4 = 1, where the correlation of the risk premium with the forward
discount is zero. By inspection, the ¯4 coe±cient is precisely equal to ¯4 in equa-
tion 4.9. Similarly, the hypothesis of a zero mean term premium can be tested by
examining whether the ®4 coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Table 4.7 reports GMM estimates for the test of time-varying term premia in
equation 4.4. There is strong evidence of time-variation in the term premia, given
that for all but a few deposits the null hypothesis of no time-variation, ¯4 = 1, is
resoundingly rejected. Although for the remaining deposits, Belgium and France,
and Denmark and Hong Kong the null hypothesis of no time-variation in the term
premium cannot be rejected, slope coe±cients are below unity and the joint null
hypothesis of no constant or time-varying premia is nevertheless rejected. All slope
estimates are between zero and unity, a ¯nding which corroborates the early ¯nding
of Froot (1989) and MacDonald and Macmillan (1994) for US and UK interest
rate deposits, respectively. Whilst strong evidence of time-varying term premia, all
estimates of ¯3 are signi¯cantly positive, indicating that not all of the variation in
the expectations hypothesis can be attributed to the existence of a time-varying
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Table 4.6: Error Orthogonality to Forward Premia
®3 ¯3 Â2
a) Continental Europe
Austria 0:0518 ¡0:8051¤ 4:37
(0:0798) (0:4284)
Belgium ¡0:1138 ¡0:6548¤ 7:44¤¤
(0:1115) (0:3367)
Europe ¡0:0176 0:7066¤¤¤ 15:43¤¤¤
(0:0494) (0:1802)
France 0:0414 0:3027 2:32
(0:0867) (0:2223)
Germany ¡0:1394¤¤¤ ¡0:1698 9:95¤¤¤
(0:0491) (0:2653)
Ireland 0:0525 ¡0:0654¤ 0:21
(0:1248) (0:3693)
Italy 0:3068¤ 0:3612¤ 3:63
(0:1640) (0:2766)
Netherlands ¡0:1458 ¡0:4571 9:07¤¤
(0:0947) (0:4587)
Spain ¡0:2380¤¤¤ 0:1080 14:42¤¤¤
(0:0628) (0:1274)
Switzerland ¡0:2705¤¤¤ 0:5669¤¤ 18:97¤¤¤
(0:0642) (0:2245)
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia ¡0:0845 0:3728¤ 4:89¤
(0:0583) (0:2076)
Hong Kong ¡0:0473 0:0692 0:03
(0:2852) (0:4488)
Japan ¡0:0563 0:0150 2:78
(0:0338) (0:1841)
New Zealand 0:0102 0:1126 0:27
(0:1273) (0:2688)
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada ¡0:3868¤¤¤ 0:4880¤¤¤ 25:55¤¤¤
(0:0774) (0:1560)
U.K. ¡0:1357¤¤ 0:2701 6:02¤¤
(0:0578) (0:2056)
U.S. ¡0:3505¤¤¤ 0:6436¤¤ 30:41¤¤¤
(0:0679) (0:2785)
d) Scandinavia
Denmark ¡0:1552¤ 0:2463 3:22
(0:0865) (0:2478)
Norway 0:0554 0:3722 1:79
(0:1434) (0:2837)
Sweden ¡0:2281¤¤¤ 0:4785¤¤ 15:33¤¤¤
(0:0582) (0:2344)
Notes. Sample is from January 1995 through December 2004. A ¤, ¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes rejection at a
10, 5, and 1 percent signi¯cance level. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint hypothesis that ®3 = 0
and ¯3 = 0 (standard errors are given in parentheses).72 Time-Variation in Term Premia
Table 4.7: Time-Variation in Term Premia
®4 ¯4 T : ¯4 = 1 Â2 BG ARCH
a) Continental Europe
Austria ¡0:1629¤¤¤ 0:7241¤¤¤ ¡2:70¤¤¤ 66:88¤¤¤ 2:62 1:68
(0:0232) (0:1019) (1) (1)
Belgium ¡0:0656¤ 0:6393¤¤¤ ¡1:54 8:75¤¤ 0:99 0:99
(0:0363) (0:2333) (1) (1)
Europe ¡0:0493¤¤¤ 0:4585¤¤¤ ¡8:15¤¤¤ 80:68¤¤¤ 20:71¤¤¤ 0:59
(0:0171) (0:0664) (1) (1)
France ¡0:2570¤¤¤ 0:8706¤¤¤ ¡0:96 57:75¤¤¤ 7:56¤¤ 0:24
(0:0360) (0:1345) (2) (1)
Germany 0:0132 0:3833¤¤¤ ¡7:99¤¤¤ 81:98¤¤¤ 12:13¤¤¤ 7:79¤¤¤
(0:0211) (0:0771) (1) (1)
Ireland ¡0:1485¤¤ 0:6991¤¤¤ ¡2:71¤¤¤ 13:25¤¤¤ 17:24¤¤¤ 11:04¤¤¤
(0:0756) (0:1108) (1) (1)
Italy ¡0:4115¤¤¤ 0:4680¤¤¤ ¡5:30¤¤¤ 52:30¤¤¤ 0:03 1:64
(0:0572) (0:1006) (1) (3)
Netherlands 0:0311 0:3792¤¤¤ ¡7:42¤¤¤ 70:21¤¤¤ 1:91 0:00
(0:0189) (0:0836) (1) (1)
Spain ¡0:0524 0:5381¤¤¤ ¡3:21¤¤¤ 19:94¤¤¤ 0:46 11:45¤¤¤
(0:0423) (0:1435) (1) (1)
Switzerland 0:0536¤¤ 0:3217¤¤¤ ¡8:86¤¤¤ 85:86¤¤¤ 20:36¤¤¤ 5:54¤¤
(0:0260) (0:0765) (1) (1)
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia 0:0410¤¤ 0:4087¤¤¤ ¡9:04¤¤¤ 89:45¤¤¤ 32:93¤¤¤ 12:80¤¤¤
(0:0175) (0:0654) (1) (1)
Hong Kong ¡0:3127 0:5683¤¤ ¡1:54 28:30¤¤¤ 66:82¤¤¤ 18:33¤¤¤
(0:1961) (0:2798) (6) (2)
Japan 0:0080 0:4735¤¤¤ ¡5:94¤¤¤ 35:55¤¤¤ 32:74¤¤¤ 26:44¤¤¤
(0:0078) (0:0885) (1) (1)
New Zealand ¡0:0604¤¤ 0:6696¤¤¤ ¡3:86¤¤¤ 43:67¤¤¤ 29:63¤¤¤ 30:25¤¤¤
(0:0281) (0:0855) (1) (1)
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada 0:0044 0:4532¤¤¤ ¡10:03¤¤¤ 228:28¤¤¤ 38:17¤¤¤ 5:70¤¤¤
(0:0299) (0:0544) (1) (2)
U.K. 0:0442¤¤¤ 0:5116¤¤¤ ¡7:17¤¤¤ 54:95¤¤¤ 30:55¤¤¤ 1:59
(0:0163) (0:0681) (1) (1)
U.S. 0:1421¤¤¤ 0:4530¤¤¤ ¡9:36¤¤¤ 145:78¤¤¤ 12:32¤¤¤ 14:26¤¤¤
(0:0157) (0:0584) (1) (1)
d) Scandinavia
Denmark ¡0:1275¤¤¤ 0:9308¤¤¤ ¡0:77 15:39¤¤¤ 4:67¤¤ 1:78
(0:0329) (0:0889) (1) (1)
Norway 0:0772¤¤ 0:6415¤¤¤ ¡5:77¤¤¤ 38:83¤¤¤ 48:15¤¤¤ 42:08¤¤¤
(0:0354) (0:0620) (2) (1)
Sweden 0:0004 0:6738¤¤¤ ¡3:54¤¤¤ 22:48¤¤¤ 27:46¤¤¤ 36:35¤¤¤
(0:0297) (0:0919) (1) (1)
Notes. The standard errors of the coe±cients are given in parentheses. A ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ denotes rejection
at a 10, 5, and 1 percent signi¯cance level. T : ¯4 = 1 reports the T-statistic and signi¯cance levels
for the hypothesis that ¯4 = 1. The Â2 statistic pertains to the joint hypothesis that ®4 = 0 and
¯4 = 1. `BG' and `ARCH' give serial correlation and conditional heteroskedasticity statistics.Time Series Behavior of the Term Premia 73
Lagrange multiplier tests for the presence of serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey
test) and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals are
reported. For most rates, signi¯cant serial correlation is present up to one lag, in-
dicating that term premia might be characterized by ARMA class models of low
order. In general, evidence of serial correlation is more evident for non-continental
European rates than for continental European rates. Volatility clustering further-
more appears predominantly in non-continental European term premia, indicating
that the conditional variance of term premia varies over time. One noteworthy case
is the Hong Kong interbank rate, for which autocorrelations up to six months is
reported, and strong ARCH e®ects. Hong Kong interbank rates have experienced
dramatic °uctuations in 1997 and 1998 and have decreased considerably.
We can question what the implications are of these results. To do so, a closer
examination of time-varying term premia in the ¯nancial economics literature is
required. In most ¯nancial models, time-varying term premia are essentially exoge-
nous, like in the square root model of Cox et al. (1985), the a±ne term structure
model of Dai and Singleton (2002), and the macro models of Ang and Piazzesi (2003)
and Rudebusch and Wu (2004). A way to endogenize time-varying term premia is by
arguing that transaction costs of entering the long-run bond market are higher and
vary over time due to this segment's smaller liquidity, which can obviously explain
why the yield curve is upward sloping most of the time. Alternatively, a segmented
market approach may also explain why term premia vary over time when realiz-
ing that the preferred contract length of certain type of investors may change with
their hedging requirements. In any case, an identi¯cation of the determinants of the
time-variation in the term premia is desired, so that they can be controlled for in
traditional tests of the expectations hypothesis.
On the other hand, the present ¯ndings may well present yet another challenge
to the rational expectations hypothesis. Several ways to salvage the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis in the present setting are when we consider the existence of
peso problems, learning behavior as introduced by Lewis (1989), or the presence of
regime shifts by the monetary authority. Yet, it seems more plausible to depart,
or at least rede¯ne, the expectations hypothesis. Several theories that postulate
deviations from it have recently drawn the attention. A common argument is that
individual agents have limited capacity for processing information, which is in line
with ordinary experience and basic behavior theory. A recent example of this line
of argumentation is the rational inattention model due to Sims (2003).
In the next section we analyze various time-series properties of the term premia
and look at potential explanations for the time-variation.
4.5 Time Series Behavior of the Term Premia
In most modern, intertemporal general equilibrium asset pricing models that de-
scribe the term structure of interest rates, for instance those of Vasicek (1977) or
Cox et al. (1985), the term premium is a function of variables like expectations,
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and interest rates' covariance with consumption. Although these determinants are
extremely di±cult to observe, they are commonly believed to evolve only gradually
over time. This is an important assumption, for if determinants evolve gradually, so
does the term premium and historical information about the term premium should
therefore have at least some predictive power for future levels thereof. This argument
has commonly resulted in treating it as a state variable, or unobserved component,
and estimating it by means of a Kalman ¯lter. Such state variables are commonly
assumed to follow low-order versions of the ARMA class models.
The existence of low-order serial correlation in the residuals of the time-variability
equation 4.11 furthermore supports the assumption that term premia evolve only
gradually and that past values have predictive power. In order to examine the
statistical time-series behavior of the risk premia implied by the survey-based ex-
pectations, we estimate AR(1), MA(1), and ARMA(1,1) models for the term premia
and present the model with the best ¯t in terms of the Bayesian Information Crite-
rion (BIC) in table 4.8. The general framework in which we test these time-series
models is then:
't = °0 + °1't¡1 + ²t + °2²t¡1; (4.12)
Even though in a rare occasion a higher lag seems to improve the model in terms
of the selection criterion, we do not report these results to preserve model parsi-
mony and comparability and we select the most appropriate model from the three
variations mentioned earlier. Lagrange Multiplier statistics for the presence of serial
correlation that is not picked up by the models are presented, as well as a measure
of ARCH.
The low-order versions of the ARMA class models are quite capable of accounting
for the variation in the term premia. For all AR or MA models, parameter estimates
for °1 and/or °2 are signi¯cantly positive. These ¯ndings are consistent with the
theories laid out above, in that knowledge about last month's premium provides
considerable information about next month's premium. It is noteworthy that non-
continental European deposits are better characterized by these low-order ARMA
models than other deposits, given the higher signi¯cance of the terms and higher
adjusted R2 statistics.
The ARMA models account for serial correlation in the term premia adequately,
except for Hong Kong and Norway. We do note, however, that conditional het-
eroskedasticy is present in a number of cases. In the next section we look at this
issue more closely.
4.6 Determinants of the Time-Variation Present in
the Term Premium
In this section we examine the determinants of the term premia that are implied by
the term structure. Although the presence of time-variation in the premia is ¯rmly
documented in the previous section, it remains a question as to what the source
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Table 4.8: ARMA Speci¯cations for the Term Premia
°0 °1 °2 R2
a LM ARCH
a) Continental Europe
Austria 0:1940¤¤¤ ¡ 0:2243 0:02 0:19 0:45
(0:0262) (0:1442) (1) (1)
Belgium 0:1017¤¤ ¡ 0:1789 0:01 0:03 0:14
(0:0405) (0:1451) (1) (1)
Europe 0:0768 0:7087¤¤¤ ¡ 0:49 0:28 2:83
(0:0482) (0:0863) (1) (1)
France 0:2373¤¤¤ 0:1445 ¡ 0:00 0:58 0:24
(0:0332) (0:1326) (1) (1)
Germany 0:0082 0:4163¤¤¤ ¡ 0:18 0:54 0:42
(0:0305) (0:1232) (1) (1)
Ireland 0:0692 0:5773¤¤¤ ¡ 0:32 2:15 0:62
(0:1185) (0:1193) (1) (1)
Italy 0:1666 0:7979¤¤¤ 0:9627 0:05 1:61 0:10
(0:0272) (0:1025) (0:0295) (1) (1)
Netherlands 0:0568¤¤ ¡ 0:2896¤¤ 0:03 1:89 0:00
(0:0249) (0:1409) (1) (1)
Spain ¡0:0331 0:0443 ¡ 0:00 0:87 15:36¤¤¤
(0:0274) (0:1106) (1) (3)
Switzerland 0:0446 0:4926¤¤¤ ¡ 0:24 1:15 1:42
(0:0365) (0:0792) (1) (1)
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia ¡0:0411 0:6045¤¤¤ ¡ 0:36 1:49 0:13
(0:0341) (0:0760) (1) (1)
Hong Kong 0:4497 0:8547¤¤¤ ¡0:3297¤¤¤ 0:48 19:22¤¤¤ 18:55¤¤¤
(0:2776) (0:0703) (0:1262) (2) (2)
Japan ¡0:0206 0:5292¤¤¤ ¡ 0:28 0:88 15:99¤¤
(0:0157) (0:0761) (1) (6)
New Zealand 0:0708 0:5753¤¤¤ ¡ 0:32 0:10 3:91¤¤
(0:0434) (0:0786) (1) (1)
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada 0:1279¤¤¤ 0:5410¤¤¤ ¡ 0:31 0:00 0:14
(0:0371) (0:0731) (1) (1)
U.K. ¡0:0195 0:4134¤¤¤ ¡ 0:16 0:44 0:96
(0:0254) (0:0872) (1) (1)
U.S. ¡0:0906¤¤¤ 0:3953¤¤¤ ¡ 0:16 0:05 8:44¤¤¤
(0:0249) (0:0792) (1) (1)
d) Scandinavia
Denmark 0:1354¤¤¤ ¡ 0:3019¤¤ 0:06 0:02 3:33
(0:0351) (0:1407) (1) (1)
Norway ¡0:1646¤¤ 0:7631¤¤¤ ¡ 0:58 6:75¤¤ 18:55¤¤¤
(0:0747) (0:0735) (2) (5)
Sweden 0:0208 ¡ 0:4665¤¤¤ 0:17 0:06 20:93¤¤¤
(0:0269) (0:0810) (1) (1)
Notes. Estimates are for an AR(1), MA(1), or ARMA(1,1) model, where 't = °0 + °1't¡1 + ²t +
°2²t¡1. `ARCH' is a Langrange Multiplier statistic for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
and `BG' the Breusch-Godfrey statistic for serial correlation in ²t (optimal lags in parentheses).76 Time-Variation in Term Premia
premium.
There is evidence in the literature that term premia are forecastable using vari-
ables such as the spread between the long and the short rates and the level of the
interest rate (see, for instance, Bekdache, 2001; Campbell, 1995). This relationship
is partly explainable by the preferred habitat theory of the term structure that states
that risk-averse investors require a premium when investing in assets with a maturity
that does not match their habitat. We verify this preferred habitat argumentation
by linking the term premium to
't = °0 + °1rt + °2spreadt + °3riskt + ²t: (4.13)




t . Although no particular measure of risk has
consistently been found to be signi¯cant for term premia, we use the crude proxy
riskt, de¯ned as the absolute percentage change in the yield on the n-period bond,
or j(rt ¡rt¡1)=rt¡1. Least squares estimates of equation 4.13 are presented in table
4.9. Consistent with other studies, such as Bekdache (2001) or Hejazi et al. (2000),
we ¯nd that the yield spread is highly signi¯cant for all but two interest rates, and
the relationship between the spread and the premium has the expected sign. The
level of the 3-month spot interest rate is also statistically signi¯cant in a number of
cases, yet the risk measure seems to be irrelevant.
It can be questioned whether the ¯nding that risk measures are irrelevant is
plausible or whether the risk proxy actually measures risk at all. The presence
of strong ARCH e®ects in the tests of time-variation in the term premia, as well
as in some of the low-order ARMA models, suggests that at least the inclusion of
the second moments are relevant for explaining the time-variation of the premia.
We therefore use a GARCH-M model, originally due to Engle et al. (1987), where
the risk premia are heteroskedastic and the standard deviation of each observation
directly a®ects the mean of that observation, or
't = ®0 + ®1ht + ²t (4.14)
where
h2









and where ²t » N(0;h2
t).To preserve model parsimony and keeping the summary
statistics in table 4.3 in mind that show ARCH e®ects usually up to only lag, we
select an GARCH(1,1)-M speci¯cation.
The parameters in equation 4.14 are estimated by maximum likelihood using
the BHHH algorithm and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent. Es-
timates are reported in table 4.10. The estimates for ¯1 and °1 are both highly
signi¯cant for most countries, indicating that that the GARCH speci¯cation is rel-
evant. The inclusion of the conditional standard deviation in the mean equation
results in signi¯cant parameter estimates for about half of the deposits, indicating
that the variation in the term premia can be explained by a risk component. Fur-
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Table 4.9: Linear Model of the Term Premium
constant interest spread risk
a) Continental Europe
Austria 0:2883 ¡0:0467 0:7449¤ 0:9740
(0:1983) (0:0578) (0:4010) (0:7099)
Belgium ¡0:0961 0:0597 0:6784 ¡1:4718¤
(0:1934) (0:0573) (0:4490) (0:7697)
Europe 0:0805¤ ¡0:0176 1:0798¤¤¤ 0:3307
(0:0427) (0:0121) (0:0970) (0:3394)
France ¡0:1454¤¤¤ 0:0684¤¤¤ 0:7982¤¤¤ 0:5690
(0:0517) (0:0136) (0:1126) (0:3768)
Germany 0:0375 ¡0:0128 1:1285¤¤¤ 0:0807¤
(0:0395) (0:0110) (0:0860) (0:2789)
Italy ¡0:0295 0:0385¤¤¤ 0:6366¤¤¤ ¡1:0599¤¤
(0:0537) (0:0083) (0:0965) (0:4823)
Netherlands 0:1188¤¤¤ ¡0:0365¤¤¤ 1:1272¤¤¤ 0:1520
(0:0444) (0:0125) (0:0983) (0:2811)
Spain 0:0804¤¤ ¡0:0177¤¤¤ 0:7878¤¤¤ ¡0:0570
(0:0318) (0:0057) (0:0873) (0:3817)
Switzerland ¡0:1422¤¤¤ 0:0402¤¤ 1:4028¤¤¤ 0:0585
(0:0430) (0:0167) (0:1455) (0:1272)
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia 0:0263 ¡0:0219 1:1652¤¤¤ 0:3081
(0:0788) (0:0139) (0:1042) (0:4578)
Hong Kong ¡0:6587¤¤¤ 0:1967¤¤¤ 0:7082¤¤¤ 0:4947¤¤
(0:1161) (0:0199) (0:2223) (0:2051)
Japan ¡0:0107 0:0255¤ 1:0639¤¤¤ ¡0:0613¤¤
(0:0087) (0:0143) (0:0805) (0:0288)
New Zealand ¡0:2464¤¤ 0:0337¤¤ 0:9155¤¤¤ 0:8455¤
(0:1044) (0:0147) (0:1282) (0:4625)
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada ¡0:0637 0:0078 1:1123¤¤¤ ¡0:0517
(0:0524) (0:0098) (0:0964) (0:2636)
Ireland ¡0:1080 0:0296 0:6436¤¤ 1:2860
(0:5544) (0:0903) (0:2419) (1:6864)
U.K. ¡0:0638 ¡0:0058 0:9739¤¤¤ 0:4309
(0:0576) (0:0094) (0:0858) (0:4533)
U.S. ¡0:0470 ¡0:0258¤¤¤ 0:9729¤¤¤ ¡0:2822
(0:0369) (0:0073) (0:1087) (0:2111)
d) Scandinavia
Denmark ¡0:0179 0:0361 0:0408 ¡0:3208
(0:1312) (0:0307) (0:2547) (0:7703)
Norway ¡0:0812 0:0016 0:6731¤¤¤ ¡0:8033¤¤
(0:0771) (0:0119) (0:1156) (0:3806)
Sweden ¡0:0104 ¡0:0005 0:6455¤¤¤ ¡0:1441
(0:0547) (0:0110) (0:1549) (0:3333)
Notes. Coe±cient estimates are for 't = °0 + °1rt + °2spreadt + °3riskt + ²t. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes signi¯cance at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cance
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Table 4.10: A GARCH-in-Mean Model of the Term Premium
®0 ®1 ¯0 ¯1 °1
a) Continental Europe
Austria 0:1646¤ 0:1342 0:0010 0:1393 0:8054¤¤¤
(0:1000) (0:7146) (0:0032) (0:1565) (0:2631)
Belgium ¡0:6782¤¤¤ 3:4940¤¤¤ 0:0293¤¤¤ ¡0:1765¤¤¤ 0:5996¤¤¤
(0:1183) (0:5166) (0:0045) (0:0347) (0:1091)
Europe ¡0:0283¤¤¤ 0:5430¤¤¤ 0:0410¤¤¤ 0:4284¤¤ ¡0:5632¤¤¤
(0:0040) (0:0878) (0:0067) (0:1929) (0:0980)
France ¡0:0235 1:6794¤¤¤ 0:0024¤¤¤ ¡0:0577¤¤ 0:9701¤¤¤
(0:0422) (0:3856) (0:0000) (0:0250) (0:0537)
Germany ¡0:0532 0:4313 0:0071 0:4628 0:2272
(0:0557) (0:4001) (0:0053) (0:3043) (0:2273)
Italy ¡0:1665¤¤¤ 0:9686¤¤¤ ¡0:0009¤ 0:0470¤¤ 0:9496¤¤¤
(0:0496) (0:2000) (0:0005) (0:0196) (0:0238)
Netherlands 0:0560 0:0056 0:0038 0:2323¤ 0:5663
(0:1012) (0:7620) (0:0054) (0:1266) (0:3785)
Spain ¡0:0599¤¤¤ 0:2266¤¤¤ 0:0010 1:7925¤¤ 0:1152
(0:0090) (0:0790) (0:0007) (0:8892) (0:0745)
Switzerland ¡1:8249 9:8762 0:0098¤¤¤ 0:0576 0:6687¤¤¤
(1:4028) (7:2771) (0:0031) (0:0431) (0:0563)
b) Asia-Paci¯c
Australia ¡0:1012¤ 0:2005 0:0054 0:2812¤¤¤ 0:5415¤¤¤
(0:0561) (0:3305) (0:0046) (0:1054) (0:2048)
Hong Kong ¡0:1611¤¤¤ 0:9832¤¤¤ 0:0129 1:0806 0:3301¤¤¤
(0:0524) (0:2283) (0:0084) (0:6873) (0:1066)
Japan ¡0:0628¤¤¤ 0:5980¤¤¤ 0:0000 0:2840¤¤ 0:7255¤¤¤
(0:0017) (0:1258) (0:0000) (0:1263) (0:0916)
New Zealand ¡0:1061¤¤¤ 0:6637¤¤¤ 0:0060¤¤ 0:5438¤¤¤ 0:4035¤¤¤
(0:0342) (0:1739) (0:0026) (0:1446) (0:0919)
c) Anglo-Saxon Countries
Canada ¡0:2613¤ 2:2863¤¤ ¡0:0002 0:0078 0:9851¤¤¤
(0:1436) (1:0076) (0:0002) (0:0115) (0:0115)
Ireland ¡0:6308¤¤ 1:7558¤¤ 0:0414¤¤ 0:4410¤¤ 0:3388¤¤
(0:2882) (0:7524) (0:0201) (0:2046) (0:1633)
U.K. ¡0:3522¤ 1:8109 0:0105¤¤ 0:1641 0:4945¤¤¤
(0:2012) (1:2894) (0:0049) (0:1256) (0:1552)
U.S. ¡0:1523¤¤¤ 0:3191 0:0193¤¤¤ 0:5959¤¤ ¡0:0007
(0:0494) (0:2652) (0:0051) (0:2345) (0:0462)
d) Denmark
Denmark 0:2914¤¤ ¡0:9476 0:0044 0:1083¤¤¤ 0:9883¤¤¤
(0:1441) (0:8924) (0:0035) (0:0269) (0:1170)
Norway ¡0:1272¤¤¤ ¡0:0726 0:0051¤ 0:5566¤¤¤ 0:3996¤¤
(0:0325) (0:1537) (0:0027) (0:1814) (0:1588)
Sweden ¡0:0444¤¤ 0:3143¤ 0:0251¤¤¤ 0:4729¤¤¤ ¡0:1183¤¤
(0:0267) (0:1562) (0:0061) (0:1395) (0:0500)
Notes. Reported are maximum likelihood estimates of a GARCH(1,1)-in-mean model. The quasi-
maximum likelihood heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the coe±cients are given in
parentheses. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes signi¯cance at the 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cance level,
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in the conditional standard deviation leads to an upward change in the level of the
term premium.
Finally, we document that there is considerable evidence of a high degree of
persistence in the volatility of term premia, given large estimates for ¯1 and °1.
Tzavalis and Wickens (1995) show that when ¯1 + °1 < 1, the conditional variance
of innovations in interest rates has a direct, yet fading, e®ect on the slope of the
yield curve, while if ¯1 + °1 > 1 the conditional variance is potentially explosive.
For the majority of the interest rate deposits we ¯nd that the sum of ¯1 and °1 is
smaller than unity. However, for the remaining models, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the model is integrated in variance.
4.7 Conclusions
In the current chapter we examine the expectations hypothesis using survey data for
a large set of international, short-term interest rates. In contrast to commonly-cited
results from U.S. studies we ¯nd that, although the `pure' version of the expecta-
tions hypothesis can be ¯rmly rejected for all deposits, forward rates are not biased
estimates of future interest rates. Nevertheless we ¯nd some evidence of irrational-
ity on the part of market participants, and strong evidence of the existence of a
time-varying term premium in the short end of the term structure of our deposits.
Term premia furthermore are commonly positive, suggesting that the premia
could be liquidity premia as proclaimed by the liquidity preference theory. A closer
look at the time-varying term premia reveals a large degree of persistence, which
is in line with intertemporal general equilibrium asset pricing models, such as for
instance those of Vasicek (1977) or Cox et al. (1985). We ¯nd that low-order versions
of ARMA models describe the term premia well, although low-order ARCH e®ects
are also present in several interest rate deposits. Finally, we ¯nd that although
continental European term premia show lower degrees of persistence than other
premia, the former nevertheless are time-variant and the survey respondents did
make irrational forecasts, in that not all available information to market participants
was used e±ciently.Chapter 5
Dispersion of Beliefs in
Foreign Exchange¤
5.1 Introduction
In the previous decades we have witnessed an increase in the number of studies that
attempt to explain various aspects of the foreign exchange market. The interest in
this area does not come as a surprise, since the large amount of foreign exchange
that is traded worldwide is far in excess of what is required for trade in goods and
services. It therefore seems that the foreign exchange market is a market `on its
own' and that this market, because of its large volume, is highly liquid and e±cient
(Froot and Thaler, 1990). For this reason, market participants are said to have equal
access to information and form their expectations about future events in a uniform,
rational manner.
In the academic literature, there has thus been a tendency to use a representative
agent approach when modelling exchange rate expectations. That is, expectations in
the foreign exchange market were assumed to be formed in a rational way where all
market participants optimize all information as e±ciently as possible and all market
participants have similar access to all information. The assumption of homogeneous,
rational expectations has been used in a variety of ¯elds within the exchange rate-
related literature. Several examples are worth noting.
A strand of the literature that has relied on the assumption of rational expec-
tations is the forward premium puzzle discussion (see Hodrick, 1987; Engel, 1996,
for an overview). Forward exchange rates have often been found to be biased pre-
dictors of future spot rates. Based on the assumption of rational, homogeneous
expectations, most studies have attributed this bias to the existence of time-varying
risk premia. However, Frankel and Froot (1987b) and Cavaglia et al. (1993b, 1994)
have questioned to what extent these interpretations are biased by the possible false
¤Part of this chapter is from a working paper with Willem F.C. Verschoor, Christian C.P. Wol®
and Remco Zwinkels.
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assumption of rationality; Ito (1990) examines whether the homogeneity assump-
tion is valid and Frankel and Froot (1990a) condition the use of information on the
forecasting horizon.
Another example is the literature on foreign exchange rate exposure, popularized
by the in°uential work of Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion (1990). This literature
assumes that unexpected exchange rate changes a®ect the returns of companies,
whether or not these companies have foreign operations. Based on the assumption of
rationality, the unexpected changes are commonly approximated by realized changes.
Yet after a few decades of research, the empirical evidence of whether domestic ¯rms
are exposed to currency risk still remains inconclusive and puzzling. It is for this
reason that Gao (2000) questions the rationality assumption and explicitly tries to
model the expected change in exchange rates using macroeconomic variables.
From these examples and the existence of other anomalies, such as the excess
volume of trade in the foreign exchange market, it becomes clear that the notion of
rational expectations is losing more and more ground. Instead, the focus is shifting in
the direction of bounded rationality, and the accompanying heterogeneity of agents'
expectations. New insights into how market participants form their expectations are
therefore warranted.
Among the reasons of the popularity of rational expectations is the relative ease of
(mathematical) modelling and, especially in empirical work, the lack of alternatives.
The latter issue has been resolved by the introduction of survey datasets. The use of
survey data is not uncommon in the ¯nance literature and an increase of the use of
surveys in various areas of the ¯nance literature is observed. For example, Friedman
(1979, 1980), Froot (1989) and MacDonald and Macmillan (1994) have used interest
survey data in tests for identifying term premiums and examining the rationality
of expectations of future interest rates and concluded that predictions were biased
and respondents did not e±ciently exploit the information contained in past interest
movements. Similarly, Dokko and Edelstein (1989) review the usefulness of the
Livingston forecasts of stock market rates of return and ¯nd evidence of adaptive
behavior in the forecasts. Keane and Runkle (1990) use survey forecasts of the
GNP de°ator and ¯nd that expectations are rational, and MacDonald and Torrance
(1988b) use survey data on expected changes in money aggregates with U.K. data
and ¯nd that these survey measures of expectations are extremely useful, for, unlike
statistical methods for generating estimates, they are truly exogenous.
But particularly in the foreign exchange rate literature there has been, for many
years, a considerable amount of interest in the exploration of survey-based expecta-
tions in order to understand the behavior of foreign exchange market participants.
For instance, Frankel and Froot (1987b) and Cavaglia et al. (1993b, 1994) use survey
data on foreign exchange expectations to examine whether the failure of the forward
premium puzzle can be attributed to irrational behavior on behalf of market par-
ticipants or due to the existence of time-varying risk premia and Marsh and Power
(1996) and Elliott and Ito (1999) examine the forecast performance of survey-based
exchange rate forecasts.
In this chapter we use survey-based measures of exchange rate expectations to get
new insights in the heterogeneity assumption of participants in the foreign exchangeIntroduction 83
market. Our contribution lies in the fact that we approach the issues from a more
fundamental viewpoint compared to the existing literature. Furthermore, we use a
broader dataset and a richer arsenal of tests. We start with a fundamental discussion
on what heterogeneity, or `dispersed beliefs', comprise of theoretically and how one
can measure and quantify dispersion of beliefs, speci¯cally in survey datasets of
individual forecasts. We focus on the question of what the source of the possible
dispersion is. Next, we employ these insights to a survey dataset of individual
expectations.
Typical concerns when using survey data in any setting are whether this data re-
°ects the true market's expectations, whether the data is biased because of strategic
behavior from the panel participants, or whether forecasts from surveys are of any
good in an out-of-sample forecast setting-a criteria that has often been put forward
to evaluate the quality of survey expectations. It should be noted that for survey
data in the present setting it is most important that the survey forecasts re°ect
the market's sentiment at the time they are formed, that is, the survey data should
re°ect expectations, nothing more than that.
While it is not the primary concern that the survey-based forecasts outperform
other forecasting techniques, there is a consensus view that forecasts from surveys
in general perform no worse than any other forecast technique. We can learn much
about the usefulness of survey-measures of expectations from related ¯elds. Ang
et al. (2007), for instance, provide recent evidence that forecasts from various surveys
on in°ation consistently deliver better forecasts than time-series models, models
based on the yield curve, and forecasts based on the Phillips curve, which highlights
the usefulness of survey measures of expectations. Elliott and Ito (1999) ¯nd that
in the foreign exchange market portfolios based on survey-based forecasts produce
small, but positive, pro¯ts.
We ¯nd that there are distinct periods of high and low dispersion where market
participants disagree as to what will happen to the future level of the exchange rates.
Furthermore, we document that the frequency at which extremist di®erences in
expectations among market participants occurs is higher than that what would occur
under normality. Dispersion of beliefs seems to occur as a result of the combined
e®ects of market participants holding individual expectations and attaching di®erent
weights on various elements of the set of public information. Finally, we ¯nd that
market volatility Granger-causes trader heterogeneity.
The remainder of the chapter is presented as follows. In section 5.2 we examine
the rationale behind dispersed beliefs. In section 5.3 we introduce the data used
for this analysis. Section 5.4 examines whether expectations are dispersed and in
section 5.5 we try to give an answer as to what the sources of dispersion of beliefs
is. Section 5.6 links dispersion of beliefs to market uncertainty. Finally, section 5.7
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5.2 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
In this chapter we are ¯rst and fore mostly interested in the expectations, or be-
liefs, that market participants, or agents, have with respect to future levels of an
exchange rate and in particular to what extent and by which causes these di®er
from each other. When the expectations of a group of agents di®er (for instance,
one agent expects a higher appreciation of a currency than another agent, or one
agent expects an appreciation while the other expects a depreciation), we state that
their beliefs are dispersed. `Dispersion of beliefs' therefore explicitly refers to the
di®erence in expectations that the various market participants have with respect to
the future status of the market. In related literature, the term `heterogeneity' is
often used to express similar concepts. Yet, this term is used in a much broader
setting, for instance to refer to the market participants themselves (heterogeneous
agents) or to the type of information they possess (heterogeneous information). In
order to avoid confusion about the terminology, we prefer the term dispersion of
beliefs instead of the term heterogeneity, whenever we talk about the di®erence in
agents' expectations.
There are broadly three commonly used explanations for why dispersion of be-
liefs occurs in ¯nancial markets. First of all, one strand of the literature argues that
dispersion of beliefs arises because of information asymmetries. Di®erent market
participants are assumed to hold di®erent sets of information, whereby part of the
information is common for all participants and part is private. Even when market
participants use the same techniques in forming expectations and try to make the
best forecast conditional on the information they have, their expectations will in-
herently be di®erent due to the fact that all have a di®erent information set. This
asymmetry in information may arise because of several reasons. First, when the
concept of asymmetric information was introduced in the New Classical Theory of
the macro economy, the key reason why agents were assumed to be unable to obtain
information that is public in other parts of the economy was that the transmission
of public information was rigid.
Another source of asymmetric information is the natural informational advan-
tage that some players have over others. For example, Peiers (1997) reports on
how central banks regularly execute their interventionary transactions through se-
lected large commercial, often domestic banks instead of going through the brokers'
market. The central bank can thus bene¯t from the strong market presence and
liquidity from its key intermediary, and the intermediary commercial bank has priv-
ileged information regarding the central bank's activities. Information asymmetry is
therefore caused by the fact that central bank activity is revealed in multiple stages.
Covrig and Melvin (2002) furthermore attribute part of the private information in
the foreign exchange market to the customer order °ow: large domestic banks will
receive the foreign exchange business of large domestic corporations and this con-
fers a temporary informational advantage on large domestic banks. The costs of
asymmetric information to market participants can be substantial even today. By
analyzing trades and quotes in the Deutschemark - U.S. Dollar market, Payne (2003)
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bid-ask spread.
There are, on the other hand, several arguments and empirical considerations
against the claim that all of the dispersion of beliefs is caused by the existence of
private information. First, since ¯nancial markets and foreign exchange markets in
particular are dominated by large institutions that are all competitive in the search
for information, one would expect that each of them should possess essentially the
same information. Second, even when a particular market participant possesses
private, inside information, it is still illegal to trade on such information. Since
developed ¯nancial markets are heavily monitored by a community of regulators,
brokers, and governmental institutions, one would expect that trading on such pri-
vate information is scarce, or at minimum it is unrealistic to assume that a signi¯cant
part of the volatility in foreign exchange markets is caused by illegal trade.
A second strand of the literature therefore assumes that all market participants
hold di®erent beliefs about economic variables even when there is no di®erence in the
information that is available to them. The di®erence in beliefs arises because agents
disagree about how they should interpret this information. A popular approach
in the discussion about why agents interpret information di®erently is the rational
beliefs theory due to Kurz (1994). In this theory, the disagreement is caused by
the fact that economic agents do not know the structural relations of the economy,
such as demand and supply functions. Agents only have `information' or `empirical
knowledge', which is readily observable from the economy, usually in the form of a
large amount of data concerning the past performance of an asset or economy in
general. They form their probability beliefs about the future by using the empirical
distribution that is derived from the relative frequency of events in the past. Their
own experience and success in forming accurate forecasts will likely play a role in
selecting and valuing information. Given a set of identical data, di®erent agents
will then add di®erent weights to the various elements of the data, to express their
relative importance which they think the various elements have when forming an
expectation about the future.
The rational beliefs theory therefore stands in contrast to the more commonly
used theory of rational expectations, where agents are supposed to know a lot about
the structure of the economy. It was argued that it is unreasonable to assume
that economic agents possess skills and structural knowledge that no human being
can possess. Structural knowledge can be gradually acquired by agents though,
for instance through learning, but the literature on learning has thus far not been
successful in justifying a fully rational agent.
An important observation in the rational beliefs theory is that market risks are
determined by the individual beliefs of the various market participants and that
a change in the distribution of these beliefs therefore a®ects the volatility of the
market. Kurz and Motolese (2001, p. 497) in fact claim that the \distribution of
beliefs in the market is the most important propagation mechanism of economic
volatility", in other words, much of the volatility in the market is generated by
the individual beliefs of the market participants and the correlation between these
beliefs.
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future may be related to the existence of fundamentally di®erent types of market
participants. In the ¯nancial economics literature there have been several attempts
to present models with di®erent types of investors who in essence all have the same
information. For instance, De Long et al. (1990) present a model where noise traders,
with no access to inside information, act irrationally on noise as if it were information
that would give them an advantage over rational arbitrageurs. These noise traders
can earn higher expected returns, because of their own destabilizing in°uence and
not because they bear more of the fundamental risk.
Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990a) popularize the view that the foreign exchange
market is dominated by two types of market participants that di®er in which infor-
mation they use for forming their beliefs. On the one hand, fundamentalists think
of the exchange rate as the output of an economic model, while on the other hand
chartists predominantly use the exchange rate's own history as input in their expec-
tations formation process. They show that the increased use of technical analysis
(chartist behavior) in the late 1980s could well explain why the U.S. Dollar was so far
above its long-run equilibrium at that time, or why the volume of foreign exchange
trading worldwide has grown so tremendously. Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor
and Allen (1992) were among the ¯rst to show by means of surveys that at least
90 percent of market participants place some weight on technical advise, although
this is used predominantly for shorter-term forecasts, and that the use of technical
forecasting tools has increased over the past decades.
The realization that the presence of fundamentally di®erent interacting market
participants can shed new light on some of the anomalies in the ¯nancial economics
literature has resulted in a strand of literature on how to model these `heterogeneous'
agents (see Hommes, 2006, for an overview of this literature). Most heterogeneous
agents models are based on the simple chartists - fundamentalist distinction as well,
but revolutionary is the fact that agents can switch between trader types. Switching
occurs as a result of di®erences in forecasting performance of the di®erent strategies.
Simulations show that heterogeneous agents models are capable of replicating the
stylized facts from ¯nancial markets, see e.g. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). Peri-
ods in which (extrapolating) chartists are dominating the market are characterized
by high volatility, while periods dominated by (mean-reverting) fundamentalists are
characterized by low volatility. This combination yields an economic intuitive ex-
planation for the existence of volatility clustering, heavy tailed return distributions,
excess volatility, and slow mean reversion. The ¯rst estimation results indicate
the existence of switching heterogeneous agents in di®erent ¯nancial markets; see
Boswijk et al. (2007) for the S&P500 and De Jong et al. (2006) for the EMS exchange
rates.
The market microstructure approach uses dispersion of beliefs as well as high-
lights the importance of the market microstructure theory in explaining the com-
plex short-term behavior of the exchange rate. For instance, using order °ow as a
proximate determinant, Evans and Lyons (2002) develop a model that is strikingly
successful in accounting for realized exchange rate changes. In their analyses, they
show that the order °ow conveys dispersed information and that the distribution
of information is an important determinant in short-run exchange rate movements.Data 87
Moreover, the large volumes in the exchange rate market are explanatory for short-
term movements and an indication that agents have di®erent information or process
information di®erently. In other words, a high dispersion of beliefs causes high
volatility. As shown by Fan and Lyons (2001), informative trades are mixed with
uninformative trades, indicating that market e±ciency crucially depends on how
markets accomplish the di±cult task of aggregating dispersed information.
In the next sections we attempt to deal with the ¯rst two arguments of why
dispersion of beliefs occurs, namely because of asymmetry in information and/or
disagreement about how information should be interpreted. In the next chapter we
look at the relative role of fundamentally di®erent types of market participants.
5.3 Data
To investigate the behavioral aspects of the beliefs of market participants, and in
particular the dispersion thereof between participants, we use a unique database of
survey forecasts. The individual forecasts are obtained from a survey conducted
by Consensus Economics of London on a monthly basis among the leading mar-
ket participants in the foreign exchange market, investment banks, and professional
forecasting agencies. Examples of panelist companies are Morgan Stanley, Oxford
Economic Forecasting, Deutsche Bank Research, and BNP Paribas. The panelists
companies are located worldwide, although they are all from developed economies
(notably from the U.S., Japan, U.K., France, Germany, Canada, etc.). The fore-
casts are point forecasts for a large set of currencies against the U.S. Dollar or the
Deutschemark (later the Euro) and are available for horizons of 1, 3, 12, and 24
months ahead. The names of the panelist companies are revealed.
Although survey participants have a few days time to return their forecasts, we
learned that the vast majority send their responses by e-mail on the Friday before
the publication day (usually the second Monday of the month). We consider this
Friday to be the day on which their beliefs are formed and assume that their beliefs
are translated one-to-one in a point forecast. There may be reasons for panelists not
to reveal their true beliefs, though. One motive may be that agents do not want
to expose their (private) information to other market participants. This e®ect can
be mitigated by the reputation e®ect that surveys can have. When the names of
the forecasters are given in the survey publication, like is the case in this data set,
agents have an incentive to perform well in order to attract customers.
For the Friday on which the beliefs are thought to be formed, we obtain spot and
forward exchange rate series with di®erent maturities to match with the survey data.
All spot rate series are obtained through Datastream. To verify that the information
sets of market participants are not too diverse, all of the analyses throughout this
study were re-estimated using spot data from various days surrounding this Friday,
yet the overall results remain virtually unchanged. Other data, such as interest
rates, are also obtained through DataStream.
For our sample, we obtain the forecasts for the U.K. Pound, Japanese Yen and
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Table 5.1: Data Summary
U.K. Pound Japanese Yen Euro (Deutschemark)
a) Period 1989:10 - 1995:2
Survey frequency Monthly Monthly Monthly
Minimum # panelists 89 94 99
Maximum # panelists 112 120 127
Median # panelists 99 108 112
b) Period 1995:11 - 2004:12
Survey frequency Bi-monthly Monthly Monthly
Minimum # panelists 70 82 85
Maximum # panelists 108 123 128
Median # panelists 89 103 102
Notes. The medians are rounded.
2004.1 This period is of particular interest since it contains several ¯nancial crises,
the introduction of a single monetary currency unit, and several large changes in the
level of the exchange rates. The panel is unbalanced since the response rate of the
individual market participants is less than 100 percent and since market participants
left the panel and were replaced by others. Due to data unavailability we have to
split the sample in two periods: October 1989 through February 1995 (Sample 1)
and November 1995 through December 2004 (Sample 2). In this chapter we focus
on the 3- and 12-month-ahead forecasts since these have the highest response rates.
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the survey dataset that is used and gives an
indication of how many responses are obtained from the panelists per time period.
We ¯nd that the median number of responding participants is over 100 per month
for the Japanese Yen and Euro forecasts, while slightly less than 100 per month for
U.K. Pound forecasts.
The number of methods to measure or quantify dispersion of beliefs is small be-
cause of the relatively scarcity of data on individual (survey) forecasts. We therefore
follow the formal approach proposed by Shalen (1993), who claims that the theo-
retical relationship between market volatility, volume, and the dispersion of beliefs
should be based on a squared function of the di®erence between the individual belief
and the average belief about a particular asset. We therefore take the cross-sectional
standard deviation of the individual survey-based forecasts, ¹ ¾e
t. We then divide the
cross-sectional standard deviation by the cross-sectional average, which gives us a
dimensionless statistic that allows the comparison of the variability of populations
that have a di®erent mean, such as comparing two exchange rates.2 This statistic
1Prior to January 1999 we use forecasts on the Deutschemark versus the U.S. Dollar. We
transform these forecasts into Euro / U.S. Dollar forecasts using the o±cial conversion rate.
2We check to what extent our measure of dispersion is driven by either the cross-sectional
standard deviation or the cross-sectional average. The correlation with the former is typically
between 85 and 97 percent for all currency and forecast horizon combinations. The correlation
with the latter is never more than 56 percent. Thus, the variation in our measure of dispersion is
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is often called the coe±cient of variation. If we de¯ne the individual survey-based
forecast of a particular individual as se
i;t and the cross-sectional average as ¹ se
t,3 then


















i;t ¡ ¹ se
t: (5.3)
Figure 5.1 presents this coe±cient of variation along two forecast horizons for
the three currencies. In addition, high-low spreads are presented as a robustness
check in ¯gure 5.2.4 Several ¯ndings are noteworthy. First of all, the spread and
coe±cient of variation reveal similar patterns. This ensures us that both measures
seem to be capable of capturing dispersion in beliefs, in other words, the variation
in the spreads is not caused by the extremist expectations of outliers.
Second, the dispersion in beliefs increases with the forecast horizon. When one
would see dispersion of beliefs as a sign of uncertainty, this would indicate that
the market agrees more about what will happen in the nearby future than in the
distant future. It should be mentioned though that this is not evidence that market
participants can better predict short term changes over long term changes.
Third, dispersion of beliefs is not constant over time, but seems to be high in
some periods of considerable length, while low in others. In particular for the U.K.
Pound and for the Euro dispersion of beliefs was obviously higher in the period of
early 1990 to late 1993 than in the subsequent period. Similarly, for the Japanese
Yen rate beliefs became increasingly dispersed from early 1998 onwards until the
end of 2001. This period is in the aftermath of the Asian crisis starting in mid-
1997, which would lead us to believe that market instability is a driving factor of
dispersion in beliefs. This would be an interesting argument, for if would suggest
that a dramatic event such as the Asian crisis may have an e®ect on the expectations
of market participants even 2 year after date.
5.4 Are the Beliefs of Foreign Exchange Forecast-
ers Dispersed?
One natural question is what we can learn from the distribution of the di®erences
between the individual forecasts and the cross-sectional average, di;t. Under the
3In our notation we suppress a subscript that would indicate the forecast horizon to keep the
algebra tractable.
4Using the spread as a measure of dispersion may be subject to one severe problem. Since
the spread only depends on two contemporaneous observations, non-representative market partic-
ipant who often produce extreme (outlier) forecasts directly in°uence the measure of dispersion.
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Figure 5.2: High-Low Spreads92 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
null hypothesis that beliefs are not dispersed, these di®erences (or alternatively the
di®erences between contemporaneous individual forecasts) are independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). This assumption is directly testable by examining
the distributional properties of these di®erences. Of particular interest is the tail
behavior of the distribution, since under the null hypothesis of no dispersed beliefs
extreme di®erences should not occur at a rate higher than normal. Furthermore,
the average di®erence between forecasters should be zero, and there should not be
any form of autocorrelation.
We proceed by examining formally whether beliefs are dispersed. To do so we
follow the methodology due to Ito (1990), who describes a way of how individual
agents form their beliefs about future exchange rates. Suppose individual i generates
a forecast5 about the k-period ahead level of a particular exchange rate and that
this forecast consists of a common structural part based on public information (that
is common to all market participants) and an individual e®ect gi. The individual
forecast se
i;t can then be described as
se
i;t = f(­t) + gi + ²i;t; (5.4)
where ²i;t is a pure random disturbance term (with respect to i and t) that can,
for instance, be the result of a measurement error. In a similar way can the cross-
sectional average of a set of market participants' forecasts be de¯ned as
¹ se
t = f(­t) + ¹ g + ¹ ²t: (5.5)
Suppose that a normalization such that ¹ g = 0 is possible (when f(­t) contains a
constant term). Subtracting the cross-sectional average from the individual forecast
then gives
se
i;t ¡ ¹ se
t = gi + (²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t); (5.6)
or
di;t = gi + (²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t): (5.7)
In this way it is not necessary to know the exact structure of f(­t), as long as it
is common to all agents. Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for the distribution
of the individual expectations in excess of their cross-sectional average di;t, which
should give us information about the individual e®ect gi. The statistics are generated
from the sample of pooled data.
Several observations are noteworthy. Both the high-low spread (maximum minus
minimum forecast) and standard deviation increase as the forecast horizon increases.
This indicates an increase in dispersion of beliefs as the forecast horizon lengthens, as
we have seen in ¯gure 1. Furthermore, the deviations are signi¯cantly and positively
auto-correlated and the pattern of autocorrelation is stronger for longer forecast
horizons and for the second sample period.6 Since the autocorrelation pattern does
5Recall that we made the assumption that the survey-based forecast is as close as we can get to
the true, yet unknown belief of the agent.
6Except for the U.K. Pound, but this is due to the fact that forecasts are available bi-monthly
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Table 5.2: Distributional Summary Statistics of the Deviations (pooled sample)
3 month forecast horizon 12 month forecast horizon
U.K. Japanese Euro U.K. Japanese Euro
Pound Yen Pound Yen
a) Period 1989:10 - 1995:2
Maximum 0:1481 0:2127 0:1710 0:2563 0:2574 0:3239
Minimum ¡0:1934 ¡0:1693 ¡0:1695 ¡0:3487 ¡0:3044 ¡0:2457
Stdev 0:0319 0:0317 0:0308 0:0536 0:0604 0:0536
Skewness ¡0:21 0:12 0:15 ¡0:05 0:09 0:21
Kurtosis 5:68 4:91 4:52 4:28 3:56 3:92
Bera-Jarque 1961:02¤¤¤ 1071:56¤¤¤ 718:14¤¤¤ 443:08¤¤¤ 101:06¤¤¤ 313:52¤¤¤
Autocorrelation 0:454¤¤¤ 0:467¤¤¤ 0:446¤¤¤ 0:610¤¤¤ 0:657¤¤¤ 0:613¤¤¤
b) Period 1995:11 - 2004:12
Maximum 0:1037 0:2287 0:1540 0:1399 0:3630 0:1371
Minimum ¡0:1098 ¡0:1646 ¡0:1471 ¡0:1553 ¡0:2346 ¡0:3290
Stdev 0:0255 0:0378 0:0322 0:0400 0:0732 0:0554
Skewness ¡0:02 ¡0:05 0:01 ¡0:29 0:41 ¡0:59
Kurtosis 4:54 4:32 4:40 4:13 3:76 3:87
Bera-Jarque 109:69¤¤¤ 162:60¤¤¤ 180:89¤¤¤ 74:96¤¤¤ 1118:22¤¤¤ 200:87¤¤¤
Autocorrelation 0:303¤¤¤ 0:506¤¤¤ 0:541¤¤¤ 0:563¤¤¤ 0:738¤¤¤ 0:717¤¤¤
Notes. The ¯gures are in logarithms, so they can be seen as the percentage deviations from the
consensus average expectations. A ¤, ¤¤, and ¤¤¤ indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of
normality at the 10, 5, and 1 percent signi¯cant level, respectively.
not extend beyond the ¯rst lag (not reported), we can conclude that the error terms
in equation 5.7 follow either an AR(1) or MA process with an unknown number of
lags. This correlation can be explained from the overlapping pattern of the survey
forecasts. Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) demonstrate that, when
the forecast horizon is longer than the observational frequency (which is one month),
the error term in equation 5.4 will be serially correlated up to a moving average
process of order k ¡ 1. The error component in equation 5.7 therefore inherits this
structure. In the remainder of the chapter we will correct for this moving average
structure.
Although the individual forecasts do not appear to be skewed in a particular
direction, the distributions are consistently leptokurtic. While high kurtosis is not
analogous to fat tail behavior, we may state that an excessive number of forecasts
are at enough distant from the consensus forecast that they render the distribution
non-normal. Jarque-Bera statistics for the normality of the individual expectations
are included and corroborate the rejection of the normality assumptions under high
levels of signi¯cance.
A formal analysis of the tail behavior of the distribution of individual deviations
can be given by examining a measure for the tail index. Hill (1975) de¯nes a tail
index estimate by looking at the order statistics of a series. Suppose that the survey-
based forecasts for a particular exchange rate are independently and identically
distributed. We then de¯ne X as the set of di;t for all i and t. We de¯ne x(1) ·
x(2) · ::: · x(n) as the ascending order statistics from the sample x1;x2;:::;xn of94 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
consecutive deviations in the set X. In other words x(n) is the largest individual
upward deviation and x(n¡m) is the m'th largest individual upward deviation (the
particular di;t is positive) from the total set of individual expected deviations. The












where m is the number of observations in the tail that is used for estimating the tail





is called the tail index estimate and can be interpreted as the highest moment that
exists from the sample. So when the tail estimates ® are su±ciently low (or the Hill
estimates ° su±ciently high), we can question the existence of higher moments of
the distribution, which is direct evidence of fatness in the tails. The speci¯cation in
equation 5.9 is in fact a measure for the upper (right) side of the distribution, where
we ¯nd the largest individual estimates that are above their cross-sectional average.
A similar index can be generated for the lower (left) side of the distribution, by using
instead descending order statistics x(1) ¸ x(2) ¸ ::: ¸ x(n). We distinguish these
indices as ®r and ®l. We choose the cuto® point m by using a certain percentage of
the lowest observations in X.
Table 5.3 provides tail index estimates for the 1, 5, and 10 percent tails of the
distribution. Estimates for both upper (right) and lower (left) tails are included sep-
arately to detect any tail asymmetries. The number of tail observations m that is
used to estimate the tail indices is reported above the estimates. It can be seen that
the distribution is fat-tailed, with indices either just above or below 4, depending
on the percentile. This would even question the existence of the 4th moment in the
distribution and indicates that extreme expectations occur more often than would
be normal. In other words, the number of expected changes that is extremely devi-
ating from the mean expectation is such that we can state that market participants'
beliefs are signi¯cantly dispersed and the assumption of a representative agent can
be rejected.
A question that appears naturally is whether for a particular currency the mar-
ket expects more upward trends than downwards trends. For instance, when a su±-
ciently large number of extreme expected upward changes occur relative to expected
downward changes, then the right tail of the distribution should be signi¯cantly
bigger than the left tail. We therefore use a two-sided T-test to formally test for
equality of the left and right tail index estimates.
Hill (1975) shows that the statistic
p
m(° ¡ ¹ °) (where ¹ ° is the `true', but un-
observable Hill index) is asymptotically normally distributed N(0; ¹ °2). A two-sided
test for the equality of the tail index estimates can therefore be based on the following
T-statistic:
T =
®l ¡ ®r p
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Table 5.3: Hill Estimates (pooled sample)
3 month forecast horizon 12 month forecast horizon
U.K. Japanese Euro U.K. Japanese Euro
Pound Yen Pound Yen
a) Period 1989:10 - 1995:2
1th percentile m = 63 m = 68 m = 71 m = 64 m = 69 m = 71
®l 3:682 5:981 4:917 4:846 6:383 5:460
®r 5:430 4:521 5:085 4:981 5:557 16:147
T : ®l = ®r 2:115¤¤ ¡1:605 0:208 0:156 ¡0:810 5:283¤¤¤
5th percentile m = 318 m = 344 m = 357 m = 321 m = 347 m = 357
®l 3:173 3:280 3:429 3:846 4:197 3:806
®r 3:372 3:368 3:274 4:138 3:823 5:168
T : ®l = ®r 0:768 0:348 ¡0:618 0:925 ¡1:226 4:009¤¤¤
10th percentile m = 636 m = 688 m = 715 m = 642 m = 695 m = 715
®l 2:403 2:837 2:719 2:908 3:393 3:136
®r 2:436 2:648 2:865 2:913 2:984 3:486
T : ®l = ®r 0:244 ¡1:277 0:989 0:033 ¡2:388¤¤ 1:994¤¤
b) Period 1995:11 - 2004:12
1th percentile m = 11 m = 22 m = 22 m = 11 m = 22 m = 22
®l 4:325 6:728 4:300 4:932 8:789 4:843
®r 3:858 5:989 6:271 6:557 3:048 8:794
T : ®l = ®r ¡0:268 ¡0:385 1:216 0:657 ¡2:894¤¤¤ 1:846¤
5th percentile m = 55 m = 110 m = 110 m = 55 m = 110 m = 110
®l 3:428 3:487 3:435 2:958 5:390 3:992
®r 3:497 3:173 3:474 4:240 4:186 5:996
T : ®l = ®r 0:106 ¡0:696 0:085 1:839¤ ¡1:850¤ 2:917¤¤¤
10th percentile m = 110 m = 221 m = 220 m = 110 m = 221 m = 220
®l 2:568 2:744 2:949 2:658 3:270 3:041
®r 2:606 2:856 2:612 2:888 3:495 4:002
T : ®l = ®r 0:119 0:420 ¡1:267 0:615 0:698 2:835¤¤
Notes. This table gives the upper ®r and lower ®l, tail index estimates for the 1, 5, and 10th
percentile of the tails of the distribution of the individual expectations in excess of the cross-
sectional average. The T-statistic is for the equality of tails. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ refers to rejection of
the null hypothesis that the tail index estimates are equal at a 10, 5, or 1 percent signi¯cance level,
respectively. `m' refers to the number of tail observations that are included for the Hill estimates.




Table 5.3 reports results from this T-test. We can only consistently reject the
null hypothesis of equal tails for the 12-month-ahead forecasts of the Euro. For
most other series do the tail indices look similar and hence may we assume that tails
are symmetric here. The tail indices are in general also larger for the longer-term
forecast horizons. In the next section we go a step further and question what the
source of this dispersion is.96 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
5.5 Asymmetric Information with Individual and
Idiosyncratic E®ects
It remains a matter of debate whether dispersion of beliefs arise because market
participants use di®erent information sets whereby part of the information is private,
whether they attach di®erent weights to some elements of a common information
set, or a combination of both. To deal with this question we should ideally look
at evidence of dispersed beliefs for each market participant separately. Reconsider
equation 5.7:
di;t = gi + (²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t): (5.12)
Here, we assumed that the public information set ­t is common for all market
participants. For this reason, it is unnecessary to know the exact structure of f(­t).
Since the random disturbance terms both have expected value equal to zero, the
individual e®ect gi can be estimated from a regression of the individual forecasts in
excess of the cross-sectional average on a constant. The signi¯cance of the gi term
indicates whether individual e®ects are present for agent i, or in other words that
this agent bases her forecasts on an informational set that is unique for this agent.7
We therefore estimate equation 5.7 using a least squares regression for each mar-
ket participant. Since the forecast horizon is longer than the observational frequency,
the error component in equation 5.7 will be serially correlated up to a moving av-
erage process of order k ¡ 1. While least squares estimates of equation 5.7 remain
consistent in spite of the serially correlated residuals, the least squares standard er-
rors are biased. Therefore, we adjust the standard errors nonparametrically using
the procedure of Newey and West (1987, 1994), employing the Bartlett kernel. This
correction will also be applied to all variations of this equation further on in the
chapter.
Thus far this reasoning assumes that dispersion of beliefs arises due to di®erences
in information sets, i.e. `private' information. In addition to holding private infor-
mation, it is reasonable to assume that although the remainder information may be
common to all market participants, they interpret this information di®erently and
hence attach di®erent weights to its various elements. We call the di®erent weights
`idiosyncratic e®ects.' Ito (1990) and MacDonald and Marsh (1996), for instance,
regress the di®erence between the forecasts of agents on a set of variables that is
possibly used in forming expectations, such that the di®erence in weight put on a
certain variable in the expectation formation model is estimated directly.
We consider two models that may explain how market participants form their
forecasts. First, we assume that agents follow a simple autoregressive forecasting
rule, where they extrapolate the most recent trend in the exchange rate into the
future. In essence this is a technical (or chartist) tool. Second, we assume that
agents use an uncovered interest parity approach, where the expected change in
the level of the exchange rate is related to the relative interest rate level of the
7In addition, if the di®erence in the individual e®ects of two individuals (say i and j) is to be
estimated, a similar method can be used: se
i;t¡se
j;t = gi¡gj +(²i;t¡²j;t). However, the estimation
results are virtually identical to those of equation 5.7. These results are available on request.Asymmetric Information with Individual and Idiosyncratic E®ects 97
domestic and the foreign country. This is on its turn a more fundamentals-based
approach. If the ¯t of a certain model of expectation formation is better for one agent
compared to the other and vice versa, this is not only a direct proof of dispersion of
beliefs, but it also lays bare the source of the dispersion, namely on which variables
the agents put di®erent weights. Audretsch and Stadtmann (2005) determine the
optimal model for each agent by using the R2 of these types of regressions. These
statistics are informative in that they reveal to what extent the forecast is based on
observable information. The remaining variance is then caused by other variables,
such as psychological, experience, etc.
If market participants form forecasts in an extrapolative way, then
se
i;t ¡ st = gi +
L X
l=1
¯l;i(st¡l ¡ st¡l+1) + ²i;t; (5.13)
where L is the number of lags that is used in the forecast. This equation is a
speci¯cation to equation 5.4, where we have subtracted st from both sides of the
equality sign. In fact, we have imposed a structure for the unknown f(­). Following
the same procedure as in equations 5.4, 5.5, and 5.7, we ¯nd that
di;t = gi ¡ ¹ g +
L X
l=1
(¯l;i ¡ ¹ ¯l)(st¡l ¡ st¡l+1) + ²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t: (5.14)
In other words, the structural part of the information set and the values of the
regressors are the same for all market participants, yet the coe±cients (or weights)
di®er. We estimate equation 5.14 for all market participants. We use only two lags
to preserve model parsimony, while still capturing most of the dynamics. Since we
¯nd that serial correlation usually does not extend beyond the second lag, we feel
that this speci¯cation represents an extrapolative expectations model su±ciently.
We continue the analysis by questioning whether uncovered interest parity (UIP)
has appeal as an empirical fundamental model for the formation of beliefs and
whether market participants have idiosyncratic beliefs as to the importance in the
relative level of interest rates. Uncovered interest parity assumes that the change in
the level of the exchange rate over a period k is related to the level of the k-period
domestic interest rate relative to its foreign counterpart, such that
se
i;t ¡ st = gi + °i(rt ¡ r¤
t) + ²i;t; (5.15)
where rt is the k-period domestic interest rate and r¤
t the k-period foreign interest
rate. Following the same line of reasoning as under equations 5.4, 5.5, and 5.7, we
can rewrite equation 5.15 as
di;t = gi ¡ ¹ g + (rt ¡ r¤
t) + ²i;t ¡ ¹ ²t: (5.16)
We measure rt and r¤
t as the domestic and foreign interbank rates, respectively,
using the 3- and 12-month interbank rates for the two forecasting horizons.98 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
Table 5.4: Percentages Agents with Individual or Idiosyncratic E®ects
3 month forecast horizon 3 month forecast horizon
U.K. Japanese Euro U.K. Japanese Euro
Pound Yen Pound Yen
a) Period 1989:10 - 1995:2
Individual e®ect
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 43:33 37:01 37:87 50:00 49:69 58:29
Individual and idiosyncratic e®ect due to extrapolation
¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 22:00 9:74 14:20 32:24 13:21 29:71
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 44:00 35:71 39:64 52:63 42:14 57:14
¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 and gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 11:33 5:19 7:10 18:42 6:92 21:71
Individual and idiosyncratic e®ect due to UIP
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 24:00 26:62 26:63 34:87 38:99 42:29
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 33:33 39:61 30:77 43:42 55:97 43:43
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 and gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 19:33 15:58 9:47 23:02 27:04 18:86
b) Period 1995:11 - 2004:12
Individual e®ect
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 31:03 29:03 32:26 44:83 61:29 48:39
Individual and idiosyncratic e®ect due to extrapolation
¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 31:03 12:90 19:35 48:28 35:48 48:39
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 27:59 29:03 29:03 48:28 61:29 54:84
¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 and gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 10:34 6:45 0:00 31:03 22:58 32:26
Individual and idiosyncratic e®ect due to UIP
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 37:93 29:03 41:94 34:48 38:71 38:71
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 31:03 35:48 35:48 44:83 38:71 48:39
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 and gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 17:24 19:35 25:81 20:69 25:81 25:81
Notes. This table presents the percentage of respondents for which we ¯nd signi¯cant individ-
ual and/or idiosyncratic e®ects, i.e. the percentage of respondents for which we ¯nd signi¯cant
coe±cients from estimating equations 5.7, 5.14 and 5.16.
The results for equations 5.7, 5.14 and 5.16 are summarized in table 5.4. In this
table we present the percentages of market participants for which we ¯nd individual
e®ects, idiosyncratic e®ects with respect to an extrapolating model, and idiosyncratic
e®ects with respect to uncovered interest parity, all compared to the cross-sectional
average. Results are for Wald tests on the signi¯cance (on a 5 percent level) of the
parameters or combinations thereof as to discriminate between the various e®ects.
For around 40 percent of the individual market participants we ¯nd evidence of
individual e®ects on the short forecast horizon, that is when gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0. When the
forecast horizon extends to one year, this percentage increases to around 50 percent.
In the second sample period the percentages decrease to around 30 percent for the
short horizon, but remain at 50 percent for the long horizon.
Furthermore, in addition to these individual e®ects, there is proof that a large
group of market participants attach di®erent weights on the information that is in
the most recent history of the exchange rates. On average about 15 (20) percent ofAsymmetric Information with Individual and Idiosyncratic E®ects 99
the market participants show idiosyncratic e®ects with respect to extrapolation (so
¯i¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0) in the short run for the ¯rst (second) sample period.8 This e®ect is more
pronounced at the longer forecast horizon, for both sample periods and all exchange
rates. The percentage of respondents with signi¯cant individual e®ects remains
comparable after introducing the idiosyncratic extrapolation. The percentage of
respondents that exhibit both individual and idiosyncratic extrapolation e®ects, so
the ones for which gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 and ¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 is in general considerably lower than
the total e®ects, suggesting that respondents show either individual or idiosyncratic
e®ects. The combination of both e®ects occurs more frequently for the longer horizon
beliefs with up to 32 percent of the agents subject to both e®ects.
The percentage of respondents with signi¯cant idiosyncratic UIP e®ects is larger
than extrapolation e®ects, implying that respondents' beliefs on the e®ect of the
interest rate di®erential on the exchange rate are highly dispersed. Speci¯cally, for
the ¯rst period, we ¯nd that around 25 (40) percent of the respondents exhibit
signi¯cant UIP e®ects for the short (long) horizon. For the second period, these
percentages are both around 35 percent. The percentage of respondents with indi-
vidual e®ects after including the idiosyncratic UIP e®ects is again comparable to the
results without UIP e®ects. Contrary to the case of the idiosyncratic extrapolation
e®ects, we ¯nd that the majority of respondents that have idiosyncratic UIP e®ects
also have individual e®ects, that is the percentage of agents for which gi¡¹ g 6= 0 and
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 is between 15 to 25 percent, also for the shorter forecast horizon.
A claim that is occasionally made with these types of expectation formation
models is that when one particular model is examined in a single equation, the results
may be a®ected by a missing variable bias. It is likely that agents use various models
when forming a belief about the future instead of just one technique and therefore the
omission of a set of variables in an equation with just a single explanatory variable
may lead to this bias. In order to obviate this missing variable bias, we provide as a
robustness test a combination of equations 5.7, 5.14 and 5.16 that contains individual
e®ects and both technical (lags) and fundamental (interbank) information:
di;t = gi ¡ ¹ g +
L X
l=1
(¯l;i ¡ ¹ ¯l)(st¡l ¡ st¡l+1) + (°i ¡ ¹ °)(rt ¡ r¤
t) + ²i;t ¡ ¹ ²: (5.17)
Again, we use two lags for L and the standard errors are robust to the overlapping
data problem. Estimation results for this equation are displayed in table 5.5.
The results for the combined test indicate that the results from the individual
regressions in table 5.4 are not driven by missing variable bias: the percentages of
dispersion of beliefs remain at a comparably high level. For the ¯rst period, the
fraction of respondents with individual e®ects decreases somewhat compared to the
results in table 5.4, from 40 to around 35 percent for the 3-months horizon and from
50 to somewhat over 40 percent for the 12-months horizon. The dispersion vis-µ a-vis
the extrapolation, on the other hand, increases, from 15 (20) to 20 (30) percent
for the short (long) horizon. The same conclusion holds for the idiosyncratic UIP
8Beware that we used two lags in the speci¯cation of the extrapolation model. For the remainder
of the chapter, we therefore mean with ¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ a vector of both ¯1;i ¡ ¹ ¯1 and ¯2;i ¡ ¹ ¯2.100 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
Table 5.5: Percentages Agents with Individual or Idiosyncratic E®ects (combined)
3 month forecast horizon 12 month forecast horizon
U.K. Japanese Euro U.K. Japanese Euro
Pound Yen Pound Yen
a) Period 1989:10 - 1995:2
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 33:33 39:61 34:91 43:42 44:03 40:00
¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 25:33 14:29 20:12 36:84 22:64 32:57
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 27:33 29:22 29:59 38:16 40:88 45:71
b) Period 1995:11 - 2004:12
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0 17:24 29:03 35:48 31:03 41:94 51:61
¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0 27:59 9:68 12:90 37:93 38:71 32:36
°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 34:48 29:03 38:71 27:59 48:39 32:26
Notes. This table presents the percentage of respondents for which we ¯nd signi¯cant individ-
ual and/or idiosyncratic e®ects, i.e. the percentage of respondents for which we ¯nd signi¯cant
coe±cients from estimating equation 5.17.
e®ects: from 25 (40) to 30 (over 40) percent for the short (long) horizon. For the
second period, we cannot draw any conclusions per e®ect, but we can per currency.
For the U.K. Pound and the euro, we observe that all percentages decrease; for the
Japanese Yen there is a positive tendency.
We look at various combinations of the hypothesis with respect to the three
e®ects. Table 5.6 reports percentages of market participants for which at least one
of the three e®ects has been identi¯ed and splits the sample up into subsets for which
the indicated equality or inequality holds.9 The results corroborate what we found
earlier. This is concluded from the fact that the highest percentages in table 5.6 can
be found in the top three rows of each panel, i.e. the percentages of respondents
with a single signi¯cant e®ect. This conclusion holds particularly for the ¯rst period,
but can also be distilled for the second. Speci¯cally, respondents that do combine
two e®ects, combine the individual with the idiosyncratic UIP e®ect, or, to a lesser
extent combine all three e®ects. Finally, in all three tables (5.4, 5.5 and 5.6) it
comes forward that the individual e®ect is the most important source of dispersion,
followed by the idiosyncratic UIP e®ect and, third, the idiosyncratic extrapolative
e®ect.
We should mention two drawbacks of the above approach. First is the matter of
variable selection. The exact set of variables that is commonly used to form beliefs
is not known. Second, some of the variables used in forming beliefs are inherently
unobservable, such as the state of mind of the agent during the expectation forma-
tion process, or even the weather condition at that particular time. Furthermore,
the weight agents put on a certain variable might change through time (see, for
instance, the scapegoat models in Bachetta and Van Wincoop, 2005). If beliefs
are dispersed by de¯nition, the adjustment of the weight given to a certain vari-
9For instance, gi¡¹ g 6= 0;¯i¡¹ ¯ = 0;°i¡¹ ° 6= 0 indicates the percentage of agents for which we ¯nd
individual e®ects, idiosyncratic e®ects due to di®erent weights for UIP, but no idiosyncratic e®ects
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Table 5.6: Combinations of E®ects
3 month forecast horizon 12 month forecast horizon
U.K. Japanese Euro U.K. Japanese Euro
Pound Yen Pound Yen
a) Period 1989:10 - 1995:2
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ = 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° = 0 9:33 22:08 15:38 11:84 15:09 14:29
gi ¡ ¹ g = 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° = 0 12:67 8:44 5:92 16:45 4:40 7:43
gi ¡ ¹ g = 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ = 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 4:00 11:04 13:02 7:89 15:72 18:86
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° = 0 2:00 1:30 5:33 5:92 5:66 5:14
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ = 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 12:67 13:64 7:69 15:79 12:58 6:86
gi ¡ ¹ g = 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 1:33 1:95 2:37 4:61 1:89 6:29
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 9:33 2:60 6:51 9:87 10:69 13:71
b) Period 1995:11 - 2004:12
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ = 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° = 0 6:90 6:45 9:68 10:34 6:45 32:26
gi ¡ ¹ g = 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° = 0 10:34 6:45 9:68 17:24 12:90 12:90
gi ¡ ¹ g = 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ = 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 20:69 9:68 9:68 10:34 6:45 9:68
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° = 0 3:45 3:23 0:00 10:34 0:00 0:00
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ = 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 0:00 19:35 25:81 6:90 16:13 3:23
gi ¡ ¹ g = 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 6:90 0:00 3:23 6:90 6:45 3:23
gi ¡ ¹ g 6= 0;¯i ¡ ¹ ¯ 6= 0;°i ¡ ¹ ° 6= 0 6:90 0:00 0:00 3:45 19:35 16:13
Notes. This table presents the combinations of e®ects in percentages of market participants.
able in the expectation formation process does not change simultaneously or equally
among agents. Especially in these regression-based approaches this e®ect could lead
to biased results, since it assumes a permanent di®erence in weight through time.
Therefore, the question of whether beliefs are dispersed and if so, what the source
of this dispersion is, should ideally be approached from various angles.
In this section we have examined the question of what the source of dispersion
of beliefs is. Using various techniques we showed that the dispersion of beliefs
arises both due to the existence of individual e®ects and idiosyncratic e®ects, where
market participants attach di®erent weights to variables that are observed by all
market participants contemporaneously. In the next section we attempt to ¯nd a
relationship between the dispersion of beliefs are certain market characteristics.
5.6 Dispersion of Beliefs and Market Conditions
In the previous section we have shown that the dispersion in beliefs is caused by
the fact that market participants hold private information and that they attach
di®erent weights to the various elements from the set of common information. The
next step is to see whether the degree of dispersion is in any way linked to market
characteristics. So, contrary to the previous sections where we compared forecasts
vis-µ a-vis each other and the consensus, we will now study the degree of dispersion
vis-µ a-vis the market itself. To be more speci¯c, we will examine the relation between
dispersion and market uncertainty, measured by volatility and extreme values.
The heterogeneous expectations literature indicates that there is a direct causal102 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
relation running from dispersion of beliefs to market volatility.10 However, it also
provides us with contrasting hypotheses concerning the sign of the e®ect. As the
market price is moving away from the fundamental price, there is a negative relation
between dispersion and market volatility because the expectations of the di®erent
groups are opposite to each other.11 As the market price moves more and more away
from the fundamental price, the fundamentalists get driven out of the market. The
technical analysts remain active, continue to push the market price away from the
fundamental price and increase market volatility as the number of technical analysts
increases and their expectations become self-ful¯lling.
If the market price is moving towards the fundamental price, however, there is
a positive relation between dispersion and volatility as the di®erent groups expect
similar directions of change. In this situation volatility is rising as all traders active
on the market push the price in the same direction; there is no counter acting force
which is active when the price is moving away from the fundamental price and
fundamentalists are still active. Both groups remain active as both strategies are
pro¯table.
De Grauwe and Rovira Kaltwasser (2007) illustrate the relation between disper-
sion of beliefs and extreme values in exchange rate returns. In their model, agents
disagree on the value of the fundamental exchange rate. It is shown, in a simulation
setup, that the distribution of returns exhibits heavier tails as the dispersion of be-
liefs about the true value of the fundamental rate is larger. This is caused by the
fact that the exchange rate jumps between fundamental equilibria; as the distance
between equilibria is larger, returns will automatically show more extreme values.
The market microstructure literature provides another mechanism by which dis-
persion of beliefs a®ects the volatility in the market. Evans and Lyons (2002) argue
that high turnover in markets re°ects great dispersion of opinions among traders. A
number of authors have looked into this relation empirically. MacDonald and Marsh
(1996) examine the relation between trader heterogeneity and trading volume, with
the same survey dataset as us, and ¯nd a signi¯cant positive relation. Frankel and
Froot (1990a) conclude, from surveys conducted by Money Market Services Inter-
national and The Economist, that dispersion of opinion a®ects the volume of trade
and thereby also market volatility.
We ¯rst study whether there is a relation between dispersion of beliefs and market
conditions, and, second, in which direction the relation is causal. The relation is
examined by splitting the sample in a high- and a low-dispersion sub-sample and
testing the di®erence between the market conditions (i.e., volatility and heavy tails).
Causality, on its turn, is studied by applying a (modi¯ed) Granger causality test.
First, we examine the general relation between dispersion of beliefs and volatil-
ity in table 5.7. Dispersion of beliefs is measured by the coe±cient of variation;
high (low) dispersion implies higher (lower) than average dispersion. Volatility is
measured by the sample variance; heavy tails by the kurtosis and the Hill index.
Overall, the results imply that uncertainty is signi¯cantly larger in periods with
10See Hommes (2006) for an extensive survey.
11Fundamentalists expect the price to return to the fundamental rate while technical analysts
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Table 5.7: Dispersion and Market Characteristics
3 month forecast horizon 12 month forecast horizon
U.K. Japanese Euro U.K. Japanese Euro
Pound Yen Pound Yen
a) Volatility
Low 0:00039 0:00094 0:00077 0:00041 0:00092 0:00093
High 0:00138¤¤¤ 0:00128 0:00121¤¤ 0:00135¤¤¤ 0:00134¤ 0:00098
b) Kurtosis
Low 2:626 2:699 2:115 3:918 2:471 3:419
High 5:797¤¤ 4:175 3:714 6:334¤¤ 4:275¤ 3:043
c) Tail index (Hill)
Low 1st percentile 301:058 42:445 12:164 3:133 4:187 10:381
5th percentile 9:030 6:130 7:731 4:245 6:549 5:265
10th percentile 4:412 5:177 7:535 3:374 4:508 3:961
High 1st percentile 3:303 15:273 5:661 3:303 15:272 6:236
5th percentile 1:846¤ 3:089 3:512 1:619 3:871 3:105
10th percentile 1:807 2:395 3:572 1:932 3:230 3:648
Notes. This table displays the characteristics of the FOREX returns for sub-samples with low
and high dispersion of beliefs (coe±cient of variation smaller or larger than the mean coe±cient of
variation). The cut-o® points for the Hill index are taken at the 1st, 5th, and 10th percentile. a
¤, ¤¤, and ¤¤¤ denotes a signi¯cant di®erence between low and high dispersion at the 10, 5 and 1
percent level, respectively.
high dispersion compared to periods with low dispersion. Volatility is always higher
during high dispersion periods; this is signi¯cant in four out of six cases. Kurtosis is
higher during high dispersion periods in ¯ve out of six cases; three times signi¯cant.
The tail index is consistently lower (i.e., tails are heavier) for all three cut-o® points
for high dispersion periods.12
Second, we study the causal relation between market volatility and dispersion
by means of Granger causality tests. Our approach is particularly useful in that we
consider a long time period, we use di®erent measures of dispersion and volatility,
and we focus on the causality question instead of correlations. In the previous
sections we argued that dispersion can be measured in various ways. Similarly,
volatility can be quanti¯ed by several di®erent methods. Altogether, we examine six
di®erent dispersion-volatility measure combinations in order to check the robustness
of the results. The causal relation between dispersion and extreme values could
be examined by determining the conditional kurtosis. We choose not to do so,
however, because Bollerslev (1987) shows that the conditional kurtosis is a constant
fraction of the conditional volatility. Brooks et al. (2005) propose a model with
time-varying degrees of freedom for the T-distribution used in a TGARCH setup.
However, De Haan et al. (1989) note that ARCH-type processes generate heavy tailed
12The di®erence between high dispersion and low dispersion tail indices is hardly signi¯cant as
a result of the relatively low number of observations on which the tail index is based.104 Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
distributions, such that it is su±cient in our case to focus solely on the conditional
variance.
In a standard setup, with two series x and y a Granger-causality test examines
whether, after controlling for lagged y, lagged x help to forecast yt. In case the
lagged x are signi¯cant, x is said to Granger-cause y, which gives an indication
concerning the causality between x and y instead of merely the correlation. The
setup of the standard Granger test is slightly altered here. In our analysis, in the
case of dispersion as the dependent variable, we do not use the lagged but the
contemporaneous value of market volatility.13 The reason for this is that dispersion
at time t is formed at the end of the month, when forecasts are submitted, and
concerns forecasts for the future month(s). Volatility at time t, on the other hand,
is formed during that past month (given that t is measured in months). Therefore,
including the contemporaneous value of volatility is informative in the causality
question; excluding it would imply dismissing one month of information.
Since this analysis does not require a time-series in the strict sense, it is possible
to use the total sample, from October 1989 to December 2004, with a gap of six
months in 1995, which are 175 monthly observations. For the U.K. Pound we only
use the ¯rst set (1989{1995) since the second set contains two-monthly observations.
The three and twelve month forecasts are available for the total sample. We focus
on the ¯rst and second lag of the Granger causality test as we assume that there is
no relation between the variables over periods longer than two months. The general
framework is thus:
yt = ®0 + ¯1yt¡1 + ¯2yt¡2 + °1xt¡1 + °2xt¡2 + ²t
xt = ®1 + ¯3xt¡1 + ¯4xt¡2 + °3yt¡1 + °4yt¡2 + ²t; (5.18)
where we reject the null hypothesis that x does not Granger-causes y if the statistic
from an F-test for joint signi¯cance of °1 and °2 is signi¯cant (and a similar reasoning
for the inverse Granger-causality from y to x). The dispersion measures (x)are
the coe±cient of variation and the high-minus-low range. The volatility measures
(y) are the monthly absolute returns, the monthly squared returns and a GARCH
measure.14 Since all variables are not normally distributed, especially the absolute
and squared returns, we apply a Box-Cox adjustment to both the left and right hand
side variables.
Table 5.8 presents the results for the three exchange rates. For the Euro, looking
at the absolute and squared returns for the three-month horizon, we ¯nd a sig-
ni¯cantly positive causal relation running from the variance to dispersion for both
dispersion measures. The twelve months horizon gives a more mixed image. For
the coe±cient of variation we ¯nd similar results as for the three months expecta-
tions, but concerning the range we ¯nd positive signi¯cant results running from the
heterogeneity to the variance.
The GARCH volatility measure renders a di®erent image altogether. For the
three months horizon we ¯nd, for both dispersion measures, a signi¯cant causal
13Plus lagged values of volatility (if necessary) and dispersion itself.
14The GARCH measure was constructed by estimating a GARCH(1,1) model for daily data and
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relation running from trader heterogeneity to market uncertainty; positive for the
¯rst lag, negative for the second. For the twelve months horizon we ¯nd a similar
pattern, but in the opposite causal direction.
For the Japanese Yen we see a signi¯cant positive causal link from the market
variance to dispersion for both dispersion variables and horizons, at least when
variance is measured by absolute and squared returns. In the case of the GARCH
measure we ¯nd a two-way causal relation for both dispersion measures and horizons.
The signs are in general positive for the ¯rst lag, negative for the second for the three
months horizon and both positive for the twelve months horizon.
The results for the U.K. Pound, ¯nally, re°ect a relatively homogeneous con-
clusion. For all variance and dispersion measures we ¯nd a signi¯cantly positive
causal link from market uncertainty to dispersion of opinion. For a small number of
combinations we ¯nd a two-way relation, but there does not seem to be a pattern.
In general we can conclude that the causal relation between market volatility
and trader dispersion tends to be signi¯cant and positive for di®erent measures
of both trader heterogeneity and market volatility. This result corroborates the
¯ndings of MacDonald and Marsh (1996) but is opposite to the results of Frankel and
Froot (1990a), who ¯nd causality running in the opposite direction. Furthermore,
the results are not in line with the theoretical predictions that dispersion a®ects
volatility. This might be caused by the fact that we do not have data for the total
market, but only a subset of traders. Since our traders are relatively homogeneous
in nature (most of them are ¯nancial institutions based in London), our observations
of trader heterogeneity might be biased downward. Given that we observe a subset
of the total set of traders who cannot in°uence the market signi¯cantly, current
uncertainty can cause uncertainty concerning the future, hence relatively diverse
expectations.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we examined whether expectations of future exchange rates are dis-
persed in that agents have di®erent beliefs about the future path of the exchange
rates. We approach this problem using a panel of survey forecasts for the major
three exchange rates along several forecast horizons. Using several measures for dis-
persion of beliefs we ¯nd that there are distinct periods of high and low dispersion
where market participants disagree as to what will happen to the future level of the
exchange rates. For the Japanese Yen versus the U.S. Dollar we even ¯nd that the
Asian crisis that began in mid-1997 preceded an almost two-year period of highly
increased dispersion of beliefs for this rate.
We test formally whether beliefs are dispersed using an extreme value approach
by examining the tail index estimates and conclude that the frequency at which ex-
tremist di®erences in expectations among market participants occurs, is higher than
that what would occur under normality. We furthermore attempt to answer whether
dispersion of beliefs occurs because market participants hold di®erent information
sets or whether they attach di®erent weights to commonly-held elements from theirConclusions 107
information sets. We ¯nd evidence for both. The extent of individual expectations
seems to increase as the forecast horizon lengthens. The dispersion based on extrap-
olation decreases and dispersion based in interest rate di®erences increases as the
forecast horizon lengthens. These results corroborate the fundamentalist/chartist
literature.
Finally, we examine whether dispersion of beliefs is in°uenced by volatility in the
market, as suggested earlier by the increased dispersion of beliefs in the aftermath
of the Asian crisis, or that heterogeneity in expectations is causal to the volatility
in the market. We ¯nd that a causal relation between market volatility and trader
heterogeneity tends to be signi¯cant and positive for di®erent measures of both
trader heterogeneity and market volatility.
Several issues remain unanswered. First of all, we question what the role of
di®erent `types' of market participants is in the above analysis. We ¯nd di®erent
weights in di®erent forecast horizons, but when one group of market participants
uses an extrapolative, or any other chartist way of forecasting, and another group
uses a fundamentals-based approach, we would like to see whether the number of
`chartists' versus `fundamentalists' is related to market uncertainty or dispersion of
beliefs. Second, we question whether market participants switch between various
forecasting techniques (for instance, chartist or fundamentalist approaches) when
the market becomes more volatile, and hence dispersion of beliefs increases. We feel
that further investigation of these issues is warranted.Chapter 6
The Use of Fundamentalist




The role of individual market participants in the international foreign exchange
market is a topic of enduring interest. For many years, the international ¯nancial
economics literature has assumed that these market participants form their expec-
tations about the future of the exchange rate in a rational way, without making
consistent biases in their expectations and where all publicly available information
is used in an optimal manner. All market participants were assumed to possess
essentially the same information. In this literature, the typical market participant
is a representative agent that uses the information in the most optimal way.
Yet, the assumption of rational representative agents has not been satisfactory
in answering some of the well-known anomalies in the literature, such as the excess
volume of trade. Beine et al. (2007), Chionis and MacDonald (1997), Frankel and
Froot (1990a) and MacDonald and Marsh (1996) ¯nd causal relationships between,
on the one hand, the volume traded, the volatility in the market and the extent of
central bank intervention, and on the other hand the dispersion in the expectations
of individual market participants. At the same time, the assumption of rational ex-
pectations has been refuted in many empirical studies, for example those of Cavaglia
et al. (1993b), Chinn and Frankel (1994a), Dominguez (1986), MacDonald (1992),
MacDonald and Marsh (1994), Marsh (1999), and Verschoor and Wol® (2002).
The use of behavioral theory in mainstream ¯nance literature has gradually led
¤Part of this chapter is from a working paper with Remco Zwinkels.
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to the assumption that market participants in the foreign exchange market are not
homogeneous, but possess heterogeneous beliefs due to 1) the use of private informa-
tion, 2) interpreting information in a di®erent way and thus putting di®erent weights
on various elements in the agent's information set, or 3) by using fundamentally dif-
ferent types of forecast techniques. For the foreign exchange literature speci¯cally,
the distinction between chartist agents and fundamentalist agents has often been
made (see, e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1987b; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005, 2006;
Hommes, 2006) whereby the former tries to make a forecast about the future state
of the market by means of any function of past (usually macroeconomic) variables,
and whereby the latter relies on forecasts based on the past history of the exchange
rate itself.
Two important observations are made in the literature. First, a single agent
cannot be characterized as purely chartist or fundamentalist. In a series of surveys
conducted among market participants Allen and Taylor (1990), Taylor and Allen
(1992), Menkho® and Taylor (2006), Liu and Mole (1998), and Cheung and Chinn
(2001) ¯nd that most agents use a combination of chartists and fundamentalists
techniques when forming a belief about future exchange rates. Second, the weight
that agents attach to a particular forecast technique is not constant over time. Yet,
empirically there is very little known about the way agents choose among the vari-
ous forecast techniques. The heterogeneous agent literature tells us for instance that
agents switch between forecasting techniques according to the relative past perfor-
mance of the techniques (see, e.g. De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005, 2006; Hommes,
2006). It has furthermore been documented that when the exchange rate deviates
further away from its `fundamental' value, market expectations are mean-reverting
towards this fundamental value. However, we do not know much about how the be-
liefs of individual market participants are a®ected in times of high market volatility,
or pre-crises periods. More insight into the beliefs of market participants might shed
new light onto these events.
In this chapter we attempt to investigate the relative importance of the role of
both chartist- and fundamentalist-based forecast techniques. In particular, we would
like to know whether the weight agents attach to a certain forecast tool changes over
time and why this change occurs. In contrast to all earlier work we approach this
question from an empirical angle. That is, we do not take a simulation approach,
nor use a qualitative approach based on sentiment surveys. Instead, we try to
observe the actual use of particular techniques from the data itself. To do so, we use
data from a quantitative survey of exchange rate expectations, conducted among
large players in the foreign exchange market. From this survey data we attempt
to distill the common time-varying weight that the market attaches to a particular
forecast technique, and question what the relation between the weights on the various
techniques is. We expect that although market participants use both chartist and
fundamentalist rules, there will be a negative relation between the weights on chartist
and fundamentalist rules.
Our results are easily summarized. We ¯nd that although both chartist and
fundamentalist rules are used by the market, the chartist rules are more often signif-
icant than the fundamentalist rules, especially on the shorter spectrum of the forecastMethodological Background 111
horizon. Furthermore, extrapolative forecast techniques have preference over mov-
ing average rules, while the market is fairly irrespective as to which fundamentalist
rule is used.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 6.2 we introduce
the general methodology that will be used in this chapter. Section 6.3 then looks at
the various forecasting rules that are used by di®erent types of market participants.
Section 6.4 presents the data that will be used for this research and presents already
basic features of the data. Section 6.5 gives the results of the various tests and
section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Methodological Background
We start the methodology that will be used in this chapter from the point of view
of the individual agent. We hypothesize that agent i forms an expectation about
the k-period ahead level of a particular exchange rate and that this forecast consists
of a structural part based on public information (that is common to all market
participants) f(­t) and an individual e®ect gi. This expectation, which by itself is
unobservable, can then be given as
sE
i;t+k = f(­t) + gi; (6.1)
Observe that in this speci¯cation the information set f(­t) is common for all market
participants. Equation 6.1 states that market participants interpret the informa-
tion set that is common to them in a similar way and that the di®erence in their
expectations is caused solely by the agent-speci¯c individual e®ect, which is usu-
ally attributable to an informational asymmetry (for instance, private information).
From the previous section we know that di®erences in expectations may not only be
due to informational asymmetries, but also due to the di®erent weight that agents
attach to individual elements from this common information set, or by the presence
of fundamentally di®erent market participants; both cases in which f(­t) should be
replaced by fi(­t).
To investigate the latter possibility, assume that an agent has a set of forecast
rules from which she can choose to form her expectations about the future change in
the exchange rate. An agent may use only one speci¯c rule from that set, in which
case she attaches all weight to the forecast of that rule, or multiple rules at the same
time, in which case the ¯nal forecast will be a weighted average of the forecasts of
the multiple rules. Although we cannot determine the exact set of rules a particular
agent uses at a certain point in time, we can measure whether the agent uses a
particular rule in the process of forming her expectations when her expectation is
related to the forecast of a particular rule. Furthermore, we can observe whether
the weight that the agent attaches to that rule changes over time. The individual
forecasted change by agent i is determined as
sE
i;t+k ¡ st = !0
i;t(sE





i;t;:::) is a vector of individual weights and sE
t+k ¡ st is
a vector of the forecasted changes of the various forecast rules. The time-varying
coe±cients !i;t are allowed to follow a process like:
!i;t = ®i!0
i;t¡1 + ´i;t; (6.3)
where ´i;t is treated as an individual random shock.
In order to investigate how the common factor in the weights that all individual
agents attach to a particular rule changes over time, we can suppress the individual
agent subscript and focus on the following equation:
¹ sE
t+k ¡ st = !0
t(sE
t+k ¡ st): (6.4)
Here, ¹ sE
t+k¡st may present an expected change in the market that is common for all
market participants. An obvious candidate for this common expectation would be
the principal component in all the individual expectations, or even the mere cross-
sectional average of median. In the next section, we will look at various ways to
determine the forecasted changes sE
t+k ¡ st.
6.3 The Forecasting Rules
In this section we outline the various techniques that can be used by an agent to form
her forecast. The list of techniques is virtually endless and therefore we focus on a few
approaches that have been used in the literature regularly. We distinguish between
fundamentals-based forecast rules and chartist (or technical) rules. The former uses
a set of macroeconomic variables in one way or the other, while the latter uses
exclusively the history of the exchange rate as the input in the forecasting process.
For fundamentals-based rules we use a purchasing power parity-based technique and
version of the monetary. As for the chartist rules we use an extrapolative rule and
a moving average rule. The rules will be outlined below in greater detail.
We assume that fundamentalists form their expectations by comparing the cur-
rent exchange rate to the fundamental exchange rate and expect that the exchange
rate will eventually revert back to its fundamental value. So when the current ex-
change rate is above its long-run fundamental value, fundamentalists expect a future
depreciation of the currency. In this sense this rule can be seen as a negative feed-
back rule that introduces a mean reversion in the exchange rate. We describe the
general fundamentalist rule as
fundt ´ ¡Ã(st ¡ ~ st); (6.5)
where fundt is the k-period ahead expected change in the exchange rate, Ã is a
parameter describing the speed with which the exchange rate will revert back to its
fundamental value, and ~ st is the measure for the fundamental exchange rate.
This fundamental exchange rate is the rate that is consistent with the equilib-
rium in the real part of the economy. There is usually not something like `the'
fundamental exchange rate, rather it is the rate that is in line with an economicThe Forecasting Rules 113
theory and is generally driven by the relative macroeconomic variables of at least
the two economies for which the exchange rate applies. Since most macroeconomic
variables only change gradually over time, it is expected that the fundamental ex-
change rate, being a function of these variables, also changes only gradually. It must
be stressed that, in contrast to other work in the ¯eld, we do not assume that agents
are able to observe the underlying value of the fundamental exchange rate. Rather,
they must rely on an estimate of this value and to do so they can choose from a set
of models. These will be outlined shortly.
The chartists form their forecasts by either extrapolating the most recent change
in the exchange rate into the future:
chart ´ ¯(¢st); (6.6)
where ¯ indicates the degree to which chartists extrapolate and ¢st is the most
recent change in the exchange rate. Alternatively, chartists follow a moving average
rule, where the most recent short-run moving average in the exchange rate is com-
pared to the moving average over a longer period ago. When the short-run moving
average is above (below) its long-run moving average, agents expect the domestic








t denotes the short term moving average and MA
l
t the moving average
over a longer time period. It remains of course questionable how long the two time
periods should be. In line with previous work we set MA
l
t equal to the moving
average over the last 6 months and for MA
s
t we use the moving average over the
most recent month.
The expectation of an individual agent i about the future change in the exchange
rate is then assumed to be formed as the weighted average of the fundamental and
the chartist forecast rule:
sE




The weights attached to fundamentalist and chartist beliefs is often believed to
be dependent on the relative success of each type of forecasting rule. When in
a particular period chartists forecasts have done well, the subsequent period the
weight given to chartist techniques will be increased.
These speci¯cations of the fundamentalist and chartist rules are by far the most
commonly used heuristics for modeling agents' behavior. Albeit that the rules are
all simple, they are by no means unrealistic. For many years economic research
has been centralized around fully rational, homogeneous representative agents, who
are assumed to know a great deal about the structure of the economy. Gradually,
the heterogeneous agent literature has departed from this assumption. It is argued
that it is unreasonable to assume that economic agents possess skills and structural
knowledge that no human being can possess. Instead, agents only have limited
cognitive abilities to process information and therefore rely on these simple heuris-
tics. Furthermore, it is argued that the beliefs of agents are dispersed because they114 The Use of Fundamentalist and Chartist Techniques in Forecasting Foreign Exchange
all have di®erent information sets from which they form their beliefs or that they
interpret common information di®erently.
When we replace the unknown individual expectations by the survey-based fore-
casts, while allowing for a random measurement error ²i;t such that
se
i;t+k ¡ st = sE
t+k ¡ st + ²i;t; (6.9)
then we end up with the equation
se
i;t+k ¡ st = !
f
i;tfundt + !c
i;tchart + ²i;t: (6.10)
Since the fundamental exchange rate is an unobserved variable, we propose two
approaches of how it can be estimated. We use a purchasing power parity-based
rule where the fundamental exchange rate is related to the di®erence in the price
level between two countries and we use a version of the monetary model where we
consider a larger set of macroeconomic variables. We will describe both in greater
detail later.




t. To extract the time-varying common weights we use two techniques. First,
we take the cross-sectional average of the various se
i;t+k ¡ st series from the entire
set of individual agents. Second, we determine the principal component from this
set. Both measures we will denote as ¹ se
t+k ¡ st. In section 7.5 we describe these
techniques in greater detail.
6.3.1 Purchasing Power Parity
The theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), at least in its absolute version, pre-
dicts that the exchange rate is a function of only the di®erence in the price levels
of the home and foreign country. The debate regarding the usefulness of PPP as a
way to describe the exchange rate is a long standing one. Taylor and Taylor (2004)
review the PPP debate over the last decades and conclude that although the con-
sensus view is that in the short run PPP does not hold, in the long run PPP may
hold in that exchange rates do revert to a certain level that is determined by the
relative price level and that the rate of reversion is slow, at best three to ¯ve years.
When exchange rates are expressed as units of foreign currency per unit of do-
mestic currency, then the PPP-based fundamental exchange rate can be described
by the following relation:
~ st = pt ¡ p¤
t; (6.11)
where pt is the log of the domestic country's price level in the domestic currency and
p¤
t denotes it's foreign counterpart (United States).1 Unfortunately, most measures
of price levels that are issued by statistical agencies are of little use in constructing
these PPP-based fundamental exchange rates, because they are typically reported
as indexes relative to a base year and thus they do not measure the absolute price
1Throughout the rest of the chapter an asterisk always denotes the `foreign' country; in our case
this is the United States.The Forecasting Rules 115
level at a particular point in time. Therefore, we can only use the price level relative
to the previous period's level. If we de¯ne ¼t ´ pt ¡ pt¡1 as the domestic in°ation
rate with pt as the price level in natural logarithms, and we de¯ne the foreign rate of
in°ation similarly, then the PPP-based fundamental exchange rate, ~ st, can be given
by the recursive equation
~ st = ~ st¡1 + ¼t ¡ ¼t¡1: (6.12)
We assume that at time t agents can observe the current price level pt (whether
or not as an index) and hence can determine what the in°ation over the past period,
¼t, was. The initial value for the fundamental exchange rate, ~ s0, is unknown and
therefore has to be either estimated or imposed, in order to determine the value
for the contemporaneous PPP-based fundamental spot rate in the entire sample
period. We therefore proceed as follows. We take the period of January 1975 through
September 1989 as the period in which we want to calibrate the fundamental series.
The initial value of the fundamental rate is determined in such a way that the sum
of the squared di®erences between the actual spot rate series and the fundamental
series is minimized during this sample period. This gives us an estimate for the
value of ~ st. Instead of keeping the initial value constant for the rest of the sample
period, we update the initial value for each subsequent sample period, such that we
get for all values of the fundamental series using all information that is available at
that time. In this way the exchange rate oscillates around its fundamental value.
Although there is no reason why the fundamental series we obtain accordingly
would re°ect more accurately the actual, yet unknown fundamental series, we do
belief that by this approach the fundamental exchange rate we get accordingly retains
the characteristics that such a fundamental value should have. For instance, it is
reasonable to assume that the exchange rate oscillates around its fundamental value,
provided that the time period in which we would observe this oscillating behavior
is large enough, since in the long run exchange rates do revert to a certain level
that is determined by the relative price level (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). It must be
remarked that in the end the initial value only serves as a constant scaling factor in
equation 6.12 and thus the approach described above is merely intended for a better
visual comparison of the exchange rate and its fundamental counterpart.
6.3.2 Monetary Model
The next approach looks at a broader set of macroeconomic variables. We select
four sets of macroeconomic variables that historically have been brought into context
with the exchange rate. These are the price level, interest rate, money supply, and
production, both for the home and foreign (U.S.) country. To give an economic
meaning to these variables, we use a version of the simple °exible-price monetary
model of exchange rate popularizes by Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976) that states
that log money demand depends linearly on log real income, the log price level and
the nominal exchange rate. A two-country version of this model is that for two open
economies in which the money demand functions are assumed to be stable such that:







One of the key assumptions of the monetary model is that purchasing parity holds.
From the previous section we learned that short-run PPP does not seem to hold,
but that in the long run the exchange rate reverts to a level that is determined
by the relative price level. This is captured by equation 6.11. Taking equations
6.11, 6.13 and 6.14 together gives us the fundamental exchange rate in terms of the
macroeconomic model:
~ st = (mt ¡ m¤
t) ¡ ®1(rt ¡ r¤
t) ¡ ®2(yt ¡ y¤
t): (6.15)
Before using the monetary model to generate an estimate for the fundamental
exchange rate, two issues require attention. First, in related work (see Faust et al.,
2003, for instance) the set of macroeconomic variables that are of interest is often
extended to include the price di®erence itself as well. Second, the elasticities ®1
and ®2 are unknown. Instead of making an assumption about the elasticities we try
to estimate the weights for the various macroeconomic variables empirically using
a two-step approach. In the ¯rst step the weights are estimated using a linear
regression of the spot rate on the macroeconomic variables during the period of
January 1975 through September 1989. The model then becomes:
st = ®0 + ®1(rt ¡ r¤
t) + ®2(yt ¡ y¤
t) + ®3(mt ¡ m¤
t) + ®4(pt ¡ p¤
t) + ²t: (6.16)
The ¯tted values of this regression can therefore in a way be seen as a proxy for
the fundamental exchange rate during the sample period. Although we learned that
the actual spot rate should by no means follow the same path as the fundamental
exchange rate, the exchange rate does revert to its long-run equilibrium value pro-
vided there is su±cient time. In the next step, the estimated model is used for a
one-period forecast to determine the fundamental exchange rate at the ¯rst date in
the second (survey) sample period of October 1989 through December 2004.2
6.4 Data
The foreign exchange data that will be used in this chapter is described in great
detail in section 5.3. For our sample, we obtain forecasts for the U.K. Pound,
Japanese Yen and Deutschemark against the U.S. Dollar for the period of October
1989 through December 2004.3 This period is of particular interest since it contains
several ¯nancial crises, the introduction of a single monetary currency unit, and
several large changes in the level of the exchange rates. The panel is unbalanced
since the response rate of the individual market participants is less than 100 percent
and since market participants left the panel and were replaced by others. Due to
2In other words, the fundamental exchange rate at period t is always estimated using all the
data on the macroeconomic variables and spot exchange rate up to period t ¡ 1.
3Prior to January 1999 we use forecasts on the Deutschemark versus the U.S. Dollar. We
transform these expectations into Euro / U.S. Dollar forecasts using the o±cial conversion rate.Data 117
data unavailability we have to split the sample in two periods: October 1989 through
February 1995 (Sample 1) and November 1995 through December 2004 (Sample 2).
In this chapter we focus on the 3- and 12-month-ahead forecasts since these have
the highest response.
For the fundamental forecast models, we furthermore obtain data on various
macroeconomic variables. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment's (OECD) Main Economic Indicators dataset is the source for seasonally
adjusted money supply, mt (M4 for the United Kingdom and M1 for the other
countries, all in current prices)4 and for the non-seasonally adjusted consumer price
index, pt. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) International Financial Statis-
tics dataset is the source for the seasonally adjusted gross domestic production5 as
a proxy for output yt. Interest rates are three-months Euro-rates, rt, obtained from
Datastream. All macroeconomic and spot variables are obtained for the period of
January 1975 through December 2004, except for the Japanese Euro-rate, which
starts in August 1978. Natural logarithms are taken from all variables, except from
the interest rates.
6.4.1 Unit Root Test Results
Before we outline the techniques that will be used, we investigate the unit root prop-
erties of the realized exchange rate and the macroeconomic variables. Since macroe-
conomic variables are often known to contain a unit root or are even integrated of
order two, it is important to know the proper order of integration of all series prior
to conducting any of the tests in the next section. We employ two di®erent unit
root tests to get a robust conclusion. First we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
where the proper lag length is determined by the Schwarz information criterion. In
addition, we use the Phillips-Perron test that uses the Bartlett kernel as the spectral
estimation method. The proper lag length in this test is determined automatically
using the approach by Newey and West (1994). The inclusion of a linear trend is
determined by a visual inspection of the data series. Unit root tests are conducted
for the series in levels and their ¯rst (or even second) di®erence. The sample period
spans the entire period from January 1975 (if available) until December 2004 (360
observations). In principle, we de¯ne a variable to be stationary, or I(0), if both
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at least at the 5 percent signi¯cance
level. We de¯ne the variable to be I(1) when the two tests cannot both reject the
null of a unit root for the level at the 5 percent signi¯cance level, but can so for the
¯rst di®erence.
4For German money supply we use data from the OECD until December 1998 and use the
German Contribution to M1 series from the Bundesbank from 1999 onwards. Both series are
seasonally adjusted. Furthermore, prior to January 1980 data on the monthly money supply of
the United Kingdom are only available on a quarterly basis. We generate monthly series for this
period by ¯tting a cubic spline function trough the quarterly observations. We feel that this is
appropriate to do because the seasonally adjusted money supply series are already smooth.
5Because GDP is reported only for a quarter, we create monthly series from this using a local
quadratic frequency conversion function that distributes the quarterly GDP over each of the three
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.120 The Use of Fundamentalist and Chartist Techniques in Forecasting Foreign Exchange
Table 6.1 and table 6.1 report results from the unit root tests. In table 6.1, we
investigate the unit root properties of the various series from the individual countries.
In table 6.2, we de¯ne the macroeconomic variables relative to their counterparts in
the United States (for instance, m¡m¤, where an asterisk denotes the U.S. variable).
Since any linear combination of I(1) variables can itself be of order I(0), we have to
reexamine the order of integration of the relative series.
As for the individual series, several conclusions can be drawn. For the interest
rates and money supply we generally cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the level series, while we can reject this for their ¯rst di®erences. This
would suggest that these macro series are of order I(1). For the price level and the
production the results are less clear-cut. For the United Kingdom, Germany and
the United States, consumer prices appears at least to contain a unit root, although
for the latter two countries we cannot ascertain whether the appropriate order of
integration is I(1) or I(2), as is sometimes suggested for macroeconomic variables.
For Japan the results are unclear altogether. For Japan, Germany and the United
States, production (GDP) also appears to contain at least a unit root, while for the
United Kingdom the results are unclear altogether. For the relative series the results
are more clear-cut. The relative interest series appear stationary, while the relative
money supply, production and the spot exchange rate contain a unit root. Results
on the relative price level does not give a clear picture.
6.4.2 Cointegration Results
If we ¯nd that the above macroeconomic variables are cointegrated with the spot ex-
change rate, we know that there is a long-term relationship between these variables,
and the predictions from such a cointegration relation can then serve as proxies
for the fundamental exchange rate. The analysis we pursue consists of three steps.
First, we have to ascertain what the correct degree of di®erencing is for all the series.
From the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests in the previ-
ous section we learned that most macroeconomic variables, as well as the exchange
rates, are nonstationary in their levels, while stationary in their ¯rst di®erences. In
other words, they seem to be I(1) series. Only the interest rates consistently appear
to be I(0) series.
Second, we check whether there is any cointegrating relationship between the
macroeconomic variables and the spot exchange rate. We employ the cointegration
test procedure due to Johansen (1991) that assesses whether there is any linear
relationship between the variables that is stationary. Following Cumperayot (2002),
this linear relationship should then have the form of the following equation:6
st = a0 + a1pt + a2p¤
t + a3rt + a4r¤
t + a5mt + a6m¤
t + a7yt + a8y¤
t + ²t: (6.17)
The Johansen approach starts by estimating an unrestricted vector autoregression
(VAR) that includes all the above variables. The two interest rate series, which follow
6We use the individual country data here, i.e. not the relative series. We do this, because
the cointegration analysis requires I(1) variables instead of I(0) variables, and the unit root tests
showed that many relative series are I(0).Data 121
Table 6.3: Cointegration Test Results (full sample)
United Kingdom Japan Germany
Trace Eigen- Trace Eigen- Trace Eigen-
value value value
a) Johansen cointegration test
# cointegrating equations:
None 290:499¤¤¤ 98:782¤¤¤ 228:424¤¤¤ 90:394¤¤¤ 266:811¤¤¤ 97:988¤¤¤
At most 1 191:716¤¤¤ 73:476¤¤¤ 138:029¤¤¤ 70:397¤¤¤ 168:822¤¤¤ 80:935¤¤¤
At most 2 118:241¤¤¤ 60:272¤¤¤ 67:632¤¤¤ 30:928¤¤¤ 87:888¤¤¤ 44:565¤¤¤
At most 3 57:969¤¤¤ 27:432¤ 36:704 18:767 43:323 21:611
# equations (5% level) 5 3 2 2 3 3
b) Engle-Granger cointegration test
ADF DF ADF DF ADF DF
T-stat ¡3:384¤¤ ¡3:723¤¤ ¡5:105¤¤¤ ¡5:341¤¤¤ ¡3:850¤¤¤ ¡4:752¤¤¤
Notes. The critical values for the Trace and Maximum eigenvalue statistics are taken from MacK-
innon et al. (1999) and do not assume the inclusion of exogenous series. A ¤, ¤¤, or ¤¤¤ denotes
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level, respectively. The
ADF test assumes 4 lags in the dependent variable and the DF test none. The critical values for
the Engle-Granger cointegration test are taken from Engle and Granger (1987).
an I(0) process, are treated as exogenous variables in the VAR. We use two lags in
the VAR to capture most of the dynamics while still preserving model parsimony.
Next, we perform two likelihood ratio tests to detect the presence of cointegrating
vectors: the Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue test. The sample period
spans the entire period from January 1975 (if available) until December 2004 (360
observations).
Panel a of table 6.3 reports the results from two likelihood ratio tests. The null
hypothesis of each test is that of at most n cointegrating vectors and is stated in the
¯rst column. Test results are given for various numbers of maximum cointegrating
vectors, together with their signi¯cance levels. From the results, the number of coin-
tegrating vectors is never smaller than 2, which indicates that there is a long-term
cointegrating relationship between the spot rate and the macroeconomic variables.
As a robustness check we present in panel b of table 6.3 the results from the Engle
and Granger (1987) cointegration test approach, which claims that if the variables
from model in equation 6.16 are cointegrated, then the error terms should be sta-
tionary. We estimate equation 6.17 by least squares and use the residuals from that
regression in a Dickey-Fuller (DF) or augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test.7
The test statistics show that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals of
equation 6.17 can always be rejected at least at the 5 percent signi¯cance level. This
con¯rms the cointegrating relationship that exists between the spot exchange rate
7We estimate these tests in levels, without a trend. We use 4 lags for the ADF version of the
model, although model selection criteria usually suggest that including one or two lags is already
su±cient.122 The Use of Fundamentalist and Chartist Techniques in Forecasting Foreign Exchange
and the macroeconomic variables in equation 6.16. In the next section we present
the empirical tests together with their results.
6.5 Results
In this section we present results from various techniques in order to form an idea
about the weights that are attached to fundamentalist and chartist techniques. We
use the following three techniques: 1) a linear model where the coe±cients are con-
stant over time, 2) a state space model where the coe±cients are time-varying, and
3) a heterogeneous agent model where agents are allowed to switch between the
various forecast techniques. As dependent variables we use either the cross-sectional
average of the survey-based expectations or the principal component from the in-
dividual expectations.8 As independent variables we always take one fundamental
variable (PPP-based fundamental or monetary model-based fundamental) and one
chartist variable (moving average or recent change).
6.5.1 Linear Model
We start by the simplest situation, where agents attach a constant weight to both
the chartist and fundamentalist techniques, such that we can estimate a linear model
for the entire sample period:
¹ se
t+k ¡ st = ®0 + ®1fundt + ®2chart + ²t: (6.18)
Table 6.4 reports estimates from the linear model when the survey-based fore-
cast horizon is equal to 3 months and table 6.5 reports similar estimates when the
survey-based forecast horizon is equal to 12 months. In each table panel a reports
results from the linear model with the cross-sectional average of the expectations as
dependent variable and panel b reports results when the principal component from
the individual series is used.
Several important conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the two chartist coe±-
cients have the correct sign: they are negative, which indicates expected mean rever-
sion of the three exchange rates. For the two fundamentalist rules the results are less
clear-cut, although in the majority of the cases, and especially for the longer-term
forecasts, they appear negative as well|also con¯rming that the markets expects
the exchange rates to revert back to their long-run fundamental values.
Second, the chartist variables are highly signi¯cant, especially at the short fore-
cast horizon, while the fundamental variables are less signi¯cant, although their
signi¯cance increases with the forecast horizon. This ¯nding con¯rms what is often
claimed in the literature, namely that chartist rules are predominantly used at the
shorter spectrum of the forecast horizon and fundamentalist rules are predominantly
used at the longer spectrum of the forecast horizon. Third, the ¯tness of the lin-
ear model with the cross-sectional average as dependent variable is fairly good: the
8We use a standard principal component analysis that attempts to identify patterns in the data,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































adjusted R2 statistic is up to 72 percent. The ¯tness of the version where the de-
pendent variable is determined by the principal component analysis is clearly lower,
although results remain consistent between the panels a and b. Fourth, the inclusion
of the extrapolative rule has clear preference over the inclusion of the moving average
rule, in terms of the likelihood of the model, while there is no obvious preference for
either the PPP-based fundamental rule or the monetary model-based fundamental
rule.
From the above results we can conclude that both the chartist rules and funda-
mentalist rules have appeal when explaining the expected changes in exchange rates.
In other words, in the entire sample period under investigation these rules have at
least been used. In the next sections we try to address whether the weight that is
attached to the rules has changed during the sample period.
6.5.2 Heterogeneous Agent Model
In the second empirical analysis we take as standard heterogeneous agent modeling
approach and question ourselves whether agents switch between the chartist and
fundamentalist techniques. This model is an extension to the previous technique in
that time-varying weights are introduced now:
¹ se
t+k ¡ st = ®0 + !t®1fundt + (1 ¡ !t)®2chart + ²t; (6.19)
where !t is the fraction of fundamentalists present in the market. A natural choice
for !t is a rule that considers the pro¯tability or pricing error of following a funda-




e°(®1fundt¡¢st)2 + e°(®2chart¡¢st)2 : (6.20)
In this particular setup, the weight !t is constructed in such a way that it is between
0 and 1. The switching here depends on the relative success of either the funda-
mentalist or chartist rule and the parameter ° measures the sensitivity of market
participants (fundamentalists and chartists) to their respective pricing errors. The
parameter ° can take any value between in¯nity and minus in¯nity, yet the inter-
pretation depends on the sign: when ° is positive, agents will switch to a rule that
has been successful in the past and when ° is negative agents will switch instead to
a past unsuccessful rule, for instance because they expect that the rule will become
successful in the future. With ° = 0 agents are distributed uniformly across the
forecast techniques and do not let their choice of forecast technique be dependent
on the pro¯tability of that rule in the past. It should be noted that the absolute
value of the ° parameter is in itself meaningless.
Table 6.6 reports estimates from the heterogeneous agent model when the survey-
based forecast horizon is equal to 3 months and table 6.7 reports similar estimates
when the survey-based forecast horizon is equal to 12 months. In each table panel a
reports results from the linear model with the cross-sectional average of the expec-
tations as dependent variable and panel b reports results when the principal com-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.128 The Use of Fundamentalist and Chartist Techniques in Forecasting Foreign Exchange
the results remain robust when compared to the linear model. For instance, the
introduction of an extrapolative rule has always preference over the moving average
rule, the chartist variables all have negative coe±cients and are generally signi¯cant,
and the fundamental variables are often (though not exclusively) negative.
Second, the switching parameter ° is generally negative. This implies that fore-
casters evaluate whether the actual exchange rate has followed one of the forecasting
rules in the previous month, and adapt their forecast accordingly. In other words,
the forecasting rules that has the smallest forecasting error of the actual exchange
rate in the previous month, receives more weight when forming the exchange rate
forecast for the coming 3 and 12 months.
Third, the introduction of the switching parameter ° does not seem to contribute
to an improvement of the model at ¯rst sight since the coe±cient ° is generally not
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. This can have several reasons. It may be that simply
switching does not occur, or that switching does not occur when the only criterion
for switching is the past performance of a particular forecast tool, as is the case now.
However, an insigni¯cant switching parameter is directly in line with the literature
on heterogeneous agents modeling, see Boswijk et al. (2007). More important is
whether the individual rules are signi¯cant, and whether the introduction of the
switching mechanism improves the performance of the model. Both are the case
in our results. We try to address this issue in the next section, where we let the
switching variable follow a standard low-order time series process and explicitly look
at how the weight variable changes over time.
6.5.3 State Space Model
In the last empirical test we let the time-varying loadings for the fundamental and
chartist techniques directly be estimated using a Kalman ¯lter. The general state
space representation of the model is:
¹ se
t+k ¡ st = ®0 + ®1;tfundt + ®2;tchart + ²t (6.21)
where the coe±cients are expected to follow an AR(1) process:9
®1;t = °1®1;t¡1 + ²1;t
®2;t = °2®2;t¡1 + ²2;t: (6.22)
The loadings °1 and °2 can be interpreted as the persistency the market attaches to
the weight of the fundamentalist or chartist technique. A value close to 0 indicates
that the use of that particular forecast rule can change rapidly from one period to
the other, while a value close to 1 indicates strong persistence in the technique.
The model is optimized using maximum likelihood with the BHHH algorithm. The
starting values for the state vectors are the coe±cients from the linear model in
equation 6.18.
9Similar models are often introduced with coe±cients that follow a unit root process. Here, we


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.8 reports estimates from the heterogeneous agent model when the survey-
based forecast horizon is equal to 3 months and table 6.9 reports similar estimates
when the survey-based forecast horizon is equal to 12 months. In each table panel
a reports results from the linear model with the cross-sectional average of the ex-
pectations as dependent variable and panel b reports results when the principal
component from the individual series is used.
Two conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the °1 variables are all very persistent,
in that they all seem to follow a near-unit root process. This indicates that the weight
on the fundamental rules is relatively persistent, or in other words, the weight the
market attaches to the fundamentalist rule does not change dramatically from one
period to the other. On the other hand, the signi¯cance of the °2 variables is much
lower, indicating that there is much lower persistence in the weight that is attached
to chartist rules and that the market is much quicker to switch from using a chartist
rule from one period to the other.
We continue the analysis by ¯ltering the series ®1 and ®2 for all of the Kalman
¯lter models. So each model with a particular chartist and fundamentalist rule gen-
erates a set of and series. Next, tables 6.8 and 6.9 also present correlations of each of
these sets of series, one for each model. The general result that emerges is that the
correlations between the fundamentalist and chartist `weights' are predominantly
negative (and even large in absolute magnitude) for Japan and Germany, irrespec-
tive of the combination of fundamentalist or chartist rule.10 This is an interesting
¯nding, for it shows that although the market uses both fundamentalist and chartist
techniques in forecasting future foreign exchange, the use of the rules is not inde-
pendent from one another: an increase in the use of a fundamentalist rule is paired
with a decrease (albeit imperfect) use of a chartist rule, and vice versa. For the
United Kingdom the correlations are mixed positive and negative, so that no clear
conclusion can be drawn here.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to shed new light on the various forecast techniques that
are used when forecasting future foreign exchange. The ¯eld of behavioral ¯nance
has documented the heterogeneity in the expectations of market participants in
the foreign exchange market. The reason for this heterogeneity has generally been
attributed to the existence of private information, the di®erence with which agents
interpret common information, and the fundamental di®erence in forecast techniques
that have been used by the market. In this article, we have attempted to investigate
this last argument using a dataset of survey-based foreign exchange rate expectations
for the three major exchange rates.
We found that market participants use both chartist and fundamentalist tech-
niques at the same time when forecasting future foreign exchange, but that the
10This ¯nding is particularly apparent for the models where the cross-sectional average is used
as dependent variable. We focus primarily on these models, since they appeared to be the most
successful in describing the relationships between the forecast rules and the sentiment in the market.132 The Use of Fundamentalist and Chartist Techniques in Forecasting Foreign Exchange
weights attached to the various techniques is not constant over time. It seems that in
general an increase of the use of fundamentalist techniques is paired with a decrease
of the use of chartist techniques, but that this relationship is not a strict `zero-sum'
game. Chartist techniques seem to be especially of relevance at the short-term spec-
trum of the forecast horizon, while fundamentalist techniques become more relevant
on longer (1-year ahead) forecasts. To be more precise: an extrapolative rule has
clearly preference over a moving average rule. On the other hand, fundamentalist
rules are used predominantly for longer-term forecasts.
Interestingly, there does not seem to be strong evidence at ¯rst sight for the
general claim in the heterogeneous agent literature that the weight agents attach to
a forecast technique is dependent on the success of that rule in the previous period.
However, at closer inspection it appears that the introduction of the switching mech-
anism improves the performance of the model overall. This is a sign that switching
between forecast rules occurs. We do ¯nd that the weight attached to fundamental-
ist rules is more persistent over time as compared to the weight that is attached to
chartist techniques.
Finally, it appears that the weights for the fundamentalist rules are all very
persistent, in that they all seem to follow a near-unit root process. In other words, the
weight the market attaches to the fundamentalist rule does not change dramatically
from one period to the other. On the other hand, the signi¯cance of the chartist
weights is much lower, indicating that there is much lower persistence in the weight
that is attached to chartist rules and that the market is much quicker to switch
from using a chartist rule from one period to the other. We also ¯nd that the
correlations between the fundamentalist and chartist `weights' are predominantly
negative. This is an interesting ¯nding, for it shows that although the market uses
both fundamentalist and chartist techniques in forecasting future foreign exchange,
the use of the rules is not independent from one another: an increase in the use of
a fundamentalist rule is paired with a decrease (albeit imperfect) use of a chartist
rule, and vice versa.
As for future research, the use of advanced panel techniques should allow for more
detailed analysis of the use of various forecast techniques. We belief that a better
understanding of the role of forecast techniques can explain the behavior individual
market participants better, and thus allowing for a better understanding on how the
beliefs of market participants a®ects the actual behavior of exchange rates.Chapter 7




One of the most striking ¯nancial developments of recent decades is the tremendous
increase in exchange rate instability following the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system in 1973. While since 1973 exchange rate movements have been dramatic
by almost any standard, the ongoing internationalization of trade, production and
investment has intensi¯ed the concern of economists, managers and policymakers
about foreign exchange risk. As it is essential to know how much wealth is at risk
before de¯ning how much e®ort and cost it is worth incurring to manage these risks to
an acceptable level, the explicit measurement and identi¯cation of the implications
of foreign exchange risk uncertainty has become one of the most crucial issues in
economics, business and international ¯nance.
While there is a general agreement that changes in exchange rates should a®ect
the value of any physical or ¯nancial asset, empirical research on foreign exchange
risk exposure|de¯ned as the sensitivity of asset values to unanticipated exchange
rate movements|hasn't been able, until now, to give a clear answer regarding the
impact of foreign exchange risk. The somewhat surprising, but fairly unanimous,
early results by Jorion (1990, 1991) and Bodnar and Gentry (1993) suggest indeed
that exchange rate °uctuations in°uence ¯rm very little, if at all. Today, after more
than 15 years of intensive discussion on probable di±culties related to methodological
issues (Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; Koutmos and Martin, 2003b,a; Bartram, 2004;
Dewenter et al., 2005; Muller and Verschoor, 2006a), to the investigation ¯eld (He
and Ng, 1998; Muller and Verschoor, 2006b) and to the impact of potential hedging
¤Part of this chapter is from a working paper with Aline Muller and Willem F.C. Verschoor.
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activities (Bartov and Bodnar, 1994), empirical evidence still remains inconclusive
and puzzling (Gri±n and Stulz, 2001).1
Interestingly, the analysis of the extensive literature on foreign exchange exposure
reveals that most empirical studies|with a few exceptions like Amihud (1994) and
Gao (2000)|have based the estimation of foreign exchange exposure on the question-
able assumption that unanticipated exchange rate movements may be approximated
by changes in realized spot exchange rates. While some empirical studies, like Meese
and Rogo® (1983, 1976), Urrutia (1992), and Smoluk et al. (1998) tend to support
this assumption, the lack of consensus regarding the general outperformance of ran-
dom walk forecasts over any other alternative exchange rate forecast model (Frankel
and Rose, 1995; MacDonald, 1995) opens a new and promising research avenue that
compares the impact of `realized' versus `unanticipated' exchange rate movements
on shareholder wealth.
One of the reasons why the vast majority of foreign exchange risk exposure stud-
ies use realized changes in spot exchange rates as a proxy for unexpected currency
movements is that it may be di±cult to estimate in how far realized currency °uctu-
ations have been anticipated. While the foreign exchange rate market literature has
stirred for years a considerable amount of interest in the exploration of survey-based
expectations in order to understand the behavior of foreign exchange market partic-
ipants (Frankel and Froot, 1987b; Liu and Maddala, 1992a; Cavaglia et al., 1993b),
surprisingly, no existing study has yet incorporated the huge amount of informa-
tion contained in foreign exchange rate market expectations to distinguish between
`anticipated' and `unanticipated' exchange rate movements and verify whether it is
only to the extent that exchange rates move by more or less than had been expected
that there are likely to be losses, respectively gains, in economic value.
In this study we analyze how foreign exchange market expectations and the het-
erogeneity of these expectations a®ect the valuation of U.S. multinational companies.
To our knowledge such a study has not been undertaken before and should, therefore,
provide useful information about key aspects dealing with foreign exchange risk. In
particular, we use survey data on 1-, 3- and 12-month exchange rate forecasts related
to 16 bilateral exchange rates for the period 1995{2005. These expectations allow us
to distinguish between six distinctive `realized' versus `unanticipated' region-speci¯c
trade-weighted exchange rate indices. In order to measure in how far market par-
ticipants use the information contained in these foreign exchange market forecasts
when valuing U.S. multinationals, we use an extensive data set consisting of 935 U.S.
companies with real operations in foreign countries and estimate the ¯rm-speci¯c
exchange risk exposure of each company according to the geographical dispersion of
its activities.
The comparison of our results with previous U.S. evidence (1) con¯rms that the
disaggregation of the worldwide trade-weighted U.S. dollar exchange rate index into
six region-speci¯c trade-weighted indices increases the precision and signi¯cance of
exposure estimates; (2) suggests that models assuming that changes in spot exchange
rates are unanticipated are frequently misspeci¯ed and, thus, not able to correctly
1Muller and Verschoor (2006c) o®er a detailed overview on the foreign exchange risk literature.Background and Motivation 135
detect the impact of currency movements on ¯rm value; and (3) reveals that investors
tend to use more the information contained in short-term exchange rate forecasts
than in long-term forecasts.
The outline of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the motivations of this research. Section 7.3 describes the selection procedure
used to form the sample of U.S. multinationals analyzed and carefully details the
construction of the `realized' and `unanticipated' exchange rate series. In section 7.4
we describe the empirical design used to measure foreign exchange risk exposure.
The foreign exchange risk exposure estimates obtained from alternative exchange
risk factor speci¯cations are presented in section 7.5 and results are analyzed when
lengthening the return horizon. Section 7.6 concludes.
7.2 Background and Motivation
Adler and Dumas (1984) can be interpreted as de¯ning foreign exchange risk ex-
posure as the sensitivity of the domestic-currency value of any physical or ¯nancial
asset to changes in unanticipated exchange rate movements.2 The exposure of an
asset is hence estimated by regressing its domestic-currency return on the contem-
poraneous unexpected exchange rate change.3 Since other macroeconomic variables
may nevertheless simultaneously covary with exchange rate movements and asset
returns, Jorion (1990) recommends measuring the asset-speci¯c exchange rate sensi-
tivity (called residual exposure) in excess of the total market's reaction to exchange
rate movements. Equation 7.1 describes his augmented market model that may be
regarded as the traditional approach used in the literature to measure foreign risk
exposure:
Ri;t = ®i + ¯iRm;t + °iµt + ²i;t; (7.1)
where Ri;t designates the total return of asset i in period t,4 Rm;t the overall stock
market return in period t, ¯i asset i's return sensitivity to market risk, µt the move-
ment in the exchange rate factor in period t, °i asset i's exposure to the exchange
rate independent of the e®ect these currency movements have on the overall market,
and ²i;t denotes the white noise error term.5
It should be emphasized that, according to the seminal de¯nition of Adler and
Dumas (1984), foreign exchange risk exposure relates to `unanticipated' changes in
exchange rates. The rationalization for this speci¯cation is that current market
2The seminal papers of Shapiro (1975) and Hodder (1982) o®er a similar de¯nition of foreign
exchange risk exposure.
3As underlined in Jorion (1990), the decomposition of the value of an asset into a component cor-
related with the unanticipated exchange rate shock doesn't necessarily imply a casual relationship
between unexpected currency movements and asset prices.
4To avoid confusion over the notation, we use an uppercase R to denote stock returns and a
lowercase r to denote interest rates. The uppercase R does not mean, however, that the stock
returns are not in natural logarithms.
5A zero exposure therefore doesn't signify that the asset is not a®ected by currency movements.
It rather means that the asset value reacts to exchange rate movements to the same degree as the
market portfolio.136 Using Survey Data to Test Propositions Regarding Exchange Risk Exposure
prices are assumed to have already incorporated currency °uctuations that were
anticipated. Consequently it is only to the extent that exchange rates move by more
or less than had been expected that there are likely to be losses, respectively gains,
in economic value.
While there is a general consensus regarding this de¯nition of exchange risk expo-
sure, it is striking to observe that most previous empirical studies have used realized
changes in spot exchange rates to proxy for unanticipated currency movements.6 One
of the reasons why realized changes in exchange rates have been used in previous
studies to approximate unanticipated currency movements is that it may be di±cult
to estimate how much of the realized change was anticipated, respectively unan-
ticipated. Some authors have nevertheless tried to consider alternative approaches
to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated exchange rate °uctuations.
While Levi (1994) suggests the use of forward exchange rates to approximate ex-
pected future spot rates,7 Amihud (1994) recommends the use of an AR(1) model to
estimate unanticipated currency movements. After having regressed exchange rate
variations on their lagged values, he estimates equation 7.1 with µt being de¯ned as
the residuals of the ¯rst regression|considering, hence, the residuals of the ¯rst re-
gression as unanticipated exchange rate changes. As this procedure only marginally
increases the signi¯cance of the results, some authors have constructed the exchange
rate factor to be used in equation 7.1 to be orthogonal to fundamental variables.8
Gao (2000) proposes, for instance, the regression of exchange rate movements on
macroeconomic variables:











i=1 °¼;i¼t¡i + µt;
(7.2)
where rt stands for the interest rate, mt for the money supply, yt the level of indus-
trial production, tbt net exports and ¼t the rate of in°ation at time period t.9 The
residual term µt thus represents the unanticipated change in exchange rate at time
period t and should be used as input in equation 7.1.
The implicit assumption made by Gao (2000) is that such a fundamentals-based
exchange rate model is not only able to explain exchange rate movements but also
able to capture the market participants' expectations concerning these currency
movements. Many empirical studies, however, have pointed out that fundamental
variables such as international payment situations, money supplies, interest rates,
output levels and in°ation rates can hardly explain exchange rate °uctuations or
market participants' behavior (Frankel and Rose, 1995).
6See for instance Jorion (1990, 1991), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), Bartov and Bodnar (1994),
He and Ng (1998).
7The use of forward exchange rates as a proxy for expected future spot exchange rates may be
cast into doubt given the empirically documented biasness of the forward premium. Hodrick (1987)
and Engel (1996) provide good overviews of the extensive literature on this topic.
8See, for instance, Choi and Prasad (1995) and Gao (2000).
9Investigating the impact of these unanticipated exchange rate changes dµt on a sample of 80
multinational ¯rms (equation 7.2), Gao (2000) shows that they have signi¯cantly stronger e®ects
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Given the lack of consensus regarding the performance of fundamentals-based
exchange rate forecasts and the limitations of previous reported approaches, this
chapter o®ers a new empirical speci¯cation of the exchange risk factor to be used
in equation 7.1. Since our focus is to understand in how far currency movements
that haven't been anticipated by the market a®ect shareholder wealth, the easiest
and straightest approach is to concentrate on the expectations of foreign exchange
market participants. We de¯ne hence the `expected' part of currency movements
as the consensus average measure of foreign exchange rate expectations established
on survey-based market participants' forecasts. This procedure enables us not only
to distinguish between `anticipated' and `unanticipated' exchange rate shocks but
also to get at each day of expectation formation a perception of the overall market
sentiment as well as of the agreement, respectively disagreement, among market
participants regarding the future path of the exchange rate.
The use of survey data is not uncommon in the ¯nance literature and an in-
crease of the use of surveys in various areas of the ¯nance literature is observed.
For example, Friedman (1979, 1980), Froot (1989), and MacDonald and Macmillan
(1994), have used interest survey data in tests for identifying term premiums and
examining the rationality of expectations of future interest rates and concluded that
predictions were biased and respondents did not e±ciently exploit the information
contained in past interest movements. Similarly, Dokko and Edelstein (1989) review
the usefulness of the Livingston forecasts of stock market rates of return and ¯nd
evidence of adaptive behavior in the forecasts. Keane and Runkle (1990) use survey
forecasts of the GNP de°ator and ¯nd that expectations are rational. MacDonald
and Torrance (1988a) use survey data on expected changes in money aggregates with
U.K. data and ¯nd that these survey measures of expectations are extremely useful,
for, unlike statistical methods for generating estimates, they are truly exogenous.
Particularly in the foreign exchange rate market literature there has been for
years a considerable amount of interest in the exploration of survey-based expecta-
tions in order to understand the behavior of foreign exchange market participants.
Frankel and Froot (1987b) and Cavaglia et al. (1993b, 1994) use survey data on
foreign exchange to examine whether the failure of the forward premium puzzle is
attributed to irrational behavior on behalf of market participants or due to the exis-
tence of time-varying risk premium and Marsh and Power (1996) and Elliott and Ito
(1999) examine the forecast performance of survey-based exchange rate forecasts.
As no existing study has yet incorporated the huge amount of information con-
tained in survey-based exchange rate expectations to estimate foreign exchange risk
exposures, this research makes three major contributions. First, it confronts the
traditional currency exposure estimation with a new empirical speci¯cation that
measures the impact of the part of the exchange rate change that hasn't been antic-
ipated by market participants|and may, hence, be legitimately regarded as a `new'
currency shock. Second, the fact that market participants' forecasts are taken into
account allows us not only to measure the foreign exchange risk exposure of U.S.
shareholder wealth as originally de¯ned and speci¯ed in the literature (Hodder, 1982;
Adler and Dumas, 1984) but also to compare the foreign exchange risk exposure es-
timates obtained using these `unexpected' currency movements with those obtained138 Using Survey Data to Test Propositions Regarding Exchange Risk Exposure
using `realized' changes in spot exchange rates. The contrast between these results
is extremely informative on the way U.S. shareholders use the publicly available
exchange rate forecasts when valuing multinational companies. Third, the analysis
of our empirical ¯ndings across 1-, 3- and 12-month horizons o®ers a complete and
empirically rich picture on the role played by short- and long-term foreign exchange
rate expectations in the valuation of U.S. multinationals and sheds new light on the
links and interactions between stock and foreign exchange rate markets.
7.3 Sample Selection of U.S. Multinationals and
Survey Data
7.3.1 U.S. Multinational Firms
We begin by describing the selection of U.S. multinational ¯rms with real operations
in foreign countries. The focus on multinational companies allows us to concentrate
on ¯rms that, due to their real foreign trade and production activities, are expected
to be a®ected by exchange rate shocks.10 The selection procedure of these ¯rms
consists of three steps. The ¯rst selection step identi¯es all U.S. companies that
are registered in the 15th edition of the Directory of American Firms Operating in
Foreign Countries. As only listed ¯rms are included in our study, we check the ¯rms
for their daily stock market return availability in the University of Chicago Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Companies are as well required
to provide at least ¯ve years of consecutive daily returns across the entire sample
period from January 1995 to December 2005. The entire procedure yields a sample
of 935 U.S. multinational ¯rms. For all these companies, the data employed are daily
adjusted prices obtained from CRSP and Datastream International from November,
10th 1995 until December, 31st 2005. The use of daily prices is essential in order to
extract for each company in each month the share price on that day on which the
expectations for the various exchange rates are formed.11
Table 7.1 gives a brief overview on the size, debt structure and foreign sales activ-
ities of the ¯rms included in our sample. The summary statistics of the market values
and debt ratios clearly indicate the presence of some relatively large, respectively
strongly leveraged companies in our sample. It should furthermore be emphasized
that the selected U.S. multinationals are extensively involved in international activ-
ities as their foreign sales accounted on average for almost 50 percent of their total
sales.12
10Firms with sales and sourcing totally limited to the domestic market may as well be exposed to
shifts in the competitive environment caused by changes in foreign exchange rates. As the exposure
of domestic ¯rms is primarily operating exposure|which occurs because current, and particularly,
future pro¯ts from operations depend on exchange rates|and, more importantly, as investors may
be less aware of the operating exposure of domestic ¯rms, some authors argue that it may take,
on average, more time to detect the impact of currency movements on domestic companies in
comparison with multinational ¯rms (Bartov and Bodnar, 1994).
11The expectation formation day is usually the Friday before the second Monday of the month
(see the next section for more details on the expectation series).
12As suggested in Bartov and Bodnar (1994), the focus on ¯rms with large foreign revenuesSample Selection of U.S. Multinationals and Survey Data 139
Table 7.1: Summary Statistics of Sample of U.S. Multinational Firms
# obs mean ¯rst quartile median third quartile
Market capitalization 935 53;358;951 239;849 731;851 3;344;989
Dept/equity ratio 890 1:767 0:556 1:146 2:275
Foreign sales/total sales 724 0:482 0:309 0:484 0:679
Notes. This table reports descriptive statistics for the market value, debt structure and foreign sales
of the 935 companies included in our sample. For each company the market capitalization, debt
ratio and foreign sales ratio has been calculated as the average value over the entire sample period.
Market capitalizations are in thousands of U.S. dollars. For some companies the debt/equity ratio,
respectively the foreign sales/total sales ratio, is not made available by the Datastream International
database. `# obs' reports the number of observations.
The foreign operations of the U.S. multinationals of our sample are grouped in six
geographical regions: Europe, U.K., Asia, Australia, Latin America and Africa. In
table 7.2, we provide information about the geographical dispersion of these foreign
trade and/or production activities. It is interesting to observe that the major inter-
national trading activities of the 935 U.S. multinationals included in our sample are
located in Europe, U.K. and Asia. While all companies active in Africa|with the
exception of one|seem to have trading and production relationships in the entire
world, particularly in Asia, it should be stressed that on average 80 percent of the
companies that have real operations in Asia, Australia, Latin America or Africa have
as well trading links in Europe. Finally, only very few ¯rms appear to be exclusively
focusing on one geographical region.13
7.3.2 Exchange Risk Factors
The data on the unexpected exchange rate changes is obtained from a survey among
market participants. Every second Monday of each calendar month Consensus Eco-
nomics of London publishes results from a survey among up to 150 professional
market participants and forecasting agencies for their subjective expectations of a
large number of exchange rates. Forecasts are made for a variety of horizons ranging
from 1 month to 24 months ahead.
For our panel, we obtain expectations on the Argentine peso, Australian dollar,
Brazilian real, Chilean peso, Chinese renminbi, Hong Kong dollar, Japanese yen,
Malaysian ringitt, Mexican peso, New Zealand dollar, South African rand, Singa-
porean dollar, South Korean won, Thai baht, euro, and United Kingdom pound
versus the United States dollar, for the period of November 1995 through December
2004.14 This period is of particular interest since it contains several ¯nancial crises,
the introduction of a single monetary currency unit, and several large changes in the
doesn't necessarily favor the detection of signi¯cant foreign exchange risk exposures, as these ¯rms
are more likely to hedge (with ¯nancial or operational strategies) their foreign exposures and to be
able to undertake these hedging activities at a lower cost.
1335 ¯rms are exclusively active in Europe (excluding the U.K.), 59 in the U.K., 28 in Asia, 9 in
Australia, 36 in Latin America and 1 is exclusively active in Africa.
14Prior to January 1999 we use expectations on the Deutschemark / U.S. dollar and calibrate
these expectations to U.S. Dollar / euro expectations.140 Using Survey Data to Test Propositions Regarding Exchange Risk Exposure
Table 7.2: Geographic Dispersion of the Foreign Activities of U.S. Firms
# obs Europe U.K. Asia Australia Latin Africa
America
Europe 683 ¡ 81:55% 77:16% 51:24% 53:00% 22:40%
U.K. 712 78:23% ¡ 72:47% 49:30% 50:56% 20:79%
Asia 639 82:47% 80:75% ¡ 52:90% 57:59% 24:73%
Australia 396 88:38% 88:64% 85:35% ¡ 70:45% 35:35%
Latin America 461 78:52% 78:09% 79:83% 60:52% ¡ 31:89%
Africa 164 93:29% 90:24% 96:34% 85:37% 89:63% ¡
Total sample 935 73:05% 76:15% 68:34% 42:35% 49:30% 17:54%
Notes. This table gives a brief description of the geographic dispersion of the foreign activities
of the U.S. multinational companies included in our sample. For instance, 78.23 percent of U.S.
multinational ¯rms that have real operations in the U.K. also have real operations in the rest of
Europe. `Total sample' give the percentage of ¯rms that have foreign operations in any of the 6
regions. The source is the 15th edition of the Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign
Countries.
level of some of the exchange rates.
Speci¯cally, for these currencies we obtain the consensus average expectations
that are made for 1, 3, and 12 months ahead.15 Consensus measures of expectations
are likely to perform better than the individual expectations that together make
the consensus. Although some individuals' forecast performance may be better than
others'|in terms of criteria like root mean squared errors|it is di±cult to identify a
priori who these individuals are, in particular since forecast performance is generally
not constant through time. As surveys aggregate the expectations from many market
participants, the information in consensus measures is thus usually superior, which
may be due to an e®ect similar to the Bayesian model averaging or due to the
fact that the common components of the forecasts are implicitly ¯ltered out in the
consensus value.
Although the survey participants have a few days time to return their expecta-
tions, we learned that the vast majority send their forecasts by e-mail on the Friday
before the publication day (usually second Monday of the month). We consider this
Friday to be the day on which the expectations are formed. On this Friday, we
obtain spot exchange rate series to match with the survey data. All spot rate series
are obtained through Datastream and origin from either Reuters or Barclays Bank
International. To verify that the information sets of market participants are not too
diverse, all of the analyses throughout this study were re-estimated using spot data
from various days surrounding this Friday, yet the overall results remained virtually
unchanged.
Typical concerns when using survey data in any setting are whether this data
re°ects the true market's expectations, whether the expectations are biased because
of strategic behavior from the panelists, or whether forecasts from surveys are of any
good in an out-of-sample forecast setting|a criteria that has often been put forward
to evaluate the quality of survey expectations. It should be noted that for survey data
15We excluded the 24-month ahead expectations for this would considerably reduce the number
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in the present setting it is only important that the survey expectations re°ect the
market's sentiment at the time they are formed, that is, the survey data should re°ect
expectations, nothing more than that. While it is not the primary concern that the
expectations outperform other forecasting techniques, there is general consensus
that expectations from surveys in general perform no worse than any other forecast
technique. In general, we can learn much about the usefulness of survey-measures
of expectations from related ¯elds. Ang et al. (2007), for instance, provide recent
evidence that aggregate expectations from various surveys on in°ation consistently
deliver better forecasts than time-series models, models based on the yield curve,
and forecasts based on the Phillips curve, which highlights the usefulness of survey
measures of expectations. Elliott and Ito (1999) ¯nd that in the foreign exchange
market portfolio's based on survey expectations produce small, but positive, pro¯ts.
We proceed by de¯ning the natural logarithm of the current spot rate on a
particular currency l at time t as sl;t and the natural logarithm of the k-period
ahead survey-based consensus expectation for that particular exchange rate formed
at time t for delivery at time t + k as se
l;t;t+k and make the assumption that the
survey-based expectations equal the unobserved `true' market observation up to a
white noise random error, such that se
l;t;t+k = sE
l;t+k + ²l;t+k. The ex-post realized
change in the exchange rate over the last k-period can then be decomposed in an
`anticipated' component and an `unanticipated' (or noise) component:
sl;t ¡ sl;t¡k = (se
l;t¡k;t ¡ sl;t¡k) + (sl;t ¡ se
l;t¡k;t): (7.3)
The expectations for the individual currencies are grouped together to construct
6 region-speci¯c indices. A particular region is indicated as j. The indices are
region-speci¯c trade-weighted exchange rate indices16 that translate the evolution
of one or more foreign currencies of the same geographical region towards the U.S.
dollar. They are computed as a weighted average of spot and survey-based expected
















where nj is the number of countries included in a particular region j, expl is the
export °ow from the U.S. towards country l and impl the import °ow from country
l towards the U.S. The weights of the region-speci¯c indices, updated monthly, are
based on each country's proportion of trade (expl + impl) in the total import and
export °ows of the region with the U.S. (
Pnj
l=1(expl + impl)) as reported by the
Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census Bureau.
16Following Jorion (1990) and Dominguez and Tesar (2001a,b), exchange rate indices are parsi-
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Table 7.3: Summary Statistics of Realized and Unexpected Exchange Rate Change
Index/rate Mean Median Stdev Skew Kurt BJ
a) 1 month forecast horizon
Realized Euro ¡0:0019 ¡0:0033 0:0381 0:5132 2:6627 5:3501¤
U.K. Pound 0:0047 0:0031 0:0282 0:2489 2:4854 2:3493
Asian index 0:0028 0:0013 0:0233 0:4479 4:9737 21:5328¤¤¤
Australian index 0:0023 0:0048 0:0370 0:0425 2:7053 0:4313
Latin American index 0:0087 0:0055 0:0313 0:1827 4:1218 6:3797¤¤
South African Rand 0:0061 0:0125 0:0610 0:1431 4:1303 6:2310¤¤
Unexpected Euro ¡0:0058 ¡0:0097 0:0433 0:2425 2:3298 3:1365
U.K. Pound 0:0058 0:0049 0:0293 0:2691 2:6414 1:9168
Asian index 0:0013 0:0034 0:0246 0:0899 5:0353 19:1353¤¤¤
Australian index 0:0063 0:0049 0:0427 0:3359 2:9418 2:0840
Latin American index ¡0:0023 ¡0:0080 0:0326 0:2476 3:8906 4:7590¤
South African Rand 0:0024 0:0105 0:0689 0:0131 4:0840 5:3883¤
b) 3 month forecast horizon
Realized Euro ¡0:0023 ¡0:0042 0:0578 0:1009 2:2217 2:9629
U.K. Pound 0:0086 0:0049 0:0379 0:5456 2:9246 5:4842¤
Asian index 0:0046 0:0026 0:0370 0:3459 4:6231 14:2676¤¤¤
Australian index 0:0012 ¡0:0009 0:0585 0:0435 2:4220 1:5660
Latin American index 0:0169 0:0135 0:0407 0:5049 3:4697 5:6839¤
South African Rand 0:0152 0:0231 0:0968 0:1914 3:7619 3:3325
Unexpected Euro ¡0:0142 ¡0:0129 0:0639 ¡0:1225 2:3071 2:4759
U.K. Pound 0:0100 0:0090 0:0402 0:1137 3:1200 0:3028
Asian index 0:0029 0:0058 0:0396 0:0698 4:6204 12:1241¤¤¤
Australian index 0:0168 0:0075 0:0666 0:2267 2:4249 2:4575
Latin American index ¡0:0088 ¡0:0171 0:0432 0:7111 3:1778 9:4143¤¤¤
South African Rand 0:0049 0:0194 0:1118 0:0663 3:1121 0:1381
c) 12 month forecast horizon
Realized Euro ¡0:0079 ¡0:0110 0:1179 0:2720 2:1088 4:9966¤
U.K. Pound 0:0201 0:0226 0:0706 ¡0:1567 2:1635 3:6571
Asian index 0:0116 ¡0:0114 0:0711 0:6065 2:8667 6:8259¤¤
Australian index 0:0030 ¡0:0130 0:1328 ¡0:0478 2:2094 2:9068
Latin American index 0:0507 0:0384 0:0759 0:4899 3:1282 4:4759
South African Rand 0:0480 0:0782 0:2046 ¡0:6359 2:6804 7:8813¤¤
Unexpected Euro ¡0:0484 ¡0:0659 0:1245 0:2015 2:0764 4:6536¤
U.K. Pound 0:0226 0:0326 0:0741 ¡0:5129 2:3636 6:6790¤¤
Asian index 0:0211 ¡0:0010 0:0775 0:5422 2:6945 5:8183¤
Australian index 0:0514 0:0222 0:1381 0:1875 2:1192 4:2001
Latin American index ¡0:0304 ¡0:0518 0:0804 0:3895 2:3098 4:9641¤
South African Rand 0:0022 0:0320 0:2273 ¡0:3195 2:1781 4:9673¤
Notes. This table presents summary statistics for 1-, 3-, and 12-month expected and unexpected
log price changes for the period of November 1995 until December 2004.
Table 7.3 provides summary statistics of these region-speci¯c indices. Since all
series are in natural logarithms, we can interpret the ¯gures as percentage changes.Empirical Design 143
Several consistencies emerge. First of all, the median and standard deviation of the
unexpected exchange rate change are generally larger than the realized change. This
implies that the role of currency changes in previous exposure literature that focus on
realized changes is potentially understated. In addition, if unexpected changes are
larger and more volatile than actual changes, market participants underestimated
most of the change or even missed the direction of the exchange rate change, and
hence most of the change comes at a surprise for investors. Finally, most changes
are skewed to the right, which indicates that there are some large appreciations in
the currencies over the sample period under investigation, while there is no apparent
evidence of lepto- or platykurtosis.
7.4 Empirical Design
Following the extensive literature on foreign exchange rate exposure we measure the
¯rm-speci¯c exchange rate sensitivity, called ¯rm-speci¯c exposure, as the e®ect of
exchange rate changes (whether anticipated or not) on the value of a ¯rm in excess
of the global market's reaction to foreign exchange rate movements17:
Ri;t = ®i + ¯iRm;t + °iµt + ²i;t; (7.6)
where Ri;t designates the total return of ¯rm i over the period t¡k until t,18 Rm;t the
global stock market return over the period t¡k until t, ¯i ¯rm i's return sensitivity
to market °uctuations, µt the change in the exchange risk factor from period t ¡ k
until t, °i ¯rm i's exposure to exchange rate changes independent of the e®ect these
variations have on the overall market, and ²i;t denotes the white noise error term.
The proxy for the market portfolio used in this study is the CRSP value-weighted
U.S. market index as provided by the CRSP database.19 20
The coe±cient °i is the so-called foreign exchange risk exposure measure. It de-
scribes the sensitivity of ¯rm i's stock returns to changes in exchange rates. As we
de¯ne foreign exchange rate movements as the evolution of one or more foreign cur-
rencies towards the U.S. dollar, the appreciation of the home currency corresponds
to a positive change in the exchange risk factor µt. Consequently, we expect °i to
be negative for an exporter, since a U.S. dollar appreciation causes U.S. exports
to get more expensive in terms of the foreign currencies, leading potentially to a
17See Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion (1990) for instance.
18In contrast to work that looks at the return over only 1 period, in this chapter we match the
return period with the length of the forecast period of the survey-based exchange rate forecasts.
19If °i is zero, this doesn't imply that ¯rm i has no exposure. It implies that ¯rm i has the same
exchange risk exposure as the market portfolio.
20Including the stock market return in equation 7.6 dramatically reduces the residual variances
of the regression. In addition, the market return implicitly controls for the value-relevant macroe-
conomic factors that are correlated with the exchange rates. As suggested by Bodnar and Wong
(2003) this measurement of a ¯rm's exposure estimate improves (somewhat) the precision of the
exposure elasticity estimates, but more importantly, improves the interpretation of a ¯rm having
zero ¯rm-speci¯c exposure. The empirical result of having zero exposure no longer implies that
the ¯rm's value is independent of exchange rates; rather, a zero ¯rm-speci¯c exposure implies that
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fall in foreign demand and foreign sales revenue. On the other hand, the importing
¯rm will bene¯t from an appreciation of the domestic currency, resulting hence in a
positive °i coe±cient.21 The sign of °i becomes less distinct for companies that are
both importing and exporting. These ¯rms' sensitivity to exchange rate °uctuations
depends on the elasticity of the ¯rms' demand for foreign goods relative to the elas-
ticity of the foreign markets' demand for the ¯rms' goods (Adler and Dumas, 1984;
He and Ng, 1998).
Testing for exchange risk exposure entails taking a stand on a number of em-
pirical issues. One of these issues addresses the relevance of the composition of
the exchange rate factor. To the extent that U.S. multinationals are not uniformly
involved in the international environment, the traditional approach that uses a com-
mon trade-weighted exchange rate index to measure ¯rms' currency exposure has a
major drawback: by implicitly assuming that ¯rms are identically exposed to the
exchange rates (and the relative weights) included in the index, the model is system-
atically misspeci¯ed for any ¯rm whose foreign activities doesn't correspond to the
speci¯c weighting structure of the index|distorting, hence, both the measurement
and the detection of foreign exchange risk exposure (Dominguez and Tesar, 2001a,b;
Ihrig, 2001). To alleviate this problem, we create for each U.S. multinational a ¯rm-
and region- speci¯c exchange risk factor based on each individual ¯rm's trading or
production links with one of the six following regions: Europe (EU), United King-
dom (UK), Asia (AS), Australia (AU), Latin America (LA) and South Africa (SA).
The model then becomes:
ri;t = ®i + ¯irm;t +
X
j2J
°j;iDj;iµj;t + ²i;t; (7.7)
for the set J = fEU, UK, AS, AU, LA, SAg. °j;i measure ¯rm i's exchange risk
exposure towards the euro, the U.K. pound, Asian index, the Australian dollar,
Latin American index and the South African rand. Dj;i describe the presence of
¯rm i's real activities in Europe, the U.K., Asia, Australia, Latin America and




1 if ¯rm i has foreign operations in region j
0 otherwise (7.8)
Finally, µj;t denotes the °uctuation of the price of one euro, U.K. pound, basket
of Asian currencies, Australian dollar, basket of Latin American currencies and
South African rand, respectively, in terms of U.S. dollars over the period t ¡ k
until t. As outlined in section 7.3.2, a crucial question regarding the estimation of
foreign exchange risk exposure is the speci¯cation of `unanticipated' exchange rate
movements. In contrast to the vast majority of the previous empirical studies that
use changes in realized spot exchange rates as a proxy for `unanticipated' currency
movements, we adopt a new empirical speci¯cation and de¯ne the `unanticipated'
part of the exchange rate movement as the di®erence between the `realized' exchange
21Similarly, ¯rms with net exposed foreign denominated liabilities will gain with a strengthening
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rate movement and the consensus average expectation of foreign exchange market
participants. The exchange risk factor µj;t is therefore de¯ned as
µj;t =
½
xj;t ¡ xj;t¡k for `realized' exchange rate changes
xj;t ¡ xe
j;t¡k for `unanticipated' exchange rate changes (7.9)
Finally, it should be mentioned that the assumption of constant variance made in
the afore-mentioned models may be violated in some cases|invalidating hence the
test statistics of the ordinary least squares regression. We therefore test the residuals
²i;t of the model in equation 7.7 for the presence of time-varying heteroscedasticity
using the test Engle derived from the Lagrange multiplier principle. If we do not
reject the null hypothesis that the residuals ²i;t present no heteroscedasticity we
estimate the afore-mentioned models using ordinary least squares. Otherwise a
GARCH(1,1) speci¯cation is added to the initial model and all the parameters are
estimated using maximum likelihood and generated by the Berndt et al. (1974)
algorithm (Bollerslev et al., 1992):
²i;t = ¹i;thi;t; (7.10)
where
h2
i;t = ±i + ¿i²2
i;t¡k + ºih2
i;t¡k; (7.11)
and where hi;t denotes the conditional standard deeviation of the residuals over the
period t until t+k, ±i, ¿i and ºi unknown parameters, and ¹i;t represents the white
noise error term.
7.5 Results
Table 7.4 presents the parameter estimates of the augmented market model described
in equation 7.7, where the exchange risk factor µt is determined by the `realized'
exchange rate change (see equation 7.9). In line with Muller and Verschoor (2006a),
results show that the disaggregation of the worldwide trade-weighted exchange rate
index into six region-speci¯c trade-weighted currency indices improves the detection
and estimation of foreign exchange risk exposures: in comparison with Jorion (1990)
who ¯nds that out of 287 U.S. multinational corporations only 5 percent exhibit
signi¯cant exchange risk exposure and Choi and Prasad (1995) who detect 15 percent
of 409 multinationals to be signi¯cantly exposed, our 1-month horizon estimation of
foreign exposure reveals that more than 31 percent of the 935 U.S. multinationals
included in our sample are signi¯cantly a®ected by currency °uctuations.
Table 7.4 reports, furthermore, the distribution of the ¯rm- and region-speci¯c
exposure coe±cients °j;i for the 3- and 12-month measurement intervals. Consistent
with Chow et al. (1997b,a) and Muller and Verschoor (2006b), our ¯ndings show
that there is a general increase in the number of signi¯cant positive and negative
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Table 7.4: Exposure to Realized Exchange Rate Changes
1-month horizon 3-month horizon 12-month horizon
# obs mean N* mean N* mean N*
® 935 ¡0:0058 ¡0:0188 ¡0:1096
(0:0012) (0:0029) (0:0145)
¯ 935 1:0668 1:0432 0:9124
(0:0255) (0:0304) (0:0439)
°EU 683 ¡0:0788 65 0:0893 92 ¡0:2059 256
(0:0357) 9:52% (0:0472) 13:47% (0:0809) 37:48%
°UK 712 0:0407 77 ¡0:0817 89 ¡0:2898 243
(0:0399) 10:81% (0:0583) 12:50% (0:1031) 34:13%
°AS 639 ¡0:0685 112 ¡0:1274 142 ¡0:4901 333
(0:0410) 17:53% (0:0569) 22:22% (0:0960) 52:11%
°AU 396 ¡0:2262 66 ¡0:2144 68 ¡0:2198 143
(0:0407) 16:67% (0:0534) 17:17% (0:0798) 36:11%
°LA 461 ¡0:2814 85 ¡0:6233 121 ¡0:6752 217
(0:0325) 18:44% (0:0581) 26:25% (0:1014) 47:07%
°SA 164 0:0412 16 0:0135 16 0:0822 57
(0:0361) 9:76% (0:0422) 9:76% (0:0705) 34:76%
298 392 668
31:87% 41:93% 71:44%
Notes. The numbers are summary statistics of the cross-sectional distribution of the ordinary least
squares parameter estimates, or the maximum likelihood (using the Berndt et al., 1974, algorithm)
parameter estimates of equations 7.10 and 7.11. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard de-
viations are in parentheses. `N*' designates the numbers of ¯rms with a documented signi¯cant
exchange rate exposure to the regional currency index (at least at the 5 percent signi¯cance level).
`# obs' are the numbers of ¯rms that have activities in the corresponding geographical regions.
icantly exposed22 U.S. multinationals increases from 298 for the 1 month horizon,
to 392 for the 3 month horizon and to 668, corresponding to more than 70 per-
cent of the total sample, for the 12 month horizon. Two arguments may explain
the stronger perceptibility of long-term foreign exchange risk exposures: either ¯-
nancial managers ignore their shareholders' long-term exposure to foreign exchange
risk in their risk-management activities|respectively are not able to properly hedge
long-term economic currency exposure that is unrelated to known transactions|or
investors make systematic errors when characterizing the impact of short-term ex-
change rate movements on ¯rm value, rendering hence the relationship statistically
and economically di±cult to identify in the short-run.
In table 7.5, the sensitivity of U.S. multinationals to `unanticipated' currency
°uctuations is described. As we already expected, the use of 'unanticipated' ex-
change rate movements in the estimation of foreign exchange risk exposure|in line
with the seminal de¯nition of currency exposure (Shapiro, 1975; Hodder, 1982; Adler
and Dumas, 1984; Levi, 1994)|strongly increases the precision and signi¯cance of
U.S. multinationals' exposure estimates. Table 7.5 reports that almost 50 percent of
the U.S. multinational corporations of our sample are exposed to at least one region-
22A company is de¯ned as `exposed' to exchange rate risk if its market-adjusted returns are
statistically signi¯cantly a®ected by changes in currency values. Throughout the chapter the 5
percent signi¯cance level is adopted therefore.Results 147
Table 7.5: Exposure to Unanticipated Exchange Rate Changes
1-month horizon 3-month horizon 12-month horizon
# obs mean N* mean N* mean N*
® 935 ¡0:0020 ¡0:0236 ¡0:1217
(0:0011) (0:0030) (0:0145)
¯ 935 1:0534 1:0656 0:8990
(0:0234) (0:0309) (0:0433)
°EU 683 0:0682 118 0:1639 136 ¡0:0980 229
(0:0309) 17:28% (0:0513) 19:91% (0:0869) 33:53%
°UK 712 0:0103 144 0:2927 174 ¡0:0738 247
(0:0435) 20:22% (0:0679) 24:44% (0:1278) 34:69%
°AS 639 ¡0:0445 143 ¡0:1591 222 ¡0:4081 359
(0:0415) 22:38% (0:0558) 34:74% (0:0959) 56:18%
°AU 396 ¡0:2543 103 ¡0:1324 104 ¡0:3052 166
(0:0388) 26:01% (0:0558) 26:26% (0:0921) 41:92%
°LA 461 ¡0:3320 141 ¡0:5379 143 ¡0:6673 189
(0:0322) 30:59% (0:0583) 31:02% (0:1016) 41:00%
°SA 164 0:0077 27 0:0085 32 0:1161 54
(0:0391) 16:46% (0:0475) 19:51% (0:0754) 32:93%
466 489 669
49:84% 52:30% 71:55%
Notes. The numbers are summary statistics of the cross-sectional distribution of the ordinary least
squares parameter estimates, or the maximum likelihood (using the Berndt et al., 1974, algorithm)
parameter estimates of equations 7.10 and 7.11. Newey and West (1987) corrected standard de-
viations are in parentheses. `N*' designates the numbers of ¯rms with a documented signi¯cant
exchange rate exposure to the regional currency index (at least at the 5 percent signi¯cance level).
`# obs' are the numbers of ¯rms that have activities in the corresponding geographical regions.
speci¯c trade-weighted exchange risk factor, when forecasts are made for 1 month
ahead. This result is in ¯erce contrast to the 30 percent of signi¯cantly exposed
companies reported at the same forecast horizon of table 7.4. The exposure due to
unanticipated exchange rate changes increases to over 70 percent of the ¯rms in the
sample when the forecast horizon lengthens.
The improvement of the detection of foreign exchange risk exposure reveals that
U.S. shareholder wealth is less a®ected by movements in spot exchange rates than by
the extent to which currency values change by more or less than had been expected
by foreign exchange market participants. It seems therefore that foreign exchange
rate expectations are re°ected in the value of U.S. multinationals before their matu-
rity and that investors make use of the publicly available forecasts of foreign exchange
market participants. The stronger perceptibility of foreign exchange risk exposure
may, however, as well be generated by ¯nancial managers' implemented hedging
strategies. It would seem that ¯nancial managers build their hedging strategies on
their perception of the overall market sentiment regarding the future evolution of ex-
change rates|leaving hence the company unprotected vis-µ a-vis unexpected currency
shocks.23
23Loderer and Pichler (2000) o®er empirical support to the argument that managers use their
perception of future exchange rate movements for the implementation of their hedging strategies.
To the extent that these perceptions are close to the consensus average value of the overall market,
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Several additional points can be made from the empirical ¯ndings presented in
table 7.5. The evolution of currency exposure estimates across the 1-, 3- and 12-
month horizon shows that, in line with our ¯ndings in table 7.4, there is a general
increase in the sensitivity of U.S. companies to unexpected exchange rate movements
from the 1-month to the longer 12-month horizon. It appears furthermore that most
U.S. multinationals active in Asia, Australia and Latin America tend to gain (su®er)
from a depreciation (appreciation) of the related currencies, indicating that they are
primarily importing from these regions. On the other hand, ¯rms with links to South
Africa appear to behave like net-exporters. U.S. multinationals' foreign operations
in Europe are more di±cult to characterize as it appears that U.S. companies have a
short-term net-exporter exposure while they have a long-term net importer exposure
to both the U.K. pound and euro.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the increase in the perceptibility and preci-
sion of the exposure to `unanticipated' versus `realized' currency °uctuations tends
to disappear when lengthening the return horizon. This would indicate that in-
vestors use more the information contained in the short-term forecasts, than in the
longer-term forecasts. A question that naturally arises is whether this ¯nding can be
explained by the possibility that long-term expectations are more heterogeneous|
that is, market participants disagree more about the value of the exchange rates
that are farther in the future than those in the nearby future. This would be an
interesting development, for it would question whether long-term expectations are
mean-reverting. If expectations are mean-reverting, one would expect that these
expectations are homogeneous, since the market should be aware of the underlying
fundamental exchange rate or in general the rate which the exchange rate would
revert to. This issue asks for a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the
formation of expectations and in particular the role of dispersion of beliefs in the
foreign exchange market.
Anderson et al. (2005) show that heterogeneous beliefs matter for asset pric-
ing in that it is a priced factor in traditional factor asset pricing models and is a
good predictor of return volatility in out-of-sample tests. Heterogeneity is usually a
missing factor when it comes to predicting returns and volatility. Yet, little is doc-
umented about the microstructure of the foreign exchange market and the role of
heterogeneous beliefs therein. Ito (1990) was the ¯rst to document the existence of
heterogeneous beliefs in the foreign exchange market and ¯nds that market partici-
pants show evidence of wishful thinking in that their expectations of future Japanese
yen / U.S. dollar rates re°ect what they would like to see happening to the exchange
rate.24 Beine et al. (2007) furthermore ¯nd that this heterogeneity can be in°uenced
by several market factors, like expected or unexpected o±cial central bank interven-
tion. Finally, there seems to be some evidence of sequential herding in the foreign
exchange market in that forecasters are connected to each other through leader and
imitation patterns, though the evidence is not strong (see, e.g. Beine et al., 2003).
We can learn much from the results in chapter 5. There we showed that the
companies to be exposed to `unexpected' exchange rate movements.
24For instance, exporters are biased towards a depreciation of the currency while importers are
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dispersion in beliefs, as measured by the coe±cient of variation, increases with the
forecast horizon. Market participants obviously disagree more about the future path
of the exchange rate when the horizon lengthens. Second, we showed that hetero-
geneity in beliefs is not constant across time. There have been periods of increased
dispersion of beliefs. For example, in the aftermath of the Asian currency crisis
(i.e. after 1997) there has been an obvious increase in uncertainty about the future
direction of the Japanese yen, since the dispersion in beliefs increased dramatically.
For these reasons, it seems plausible that the fact that on the short run the role
of expected exchange rate changes is higher than on the longer run can at least be
partly attributed to the fact that long-term expectations are more heterogeneous and
therefore the market is more in disagreement. The lack of consensus regarding the
future evolution of exchange rates may indeed cause investors to be more reluctant
to incorporate these expectations in their valuation process as well as managers to
be less likely to build their hedging strategies based on strongly dispersed forecasts.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter is devoted to clarifying the nature, de¯nition and estimation of for-
eign exchange risk exposure. While the measurement and detection of foreign ex-
change risk exposure has evolved and will continue to improve over time, there is
no doubt that the present study o®ers a unique and far-reaching contribution to
the existing literature. The focus on the original de¯nition of foreign exchange risk
exposure|characterized as the sensitivity of ¯rm value to unexpected exchange rate
movements|leads us indeed to confront the traditional approach used to estimate
foreign exchange risk exposure (for instance in Jorion, 1990) with a new empirical
speci¯cation that takes the market's perception of the future path of exchange rates
into account. By explicitly testing the implications of the generally accepted as-
sumption that unexpected currency movements may be approximated by changes
in realized spot exchange rates, we do not only provide an explanation for the weak
evidence reported in previous empirical work but increase as well our understanding
of the economic signi¯cance and mechanism of foreign exchange risk exposure|
generating hence crucial information for any ¯nancial or political decision dealing
with foreign exchange risk.
On an extensive dataset consisting of 935 U.S. multinationals with real opera-
tions in foreign countries we perform a thorough comparison of the impact of `re-
alized' versus `unexpected' exchange rate movements on U.S. shareholder wealth
from 1995 to 2005. Overall our results con¯rm the fact that the use of ¯rm-speci¯c
trade-weighted regional exchange risk factors increases the precision and detection
of foreign currency exposure estimates. The use of a unique survey-based foreign
exchange rate expectations data set allows us moreover to measure in how far the
extent to which exchange rates change by more or less than had been expected by
foreign exchange market participants a®ects ¯rm value and to verify in how far in-
vestors and managers use these publicly disclosed forecasts in their decision-making
process. There is strong evidence that U.S. multinationals are less a®ected by actual150 Using Survey Data to Test Propositions Regarding Exchange Risk Exposure
currency movements than by the extent to which these movements depart from what
had been expected by the market. Indeed, we ¯nd that more than 49 percent, ver-
sus less than 32 percent, of U.S. multinationals are a®ected by `unexpected', versus
`realized', exchange rate movements. Investors hence seem to incorporate publicly
available foreign exchange rate expectations in the valuation of U.S. multinationals
before these expectations mature. The stronger perceptibility of foreign exchange
risk exposure may, however, as well be caused by the fact that ¯nancial managers
use market expectations to design selective hedging strategies|causing hence the
company to be unprotected vis-µ a-vis unexpected currency shocks.Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Expectations in Financial Markets
In this study we have attempted to shed new light on the role of expectations in
¯nancial markets, in particular on expectations about future exchange rates and
interest rates. We have addressed several issues that so far have received only little
attention. Speci¯cally, we examined the rationality of interest rate expectations, the
role of time-varying term premia in explaining the failure of the forward premium
puzzle in the term structure literature, the role of dispersion of beliefs in expecta-
tions about future exchange rates, the role of time-varying weights of chartist and
fundamentalist rules in forecasting future foreign exchange and the role of expected
versus unanticipated exchange rate changes in generating exchange risk exposure.
The use of survey-based measures of exchange and interest rate expectations
plays a central role in the entire study and hence provides an important contri-
bution to the existing literature. Using aggregate and disaggregate measures of
expectations of important players in the market allows us to get a reasonable view
of the general sentiment about the future level of interest and exchange rates in the
market. Although the use of survey data is not unique in the foreign exchange and
interest rate literature, the topics we address are all important debates in the ¯eld
and have never been approached from a survey-based point of view.
Also, the use of disaggregate measures of expectations is relatively new. Only
in the past years have disaggregate measures of expectations become available and
the use of these tools in ¯nancial research has opened some old discussions and has
provided room for new ones. The next section gives a detailed overview of the most
important ¯ndings from this research.
8.2 Summary
In chapter 2 we analyzed over 20 years of empirical and theoretical evidence on
the role of survey-based measures of expectations in the foreign exchange market.
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First, the chapter analyzed the evidence on the failure of the forward exchange rate
as an unbiased predictor of future spot exchange rates and in particular looks at
whether the failure is primarily attributable to time-varying risk premiums, to the
failure of the rationality assumption, or to a combination of both. The consensus
emanating from the literature is that the failure of the forward premium unbiasedness
is attributable both to irrational expectations and to the existence of time-varying
risk premiums. Survey-based expected future spot rates are biased estimates of the
true level of the future spot rate and that expectations are irrational in that agents
do not use all available information e±ciently.
Second, the chapter reviewed the various attempts to model the time-variation
in the risk premium in foreign exchange and investigates whether the use of survey-
based measures of expectations adds in this modeling. There is some support for
the claim that survey-based risk premiums can be modeled by simple, low-order
time series models, while most fundamentals-based models have little explanatory
power overall. But the evidence also shows that aggregate measures of risk premi-
ums average out much of the heterogeneity and richness of the individual survey
expectations.
Third, chapter 2 looked at the performance of market participants when forecast-
ing future exchange rates and tries to ascertain whether individual market partici-
pants can outperform a simple random walk forecast. While pro¯t-based criterions
to asses the forecast performance of individual market participants appear forecast-
ers are successful in forecasting the directional change, a random walk model remains
pre-eminent. Fourth, the chapter looked at the role of heterogeneity in survey-based
forecasts and how this heterogeneity can shed new light on some of the puzzles in the
foreign exchange market, like the excess volume of foreign exchange trade. There
appears to be indeed a causal relationship that exists between the volatility in the
market, the heterogeneity of expectations, and the volume in the market. And ¯-
nally, the chapter reviewed the literature on fundamentalist- versus chartist-type
of forecast techniques and how the interaction between these two techniques has
changed over the years. It seems that over the years the role of macroeconomic fun-
damentals in forecasting has declined, and are only used for longer-term forecasts.
Still, most market participants use a combination of these two techniques. The in-
creased use of chartist techniques and the presence of noise traders in the foreign
exchange market can, at least to some extent, explain the large trading volume in
the foreign exchange market.
In chapter 3 we questioned whether expectations of future interest rates are
made in a rational manner. The chapter documented one of the well-documented
anomalies in the ¯eld, namely that implied forward interest rates are biased estimates
of future interest rates. This is the so-called forward premium puzzle. Using a
unique data set of survey-based interest rate forecast for a large set of international
interest rates, where forecasts are made for several periods of di®erent length in
the future, we tried to ascertain whether the anomaly occurs because interest rate
expectations are irrational. Speci¯cally, the survey data allowed us to perform two
separate tests, namely one in which we examine whether the expectations by market
participants are biased and another that examines whether market participants useSummary 153
all information that is available to them in an optimal manner. While short-term
interest rates sometimes appear to be rational, we corroborate the earlier ¯nding
in the literature that (longer-term) interest rate forecasts are not rational and that
agents do not use all available information in an e±cient manner.
The chapter also tried to ¯nd alternative approaches to the rational expecta-
tions model and investigated whether survey-based expectations are better charac-
terized by learning behavior or mean-reversion behavior. Market participants ap-
pear to underreact to current (unanticipated) changes in the interest rate at the 3-
and 12-month horizons, as implied by stabilizing expectations models. Our results
demonstrated that the pattern across long-term forecast horizons for foreign cur-
rency deposits corroborates the long-held view that speculation based on long-term
expectations may be stabilizing.
In chapter 4 we analyzed an alternative explanation for the forward premium
puzzle, namely whether the premium that market participants require for investing
at a certain horizon changes over time. We called this premium the time-varying
term premium. Strong evidence of the existence of a time-varying term premium
in the short end of the term structure of our deposits. Term premia furthermore
are commonly positive, suggesting that the premia could be liquidity premia as
proclaimed by the liquidity preference theory. A closer look at the time-varying
term premia reveals a large degree of persistence. Next, we turned to a novel ¯eld,
namely that of trying to explain the time-variation in the premia by means of survey-
measures of expectations. We ¯nd that low-order versions of ARMA models describe
the term premia well, although low-order ARCH e®ects are also present in several
interest rate deposits. Finally, we ¯nd that although continental European term
premia show lower degrees of persistence than other premia, the former nevertheless
are time-variant and the survey respondents did make irrational forecasts, in that
not all available information to market participants was used e±ciently.
In chapter 5 we examined whether expectations of future exchange rates are
dispersed in that agents have di®erent beliefs about the future path of the exchange
rates. We approached this problem using a panel of survey forecasts for the major
three exchange rates along several forecast horizons. Using several measures for
dispersion of beliefs we ¯nd that there are distinct periods of high and low dispersion
where market participants disagree as to what will happen to the future level of the
exchange rates. For the Japanese Yen versus the U.S. Dollar we even ¯nd that the
Asian crisis that began in mid-1997 preceded an almost two-year period of highly
increased dispersion of beliefs for this rate.
We tested formally whether beliefs are dispersed using an extreme value ap-
proach by examining the tail index estimates and conclude that the frequency at
which extremist di®erences in expectations among market participants occurs, is
higher than that what would occur under normality. We furthermore attempted to
answer whether dispersion of beliefs occurs because market participants hold dif-
ferent information sets or whether they attach di®erent weights to commonly-held
elements from their information sets. We ¯nd evidence for both. The extent of
individual expectations seems to increase as the forecast horizon lengthens. The
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di®erences increases as the forecast horizon lengthens. These results corroborate the
fundamentalist/chartist literature.
Finally, we examined whether dispersion of beliefs is in°uenced by volatility in
the market, as suggested earlier by the increased dispersion of beliefs in the aftermath
of the Asian crisis, or that heterogeneity in expectations is causal to the volatility
in the market. We ¯nd that a causal relation between market volatility and trader
heterogeneity tends to be signi¯cant and positive for di®erent measures of both
trader heterogeneity and market volatility.
Chapter 6 built upon the previous chapter and looked at whether dispersion of
beliefs occurs because market participants use di®erent types of rules to forecast fu-
ture foreign exchange. We made the distinction between fundamentalist and chartist
rules, where the former relies on various (macroeconomic) variables and the latter
exclusively on the own history of the exchange rate. We developed a theoretical
framework where the expected change by a particular market participant is a time-
varying weighted average of a fundamentalist and chartist rule. We constructed
several forecast rules that are both easy to construct and for which we know that
all market participants have access to. These rules are a purchasing power parity-
based rule, a rule that relies on a version of the monetary model, an extrapolative
expectations rule, and a moving average rule.
These rules are then implemented in thee di®erent models. The ¯rst model was
a linear one where the weights of the various forecast techniques are assumed to be
constant during the entire forecast period. We ¯nd that both chartist and funda-
mentalist rules are used by market participants when forecasting future exchange
rates, but that the way in which the rules are used di®er. Chartist rules seem, on
average, be used on all forecast horizons, but the evidence is strongest at the shorter
spectrum. An extrapolative rule has clearly preference over a moving average rule.
On the other hand, fundamentalist rules are used predominantly for longer-term
forecasts.
The second model was a heterogeneous agent model that allows for switching
between the chartist and fundamentalist techniques, where switching is based on
the relative success of each rule in the previous period. Although the switching
parameter itself is only signi¯cant in a few number of cases, the introduction of the
switching mechanism improves the performance of the model overall. This is a sign
that switching between forecast rules occurs.
The last model considered was a state-space model where the weights are assumed
to follow a simple, low order time-series process. It appears that the weights for the
fundamentalist rules are all very persistent, in that they all seem to follow a near-unit
root process. In other words, the weight the market attaches to the fundamentalist
rule does not change dramatically from one period to the other. On the other hand,
the signi¯cance of the chartist weights is much lower, indicating that there is much
lower persistence in the weight that is attached to chartist rules and that the market
is much quicker to switch from using a chartist rule from one period to the other. We
also ¯nd that the correlations between the fundamentalist and chartist `weights' are
predominantly negative. This is an interesting ¯nding, for it shows that although the
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exchange, the use of the rules is not independent from one another: an increase in
the use of a fundamentalist rule is paired with a decrease (albeit imperfect) use of a
chartist rule, and vice versa.
In chapter 7 we re-examined the existence of foreign exchange risk exposure
by explicitly making the distinction between expected and unanticipated exchange
rate movements. For a sample of 935 U.S. multinationals with real operations in
foreign countries we performed a thorough comparison of the impact of `realized'
versus `unanticipated' exchange rate movements on U.S. shareholder wealth from
1995 to 2005. Overall our results con¯rm the fact that the use of ¯rm-speci¯c
trade-weighted regional exchange risk factors increases the precision and detection
of foreign currency exposure estimates. The use of a unique survey-based foreign
exchange rate expectations data set allows us moreover to measure in how far the
extent to which exchange rates change by more or less than had been expected
by foreign exchange market participants a®ects ¯rm value and to verify in how far
investors and managers use these publicly disclosed forecasts in their decision-making
process. There is strong evidence that U.S. multinationals are less a®ected by actual
currency movements than by the extent to which these movements depart from what
had been expected by the market. Indeed, we ¯nd that more than 49 percent, versus
less than 32 percent, of U.S. multinationals are a®ected by `unexpected', versus
`realized', exchange rate movements. Investors hence seem to incorporate publicly
available foreign exchange rate expectations in the valuation of U.S. multinationals
before these expectations mature. The stronger perceptibility of foreign exchange
risk exposure may, however, as well be caused by the fact that ¯nancial managers
use market expectations to design selective hedging strategies|causing hence the
company to be unprotected vis-µ a-vis unexpected currency shocks.
8.3 Lessons from Expectations and Suggestions for
Future Research
We will conclude this study by discussing and interpreting several striking facts
that emerge consistently from the survey data on foreign exchange and interest rate
expectations. These `facts' can be seen as a meta-analysis of the various chapters in
this study. One of the most striking facts that appears consistently in this study is
that the expectations by market participants are irrational in that not only market
participants make consistent biases in forecasting future interest rates and exchange
rates, but also miss the direction of the change and do not use all information that
is available to them in an optimal way. This ¯nding is not unique to this study,
but appears consistently in the literature (see, for instance, chapters 2, 3 and 4).
The rejection of the rationality assumption in the empirical corner of the ¯nancial
economics literature leads to a discussion about the use of the rationality assumption
in theoretical ¯nance work. We feel that it is time to move away from this assumption
and instead work towards a bounded rationality approach where we acknowledge the
fact that expectations are generated under restricted conditions, by heterogeneous
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A second striking fact is the apparent mean reversion in the expectations of inter-
est rates and exchange rates. It appears that expectations eventually revert back to a
long-term equilibrium rate, provided that the time between the the current situation
and the moment of reversion is su±ciently large. Although the exact details around
the mean reversion are still open for debate, in our study we already document ev-
idence of mean-reversion at a forecast horizon of 1 year. Interestingly, the use of
macro-economic techniques like a purchasing power parity-based rule and variables
like money supply, production and interest rates are still incorporated in these mean-
reverting exchange rate expectations. Thus, although the failure of macro-economic
techniques in forecasting future foreign exchange is well documented, market partic-
ipants still use the information in these variables when forming their beliefs about
future rates.
A third issue that appears in this study is the importance of the role of hetero-
geneity in the expectations of future exchange rates. For many years the literature
has taken a single representative agent approach. In this study we have shown
empirically that the expectations of market participants are signi¯cantly dispersed.
Moreover, we showed that there is a relationship between this dispersion in ex-
pectations and the volatility in the market that runs in both directions. This is
an important ¯nding, for it implies that dispersion of beliefs is not a stand-alone
feature, but is embedded in the day-to-day operations of the market, and is likely
re°ected in the exchange rates (or at minimum the volatility thereof). A better
understanding of the beliefs of individual market participants therefore should help
us understanding some of the anomalies presently in the market and should also
help in understanding the changes in volatility, volume, and in the end a better
understanding of why ¯nancial instability (and ultimately, ¯nancial crises) occurs.
The relationship between dispersion and the condition in the market, like volatility
and volume is complex, though, and we belief that more research in this matter is
warranted. The availability of survey-based measures of expectations should be an
important tool in this research.
A fourth striking issue in this study is the large `understatement' in the literature
about how multinational corporations are exposed to foreign exchange risk. There
is a vast literature the extent to which multinational corporations are exposed to
foreign exchange risk, when they have part of their operations or sales in foreign
countries. The mainstream literature focuses on the realized changes in exchange
rates as a starting point for the measurement of foreign exchange exposure. Yet, the
use of survey-data allows us to truly measure exposure in the correct way, namely
by looking at that part of the change in exchange rate that is unexpected. Only
when an unexpected change in the exchange rate is related to the pro¯tability of the
multinational company can we truly speak about foreign exchange risk exposure.
This study reports an amazing increase in the number of U.S. companies that are
exposed to currency risk. The use of survey data has also in this ¯eld, once again,
proven its usefulness. We therefore suggest that future research in the ¯eld of expo-
sure should focus much more on this `unexpected' component and suggest the use
of survey data as an extremely useful tool in this debate.
A ¯fth fact that we would like to document is the presence of time-variation inLessons from Expectations and Suggestions for Future Research 157
many functions of interest rate and exchange rate expectations. From a method-
ological point of view the assumption of, for instance, constant foreign exchange
risk exposure, constant term premia, and constant weights on fundamentalist and
chartist forecast rules, has been very appealing. Constant parameters are easy to
estimate and often directly originate from the theory. Yet, this study has shown by
various di®erent ways that the assumption of constant behavior does not hold. We
¯nd, for instance, evidence of time-varying term premia and time-varying weights of
the use of various forecast rules. Therefore, we belief that future empirical research
should focus much more on the role of time-varying parameters. Not only does this
add more °exibility to models, it also is much more in line with the actual situation
in the various market and is in line with the behavior of actual market participants.
Several issues still remain unanswered and should provide an interesting avenue
for future research. First, this research has not touched upon the important area
of disaggregate interest rate expectations. Important lessons may be learned in this
unexplored ¯eld. For instance, Chionis and MacDonald (2002) show that the use
of aggregate measures of the interest rate risk premium average out much of the
heterogeneity and richness of the individual survey expectations. Much more can
be learned from the individual behavior of market participants. Similarly, it should
be noted that we do not address several other important topics in the ¯eld, such
as the role of expectations of stock prices, in°ation rates, and other macroeconomic
variables. Individual survey-based expectations on most macroeconomic variables is
available nowadays, yet has not been used in academic literature. We feel that this
is an important and promising avenue for future research.
Also, the increased availability of disaggregate survey-based measures of foreign
exchange, interest rate, and macro-economic expectations prompts for a better set
of tools than have been used so far. We feel that there is plenty of opportunities for
research when advanced panel data techniques are combined with the information
in these disaggregated databases. This study has not been written from a panel-
based point of view, but we do acknowledge that there is de¯nitely room for future
research.
Finally, we believe that the combination of various types of expectations should
allow a discussion about some of the well-established ¯nancial and economic rules
and parities. For instance, combining expectations data on interest rates and ex-
change rates can shed new light on, for instance, the uncovered interest parity debate.Bibliography
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In ¯nanciÄ ele markten spelen verwachtingen een bijzonder belangrijke rol. Het gedrag
dat personen vertonen die deelnemen aan ¯nanciÄ ele markten, de zogenaamde `markt-
participanten', wordt vaak gedreven door wat deze marktparticipanten verwachten
van de toekomst. Veel theoretische modellen en theorieÄ en in de ¯nanciÄ ele litera-
tuur veronderstellen een relatie tussen de huidige stand van zaken en de verwachte
toekomstige situatie.
Dit proefschrift probeert bij te dragen aan een vernieuwende kijk op de rol van
deze verwachtingen en in het bijzonder aan wat we kunnen leren van verwachtingen.
Het domein van dit onderzoek beperkt zich tot twee markten: de markt voor vreemde
valuta's en de kapitaalmarkt. Binnen dit domein stellen wij ons de volgende kern-
vragen: 1) In hoeverre worden verwachtingen binnen de rentemarkt op een rationele
manier gevormd?, 2) Zijn termijnpremies, die doorgaans aanwezig zijn binnen rente-
contracten, tijdsvariÄ erend en wat is de oorzaak hiervan?, 3) In hoeverre verschillen de
verwachtingen van marktparticipanten over de toekomstige stand van wisselkoersen
en waar is dit verschil aan te wijten?, 4) In hoeverre gebruiken marktparticipanten
verschillende technieken om toekomstige wisselkoersen te voorspellen?, 5) Wat is de
invloed van verwachte wisselkoersveranderingen op het risico dat bedrijven lopen,
wanneer ze aan wisselkoersrisico worden blootgesteld?
Een kernpunt van dit proefschrift is dat we deze vijf vragen proberen te analyse-
ren aan de hand van verwachtingsdata die door enquÄ etes zijn verzameld. Verwach-
tingsdata worden verkregen door aan verschillende marktparticipanten te vragen
naar hun subjectieve mening ten aanzien van de toekomstige stand van een variabele,
bijvoorbeeld een vreemde valuta of een rente. Door meerdere van deze individuele
verwachtingen te bundelen hopen we een beter idee te krijgen over hoe marktpar-
ticipanten `denken', wat hun algemene verwachting is, maar ook hoe de verschillen
die optreden, een invloed hebben op de huidige ontwikkelingen in de markt.
Hoofdstuk 2 bekijkt de rol van verwachtingsdata binnen de markt voor vreemde
valuta, waarbij empirische en theoretische studies over een tijdspanne van ruim 20
jaar worden geanalyseerd. Het hoofdstuk behandelt vijf vraagstukken. Ten eerste
wordt bekeken waarom de prijs van termijncontracten een consistent slechte voor-
speller is van de prijs van toekomstige vreemde valuta's, ondanks dat dit theoretisch
wel het geval zou moeten zijn.
Ten tweede wordt gekeken naar verschillende technieken om tijdsvariatie in risi-
copremies te verklaren en te modelleren en in hoeverre het gebruik van verwach-
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tingsdata hierbij een rol kan spelen. Eenvoudige tijdreeksmodellen (zoals die van
de ARMA-klasse en de GARCH-klasse) blijken redelijk goed deze tijdsvariatie te
kunnen verklaren, terwijl macro-economische modellen gebaseerd op fundamentele
variabelen dit niet kunnen. Er moet echter wel een kanttekening worden geplaatst:
wanneer geaggregeerde verwachtingsdata (een gemiddelde van de verwachtingen van
meerdere marktparticipanten) worden gebruikt, gaat veel van de heterogeniteit en
voorspelkracht van de individuele verwachtingen verloren. Het gevolg hiervan is dat
de door ons bekeken modellen nooit echt goed presteren in het verklaren van deze
tijdsvariatie.
Als derde wordt gekeken naar de mate waarin marktparticipanten toekomstige
wisselkoersen kunnen voorspellen. Alhoewel voorspeltechnieken gebaseerd op de
winst die marktparticipanten kunnen behalen, adequaat zijn in het voorspellen van
de richting van de wisselkoersverandering (toename of afname), blijkt de meest
basale voorspeltechniek (die van geen verandering) nog steeds moeilijk te overtre®en
door meer geavanceerde technieken.
Ten vierde wordt gekeken naar de rol van heterogeniteit in de verwachtingsdata
(ofwel: de mate waarin verwachtingen van marktparticipanten van elkaar verschillen)
en hoe deze heterogeniteit een nieuw licht kan werpen op bestaande onregelmatighe-
den, zoals het bijzonder hoge volume van vreemde valuta's die dagelijks wereldwijd
worden verhandeld. Er blijkt ruimte te zijn voor een complex causaal verband tussen
de mate waarin verwachtingen van elkaar verschillen, de volatiliteit van de markt en
het verhandelde volume van vreemde valuta's.
Tenslotte bekijkt hoofdstuk 2 de literatuur over de verschillen in voorspeltech-
nieken die worden gebruikt door marktparticipanten die als `fundamentalist' wor-
den getypeerd (marktparticipanten die voornamelijk gebruik maken van macro-
economische variabelen) en `technische' analisten (marktparticipanten die hun anal-
yse voornamelijk baseren op het verleden van de wisselkoers) en hoe de interactie
tussen deze technieken door de jaren heen is veranderd. Macro-economische varia-
belen hebben de laatste jaren aan belang ingeboet en worden voornamelijk gebruikt
voor langetermijnvoorspellingen. Toch geven marktparticipanten aan van beide tech-
nieken gebruik te maken. De toename van het gebruik van technische analyse en
aanwezigheid van handelaren die vanwege puur speculatieve doeleinden deelnemen
aan de markt voor vreemde valuta's, kan ten dele verklaren waarom het dagelijks
verhandelde volume van vreemde valuta's zo groot is. De bevindingen in hoofdstuk
2 geven de aanzet voor de vijf empirische hoofdstukken die hierop volgen.
Enkele technieken die in hoofdstuk 2 bekeken zijn, passen we in hoofdstuk 3 toe
op het gebied van rentecontracten. Centraal in het hoofdstuk staan de geconsta-
teerde systematische voorspelfouten in de prijsvorming van termijncontracten, zoals
die al jaren worden beschreven in de literatuur. We stellen ons de vraag in hoeverre
renteverwachtingen op een rationele manier worden gevormd en in hoeverre ver-
werping van deze rationaliteit de de slechte voorspelkracht van termijnkoersen kan
verklaren. Door gebruik te maken van een unieke dataset van renteverwachtingen
kunnen we twee criteria voor rationeel gedrag toetsen, namelijk of verwachtingen
voorspelfouten bevatten en of marktparticipanten alle informatie gebruiken die voor
hen beschikbaar is bij het vormen van hun verwachtingen. Beide criteria zijn maat-175
staven voor rationeel gedrag. Alhoewel kortetermijnverwachtingen op een rationele
wijze gevormd worden, wordt voor langetermijnverwachtingen geen optimaal gebruik
gemaakt van alle beschikbare informatie en kunnen deze verwachtingen derhalve ook
niet als rationeel worden bestempeld.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook gekeken naar alternatieve manieren om verwachtingen
te modelleren. Twee mogelijke karakteristieken van verwachtingen staan hierin cen-
traal, namelijk of marktparticipanten leergedrag vertonen (het leren van eerdere
fouten bijvoorbeeld) en of verwachtingen uiteindelijk convergeren naar een langeter-
mijnniveau. We tonen aan dat kortetermijnverwachtingen in beperkte mate en
langetermijnverwachtingen in hoge mate stabiel zijn, omdat zij gemiddeld genomen
nooit boven een toekomstig niveau uitschieten en omdat marktparticipanten waarde
hechten aan hun eigen fouten in het verleden.
In hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we een alternatieve verklaring voor de termijncontracten
anomalie (zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 3), namelijk of de systematische voor-
spelfouten in de prijsvorming van termijncontracten mede ontstaan doordat de pre-
mie die marktparticipanten doorgaans verlangen wanneer ze voor langere termijn in
de toekomst investeren, varieert met de tijd. Deze premie wordt derhalve ook een
tijdsvariÄ erende termijnpremie genoemd. We constateren niet alleen dat deze pre-
mies positief aanwezig zijn (wat erop zou kunnen duiden dat deze premies ontstaan
doordat rentecontracten met een korte looptijd veel liquider zijn dan rentecontracten
met een lange looptijd), maar ook dat de premies sterk tijdsvariÄ erend zijn en erg
persistent.
Het hoofdstuk probeert daaropvolgend een verklaring voor deze tijdsvariatie te
geven, door middel van een aantal tijdreeksmodellen. We beschrijven dat ondanks
het feit dat eenvoudige modellen van de ARMA-klasse in staat zijn om de tijdsvari-
atie na te bootsen, volatiliteitsclusters in de data aanleiding geven te veronderstellen
dat GARCH-modellen het meest geschikt zijn om deze tijdsvariatie te modelleren.
Dit betekent dat de tijdsvariatie in de termijnpremies ontstaat door de verandering
in risicoperceptie van de marktparticipanten.
In hoofdstuk 5 maken we de overstap naar het gebied van de wisselkoersen. We
bekijken de mate waarin de verwachtingen van marktparticipanten fundamenteel
van elkaar verschillen. We noemen dit `heterogeniteit' in de verwachtingen. De vra-
gen die in dit hoofdstuk centraal staan zijn: 1) Hoe dient heterogeniteit statistisch
gezien aangetoond te worden?, 2) Wat is de verklaring voor deze heterogeniteit?, 3)
Hoe kan de heterogeniteit in causaal verband worden gebracht met de volatiliteit
in de markt? Door opnieuw gebruik te maken van verwachtingsdata voor de drie
belangrijkste wisselkoersen tonen we aan dat er speci¯eke perioden zijn waarin deze
heterogeniteit hoog is en speci¯eke perioden waarin zij laag is en dat de mate van
heterogeniteit toeneemt met de voorspelhorizon. Zo heeft de AziÄ ecrisis binnen de
wisselkoersliteratuur een aanzienlijk e®ect gehad op de heterogeniteit van wissel-
koersverwachtingen in de daaropvolgende periode.
We tonen de heterogeniteit van wisselkoersverwachtingen aan door middel van
een concept uit de literatuur over extreme waarden, te weten de staartindex van de
verdeling van de verwachtingen. De mate waarin extreme verschillen in verwach-
tingen voorkomen, is vele malen hoger dan wat normaal gezien het geval zou moeten176 Nederlandse Samenvatting
zijn. We tonen aan dat deze heterogeniteit niet alleen te verklaren is doordat markt-
participanten informatie gebruiken in hun voorspelproces die uniek is voor ieder van
hen, maar ook doordat zij gezamenlijke informatie verschillend interpreteren. Ook
tonen we aan dat bij verschillende voorspeltermijnen marktparticipanten de nadruk
leggen op andere technieken: als de voorspeltermijn toeneemt, nemen de verschillen
tussen marktparticipanten die gebruik maken van fundamentele voorspeltechnieken
(bijvoorbeeld aan de hand van macro-economische data) af. Tenslotte bekijkt hoofd-
stuk 5 het causale verband tussen de heterogeniteit in de verwachtingen enerzijds
en de volatiliteit in de wisselkoersmarkt anderzijds. Wanneer er goede maatstaven
worden gebruikt om zowel de heterogeniteit als de marktvolatiliteit te meten, dan
blijkt er een complexer, in twee richtingen werkend causaal verband te bestaan.
Heterogeniteit beÄ ³nvloedt de volatiliteit in de markt, maar door een `feedback'-regel
wordt de heterogeniteit ook weer beÄ ³nvloed door de volatiliteit in de markt.
Hoofdstuk 6 bouwt verder op de materie in hoofdstuk 5 door te analyseren of
heterogeniteit wellicht ontstaat doordat er twee fundamenteel verschillende soorten
marktparticipanten opereren in de markt voor vreemde valuta's. We maken het
onderscheid tussen fundamentalisten en technische analisten. We ontwikkelen een
theoretisch kader waarbij elke verwachting een gewogen gemiddelde is van de voor-
spelling van een fundamentalistische en technische voorspeltechniek. De fundamen-
talistische voorspeltechnieken zijn gebaseerd op de koopkrachtpariteittechniek en
een techniek gebaseerd op het monetaire model. De technische voorspeltechnieken
zijn een extrapolerende techniek en een techniek gebaseerd op het voortschrijdend
gemiddelde van de wisselkoers in het verleden.
Deze technieken worden vervolgens geÄ ³mplementeerd in drie modellen. Het eerste
model is een lineair model waarbij de gewichten van de verschillende voorspeltech-
nieken constant worden gehouden. Het blijkt dat zowel fundamentele als technische
analyse wordt gebruikt door marktparticipanten, maar dat de manier waarop deze
gebruikt worden, verschilt. Ondanks het feit dat technische analyse wordt gebruikt
voor zowel korte- als langetermijnvoorspellingen, ligt de nadruk met name op het
gebruik op de korte termijn. Een extrapolerend voorspelmodel heeft in ieder geval
altijd de voorkeur boven een model gebaseerd op het voortschrijdend gemiddelde van
de wisselkoers in het verleden. Voorspelmodellen gebaseerd op macro-economische
variabelen worden echter hoofdzakelijk gebruikt voor langetermijnvoorspellingen.
Het tweede model is een `heterogene agenten model' dat de mogelijkheid toelaat
dat `agenten' (in dit geval de marktparticipanten) wisselen van de ene naar de andere
voorspeltechniek, waarbij de mate van wisselen bepaald wordt door het relatieve
succes van elke techniek in het verleden. Alhoewel de parameter die de mate van
wisselen in dit model beschrijft, niet altijd signi¯cant is, leidt de introductie ervan
wel tot een verbetering van de kwaliteit van dit model ten opzichte van het lineaire
model. Dit is een bewijs dat het wisselen van voorspeltechnieken daadwerkelijk
plaatsvindt in de praktijk.
Tenslotte bekijken we een `state-space' model waar de gewichten tijdsvariÄ erend
zijn en deze gewichten een eenvoudig tijdreeksproces worden verondersteld te vol-
gen. De gewichten voor de fundamentele technieken blijken alle persistent te zijn,
aangezien deze een bijna-eenheidswortelproces volgen. Met andere woorden, het177
gewicht dat marktparticipanten geven aan een fundamentele voorspeltechniek ve-
randert niet aanzienlijk in de ene periode ten opzichte van de andere. Anderzijds
blijken de gewichten voor de technische voorspeltechnieken aanzienlijk minder per-
sistent te zijn, een teken dat marktparticipanten niet `trouw' blijven aan een tech-
nische voorspeltechniek en sneller geneigd zijn deze niet te gebruiken, ondanks dat
men deze technieken wellicht eerder wel gebruikt heeft. Ook tonen we aan dat de
correlatie tussen fundamentele en technische gewichten voornamelijk negatief is. Dit
is een interessante bevinding: beide typen voorspeltechnieken worden gebruikt, in
die zin dat een toename in het gebruik van de ene techniek doorgaans leidt tot een
(gedeeltelijke) afname in het gebruik van de andere techniek en vice versa.
Tenslotte bekijken we in hoofdstuk 7 de materie van wisselkoersrisico opnieuw aan
de hand van verwachtingsdata door expliciet gebruik te maken van het verschil tussen
gerealiseerde en onverwachte wisselkoersveranderingen. Gebruik makende van een
steekproef van 935 Amerikaanse multinationals met activiteiten in het buitenland
onderzoeken we het e®ect van een gerealiseerde en een onverwachte wisselkoersveran-
dering op de waarde van deze bedrijven gedurende de periode 1995{2005. Onze resul-
taten tonen aan dat het gebruik van bedrijfsspeci¯eke en regio-gewogen maatstaven
voor wisselkoersrisico de precisie en aantoonbaarheid van wisselkoersrisico signi¯-
cant verhoogt. Verder leidt het gebruik van verwachtingsdata tot de mogelijkheid
om de invloed van zowel gerealiseerde als onverwachte wisselkoersveranderingen op
de waardeverandering van deze multinationals te vergelijken. Bovendien kunnen
we met verwachtingsdata bekijken in hoeverre marktparticipanten deze verwachte
veranderingen als informatie hebben meegenomen in hun prijsvormingsproces.
Er is statistisch sterk bewijs dat de waardeverandering van de multinationals
minder beÄ ³nvloed wordt door gerealiseerde wisselkoersveranderingen dan door on-
verwachte veranderingen. Van meer dan 40 procent (ten opzichte van 32 procent)
van deze bedrijven wordt de waarde beÄ ³nvloed door onverwachte (ten opzichte van
gerealiseerde) wisselkoersveranderingen. Bij het totstandkomen van de waarde van
multinationals gebruiken investeerders dus de informatie die publiekelijk beschikbaar
is betre®ende de verwachte verandering van wisselkoersen.Curriculum Vitae
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